MORAL PHILOSOPHY

G. COMBE.

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MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

THE SELECT WORKS OF GEORGE COMBE.

THE SERIES INCLUDES:—

The Constitution of Man.
Moral Philosophy.
Science and Religion.
Discussions on Education.
&c. &c.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY;

OR,

THE DUTIES OF MAN, CONSIDERED IN HIS INDIVIDUAL, DOMESTIC, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS CAPACITIES.

BY

GEORGE COMBE.

CASSELL AND COMPANY, LIMITED:
LONDON, PARIS & MELBOURNE.
THE CASSELL PUBLISHING COMPANY,
NEW YORK.
1893.

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PREFACE.

GEORGE COMBE'S "Moral Philosophy" is the sequel and complement to his "Constitution of Man." It does not profess to be a systematic treatise on ethics, dealing either with the doctrine of utility on the one hand, or with the theory of abstract virtue on the other. Its less ambitious, but not less useful, aim is to show how the principles of human nature developed in the author's "Constitution of Man" may be applied to the conduct of life—by man as an individual, and as a domestic, a social, and a religious being. In this, as in the former work, the point on which the author mainly insists is the moral and religious obligation of the natural laws as a revelation of the Divine will, which cannot be disregarded with impunity. He shows, in particular, how entirely his teaching coincides with that of Christianity, and how unreasonable it is to regard the apostles of natural science as inimical to Divine truth as revealed in the Bible. Nothing, indeed, is more striking than the reverent and truly pious spirit in which the argument is conceived and conducted. There is not one of the statements in the Lectures, which were denounced as impious, and even atheistical, when they were delivered, that is not now accepted as a mere commonplace, and as a social and religious axiom.

In his original Preface—written in 1840—the author gave the following account of the origin and the objects of the work:—

"In 1832 an Association was formed by the industrious classes of Edinburgh for obtaining instruction in useful and entertaining knowledge by means of lectures, to be delivered in the evenings after business hours. These lectures were designed to be popular with regard to style and illustration, but systematic in arrangement and extent. One evening in each week was devoted to Astronomy, two nights to Chemistry; and I was requested to deliver a course on Moral Philosophy, commencing in November, 1835, and proceeding on each Monday evening till April, 1836. The

audience amounted to between five and six hundred persons of both sexes.

"In twenty lectures, addressed to such an audience, only a small portion of a very extensive field of science could be touched upon. It was necessary also to avoid as much as possible abstract and speculative questions, and to dwell chiefly on topics simple, interesting, and practically useful. These circumstances account for the introduction of many local topics of illustration, and of such subjects as Suretyship, Arbitration, Guardianship, and some others, not usually treated of in works on Moral Philosophy ; and also for the occasional omission of that rigid application of the principles on which the work is founded to the case of every duty, which would have been necessary in a purely scientific treatise. These principles, however, although not always stated, are never intentionally departed from.

"The lectures were reported by one of my hearers in an Edinburgh newspaper, and excited some attention. I did not consider them worthy of being presented to the public as a separate work ; but they were reprinted in a small duodecimo volume in the United States. The edition was speedily purchased by the American public. Encouraged by that indication of approval, I published the entire lectures in Edinburgh in 1840, with such additions and improvements as they appeared to stand in need of."

Edinburgh, 1893.

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MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

LECTURE I.

The Foundations of Moral Science.

In an introductory discourse on Moral Philosophy, the lecturer unfortunately has few attractions to offer. His proper duty is not to descant in glowing terms on the dignity of moral investigations, and on the importance of sound ethical conclusions both to public and to private happiness, but to give an account of the state in which his science at present exists, and of what he means to teach in his subsequent prelections. No subject can be conceived more destitute of direct attraction. I must beg your indulgence, therefore, for the dryness of the details and the abstractness of the argument in this Lecture. I make these observations that you may not feel discouraged by an appearance of difficulty in the commencement. I shall use every effort to render the subject intelligible; and I promise you that the subsequent discourses shall be more practical and less abstruse than the present.

Our first inquiry is into the basis of morals regarded as a *science:* that is, into the *natural* foundations of moral obligation.

There are two questions—very similar in terms, but widely different in substance—which we must carefully distinguish. The one is, What actions *are* virtuous? and the other, What *constitutes* certain actions virtuous? The answer to the first question, fortunately, is not difficult. Most individuals acknowledge that it is virtuous to love our neighbour, to reward a benefactor, to discharge our proper obligations, to love God, and so forth; and that the opposite actions are vicious. But when the second question is put, *Why* is an action virtuous—*why* is it virtuous to love our neighbour, or to manifest gratitude or piety?—the most

contradictory answers are given by philosophers. The discovery of what constitutes virtue is a fundamental point in moral philosophy; and hence the difficulties of the subject meet us at the very threshold of our inquiries.

It is generally admitted that man has received definite mental and bodily constitutions; and it is in them and their relations that we must seek for the natural foundations of virtue. The knowledge of these constitutions possessed by philosophers has been very imperfect; and hence has arisen much of the obscurity of moral science.

Philosophers have never been agreed about the existence or the non-existence in man even of the most important moral emotions—such as benevolence and the sentiment of justice; and being uncertain whether such emotions exist or not, they have had no stable ground from which to start in their inquiries into the foundation of virtue. Since the publication of the writings of Hobbes, in the seventeenth century, there has been a constant series of disputes among philosophers on this subject.

Hobbes taught that the laws which the civil magistrate enjoins are the ultimate standards of morality. Cudworth endeavoured to show that the origin of our notions of right and wrong was to be found in a particular faculty of the mind, which distinguished truth from falsehood. Mandeville declared that the moral virtues were mere sacrifices of self-interest made for the sake of public approbation, and calls virtue the "political offspring which flattery begot upon pride." Dr. Clarke supposed virtue to consist in acting according to the fitnesses of things. Mr. Hume endeavoured to prove that "utility is the constituent or measure of virtue." Dr. Hutcheson maintained that it originated in the dictates of a moral sense.

Dr. Paley does not admit such a faculty, but declares virtue to consist "in doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." Dr. Adam Smith endeavours to show that sympathy is the source of moral approbation. Dr. Reid, Mr. Stewart, and Dr. Thomas Brown maintain the existence of a moral faculty. Sir James Mackintosh describes conscience to be compounded and made up of associations. Dr. Ralph Wardlaw, of Glasgow, in a work on Ethics, published in 1834, can see nothing in conscience except judgment.

Here, then, we discover the most extraordinary conflict of opinion prevailing concerning the foundations of virtue.

But this does not terminate the points of dispute among philosophers in regard to moral science. Its very existence—nay, the very possibility of its existence—as a philosophical study, is called in question. Dr. Wardlaw says: "Suppose that a chemist were desirous to ascertain the ingredients of water. What estimate should we form of his judgment if, with this view, he were to subject to his analysis a quantity of what had just passed in the bed of a sluggish river through the midst of a large manufacturing city, from whose common sewers and other outlets of impurity it had received every possible contamination which, either by simple admixture or by chemical affinity, had become incorporated with the virgin purity of the fountain; and if, proceeding on such analysis, he were to publish to the world his *thesis* on the composition of water? Little less preposterous must be the conduct of those philosophers who derive their ideas of what constitutes rectitude in morals from human nature *as it is*. They analyse the water of the polluted river, and refuse the guide that would conduct them to the mountain spring of its native purity."—(*Christian Ethics*, p. 44.)

In these remarks Dr. Wardlaw evidently denies the possibility of discovering in the constitution of the human mind a foundation for a sound system of Ethics. He supports his denial still more strongly in the following words:—"According to Bishop Butler's theory, human nature is '*adapted to virtue*' *as evidently as* '*a watch is adapted to measure time.*' But suppose the watch, by the perverse interference of some lover of mischief, to have been so thoroughly disorganised—its moving and its subordinate parts and power so changed in their collocation and their mutual action—that the result has become a constant tendency to go backward instead of forward, or to go backwards and forwards with irregular, fitful, and ever-shifting alternation, so as to require a complete remodelling, and especially a readjustment of its great moving power, to render it fit for its original purpose: would not this be a more appropriate analogy for representing the present character of fallen man?

"The whole machine is out of order. The mainspring has been broken; and an antagonistic power works all the parts of the mechanism. It is far from being with human nature, as Butler, by the similitude of the watch, might lead his readers to suppose. The watch, when duly adjusted, is only, in his phrase, 'liable to be out of order.' This

might suit for an illustration of the state of human nature at *first*, when it received its constitution from its Maker. But it has lost its appropriateness *now*. That nature, alas! is not now a machine that is merely 'apt to go out of order'—it *is* out of order; so radically disorganised that the grand original power which impelled all its movements has been broken and lost, and an unnatural power, the very opposite of it, has taken its place; so that it cannot be restored to the original harmony of its working, except by the interposition of the omnipotence that framed it." (P. 126.)

The ideas here expressed by Dr. Wardlaw are entertained, with fewer or more modifications, by large classes of highly respectable men belonging to different religious denominations.

How, then, amidst all this conflict of opinion as to the foundation and even as to the possibility of the existence of moral science, is any approach to certainty to be attained?

Dr. Wardlaw speaks of the human mind as of a watch that has the tendency to go backwards, or fitfully backwards and forwards; as having its mainspring broken; and as having all the parts of the mechanism worked by an antagonistic power. This description might appear to be sound to persons who, without great analytic powers of mind, resorted to no standard except the dark pages of history by which to test its truth; but, assuming that the brain is a congeries of faculties, I ask, Who formed it? Who endowed it with its functions? Only one answer can be given—it was God. When, therefore, we study the mental faculties and their functions, we go directly to the fountain-head of true knowledge regarding the natural qualities of the human mind. Whatever we shall ascertain to be written in them is doctrine imprinted by the finger of God Himself. If we are certain that these faculties were constituted by the Creator, we may rest assured that they have all a legitimate sphere of action.

Our first step is to discover this sphere, and to draw a broad line of distinction between it and the sphere of their abuses; and here the superiority of our method over that of philosophers who studied only their own consciousness and the *actions* of men becomes apparent. They confounded abuses with uses; and because man is liable to abuse his faculties, they drew the conclusion, prematurely and unwarrantably, that his whole nature is in itself evil.

Individual men may err in attempting to discover the functions and legitimate spheres of action of the mental faculties, and may dispute about the conclusions thence to be drawn ; but this imputes no spuriousness to the faculties themselves. There they stand; and they are as undoubtedly the workmanship of the Creator as the sun, the planets, or the entire universe itself. Error may be corrected by more accurate observations ; and whenever we interpret their constitution aright, we shall assuredly be in possession of Divine truth.

Revelation necessarily pre-supposed a capacity in those to whom it is addressed of comprehending and judging of its communications ; and Dr. Wardlaw's argument appears to me to deny man's natural capacity to understand and interpret either Scripture or the works and institutions of the Creator. He discards natural ethics entirely, and insists that Scripture is our only guide in morals. Archbishop Whately, on the other hand, who is not less eminent as a theologian, and certainly more distinguished as a philosopher, than Dr. Wardlaw, assures us that "God has *not revealed to us a system of morality such as would have been needed for a being who had no other means of distinguishing right and wrong.* On the contrary, the inculcation of virtue and the reprobation of vice in Scripture are in such a tone as *seem to presuppose a natural power*, or a capacity for acquiring the power to distinguish them. And if a man, denying or renouncing all claims of natural conscience, should practise, without scruple, everything he did not find expressly forbidden in Scripture, and think himself not bound to do anything that is not there expressly enjoined, exclaiming at every turn—

'Is it so nominated in the bond?'

he would be leading a life very unlike what a Christian's should be."

In my humble opinion, it is only an erroneous view of human nature, on the one side or the other, that can lead to such contradictory opinions as these.

By observing the faculties of the mind, then, and the mental powers connected with them, we perceive that three great classes of faculties have been bestowed on man.

1. Animal Propensities.
2. Moral Sentiments.
3. Intellectual Faculties.

Considering these in detail, we do not find one of them that man has made or could have made himself. Man can create nothing. Can we fashion for ourselves a new sense, or add a new organ—a third eye, for instance—to those we already possess? Impossible! All those organs, therefore, are the gifts of the Creator; and in speaking of them as such, I am bound to treat them with the same reverence that should be paid to any of His other works. Where, then, I ask, do we, in contemplating the faculties, find the evidence of the mainspring being broken? Where do we find the antagonistic power which works all the mechanism contrary to the original design?

I cannot answer these questions: I am unable to discover either the broken mainspring or an antagonistic power. I see and feel—as who does not?—the crimes, the errors, and the miseries of human beings to which Dr. Wardlaw refers as proofs of the disorder of which he speaks; but science gives a widely different account of their origin. We observe, for example, that individual men commit murder or blasphemy, and we all acknowledge that this is in opposition to virtue; but we do not find a disposition to murder, or a faculty whose office it is to antagonise all the moral faculties, and to commit blasphemy. All that we discover is that man has been created an organised being; that, as such, he needs food for nourishment; that, in conformity with this constitution, he has received a stomach calculated to digest the flesh of animals and to convert it into aliment; and that he sometimes abuses the functions of the stomach: and when he does so, we call this abuse gluttony and drunkenness.

We observe, further, that in aid of his stomach he has received carnivorous teeth; and in order to complete the system of arrangements, he has received a propensity, prompting him to kill animals that he may eat them. In accordance with these endowments, animals to be killed and eaten are presented to him in abundance by the Creator. A man may abuse this propensity and kill animals for the pleasure of putting them to death—this is cruelty; or he may go a step further—he may wantonly, under the instigation of the same propensity, kill his fellow-men—and this is murder. But this is a widely different view of human nature from that which supposes it to be endowed with positively vicious and perverse propensities—with machinery having a tendency only to go backwards, or to go alternately and fitfully backwards and forwards. Those

individuals, then, who commit murder abuse their faculty of Destructiveness by directing it against their fellow-men.

Again, it is unquestionable that men steal, cheat, lie, blaspheme, and commit many other crimes; but we in vain look in the brain for faculties destined to perpetrate these offences, or for a faculty antagonistic to virtue, and whose proper office is to commit crimes in general. We discover faculties of Acquisitiveness, which have legitimate objects, but which, being abused, lead to theft; faculties of Secretiveness, which have a highly useful sphere of activity, but which, in like manner, when abused, lead to falsehood and deceit; and so with other organs.

These faculties, I repeat, are the direct gifts of the Creator, and if the mere fact of their existence be not sufficient evidence of this proposition, we may find overwhelming proof in its favour by studying their relations to external nature. Those who deny that the human mind is constitutionally the same now as it was when it emanated from the hand of the Creator generally admit that external nature at least is the direct workmanship of the Deity. They do not say that man, in corrupting his own dispositions, altered the whole fabric of the universe—that he infused into animals new instincts, or imposed on the vegetable kingdom a new constitution and different laws. They admit that God created all these such as they exist.

Now, in surveying vegetable organisation, we perceive production from an embryo—sustenance by food, growth, maturity, decay, and death—woven into the very fabric of their existence. In surveying the animal creation, we discover the same phenomena and the same results; and on turning to ourselves, we find that we too are organised, that we assimilate food, that we grow, that we attain maturity, and that our bodies die. Here, then, there is an institution by the Creator of great systems (vegetable and animal) of production, growth, decay, and death. It will not be doubted that these institutions owe their existence to the Divine will.

If it be asserted that men's delinquencies offended the Deity, and brought His wrath on the offenders, and that the present constitution of the world is the consequence of that displeasure, Philosophy offers no answer to this proposition. She does not inquire into the *motives* which induced the Creator to constitute the world, physical and mental, such as we see it; but in pointing to the existence

and constitution of vegetables, of animals, and of man, she respectfully maintains that all these God *did* constitute, and endow with their properties and relationships; and that in studying them we are investigating His genuine workmanship.

Now, if we find on the one hand a system of decay and death in external nature, animate and inanimate, we find also in man a faculty of Destructiveness which is pleased with destruction, and which places him in harmony with the order of creation. If we find, on the one hand, an external world, in which there exist fire calculated to destroy life by burning, water by drowning, and cold by freezing, ponderous and moving bodies capable of injuring us by blows, and a great power of gravitation exposing us to danger by falling; we discover, on the other hand, in surveying our own mental constitution, a faculty of Cautiousness, whose office it is to prompt us to take care and to avoid these sources of danger. In other words, we see an external economy admirably adapted to our internal economy; and hence we receive an irresistible conviction that the one of these arrangements has been designedly framed in relation to the other. External destruction is related to our internal faculty of Destructiveness; external danger to our internal faculty of Cautiousness.

I have frequently remarked that one of the most striking proofs of the existence of a Deity appears to me to be obtained by surveying the roots of a tree and its relationship to the earth. These are admirably adapted; and my argument is this:—The earth is a body which knows neither its own existence nor the existence of the tree: the tree also knows neither its own qualities nor those of the earth. Yet the adaptation of the one to the other is a real and useful relation, which we, as intelligent beings, see and comprehend. That adaptation could not exist unless a mind had conceived, executed, and established it. The mind that did so is not of this world; therefore a Deity, who *is* that mind, exists; and every time we look on this adaptation, we see His power and wisdom directly revealed to us.

The same argument applies, and with equal force, to the mental faculties and to external nature. We see natural objects threatening us with danger, and we find in ourselves a faculty prompting us to regard our own safety. This adaptation is assuredly Divine; but you will observe that if the adaptation be Divine, the things adapted must

also be Divine: the external world threatening danger must have been deliberately constituted such as it is; and the human mind must have been deliberately constituted such as it is, otherwise this adaptation could not exist.

Again, we find that the human body needs both food and raiment; and on surveying the external world, we discover that in a great portion of the earth there are winter's barren frosts and snows. But in examining the human mind, we find a faculty of Constructiveness, prompting and enabling us to fabricate clothing; and Acquisitiveness, prompting us to acquire and store up articles fitted for our sustenance and accommodation, so as to place us in comfort when the chill winds blow and the ground yields us no support. We discover also that Nature presents us with numberless raw materials, fitted to be worked up, by means of our faculties, into the very commodities of which our bodies stand in need.

All these gifts and arrangements, I repeat, are assuredly of Divine institution; and although individual men, by abusing the faculty of Constructiveness, oftentimes commit forgeries, pick locks, and perpetrate other crimes, and, by abusing Acquisitiveness, steal, this does not prove that these faculties are in themselves evil.

There is a wide difference, then, between Dr. Wardlaw's views and mine in regard to human nature. His broken mainspring and antagonist power are nowhere to be met with in all the records of real philosophy, while the crimes which he ascribes to them are accounted for by abuses of faculties clearly instituted by the Creator, having legitimate spheres of action, and wisely adapted to a world obviously arranged by Him in relation to them.

Dr. Wardlaw appears to have studied human nature chiefly in the actions of men, and he has not distinguished between the faculties bestowed by the Creator and the abuses of them, for which individual delinquents alone are answerable.

If these views be well founded, Moral Philosophy, as a scientific study, becomes not only possible, but exceedingly interesting and profitable. Its objects are evidently to trace the nature and legitimate sphere of action of all our bodily functions and mental faculties, and their relations to the external world, with the conviction that to use them properly is virtue, to abuse them is vice. These principles also, if sound, will enable us to account for the barren condition of Moral Philosophy as a science.

The numerous errors, the confusion and contradiction of previous moralists, are to be ascribed to their having no adequate physiological knowledge of the structure and functions of the body, and no stable philosophy of mind. In particular, they possessed no knowledge of the mental faculties, and no sufficient means of discriminating between what is natural and what is incidental to human conduct. Sir James Mackintosh remarks that "there must be primary pleasures, pains, and even appetites, which arise from no prior state of mind, and which, if explained at all, can be derived only from *bodily organisation;* for," says he, "if there were not, there could be no *secondary* desires. What the number of the underived principles may be is a question to which the answers of philosophers have been extremely various, and of which the consideration is not necessary to our present purpose. The rules of philosophising, however, require that causes should not be multiplied without necessity."

With all deference to Sir James Mackintosh's authority, I conceive that the determination of "the number of the underived principles" of mind is the first step in all sound mental science, and especially in ethics; and when he admits that these "can be derived only from bodily organisation," it is unphilosophical in him to add "that the rules of philosophising require that causes (faculties?) should not be multiplied without necessity." Who would think of attempting either to multiply or to diminish senses, feelings, or intellectual powers depending on "bodily organisation," unless he could multiply and diminish, make and unmake, corresponding bodily organs at the same time?

My object will be to expound the courses of action to which we are prompted by all our faculties when acting in harmonious combination; and I shall admit all actions to be virtuous or right which are approved of by these combined powers, and treat all as vicious or wrong which are disavowed by them; and my doctrine is that *it is accordance with the dictates of all the faculties, enlightened by knowledge harmoniously combined, which constitutes certain actions virtuous, and discordance with them which constitutes other actions vicious.*

We are now able to understand the origin of the various theories of the foundation of virtue to which I alluded at the commencement of this Lecture, and which have been the themes of so much discussion among philosophers.

Most of the authors whom I have quoted recognise one of these three great foundations of virtue: According to them, 1st, All actions are virtuous which tend to promote the happiness of sentient and intelligent beings, and they are virtuous because they possess this tendency; 2ndly, All actions are virtuous which are conformable to the will of God, and they are so for this reason, and no other; 3rdly, All actions are virtuous which are in conformity with the dictates of our moral sense or moral faculty, which conformity is the sole characteristic of virtue. The partisans of each of these foundations of virtue have denied the reality or the sufficiency of the other foundations.

Each of the moral sentiments produces the feeling of right and wrong in its own sphere. Benevolence proclaims cruelty to be wrong, and Veneration condemns profanity. But each is liable to err when it acts singly. There are men, for example, in whom Benevolence is very strong and Conscientiousness very weak, and who, following the dictates of the former, without reference to those of the latter sentiment, often perpetrate great wrongs by indulging in an extravagant generosity at the expense of others. They are generous before they are just.

Charles Surface, in the *School for Scandal* is the personification of such a character. Veneration acting singly is liable to sanction superstitious observances; or acting in combination with Destructiveness, without Benevolence and Conscientiousness, it may approve of cruel persecution for the sake of preserving the purity of the faith which it has embraced. Further, as each of the inferior propensities has a legitimate sphere of action, it has legitimate demands, and the moral and intellectual faculties must give due effect to these before their decisions can be regarded as just and right. For these reasons I consider the virtue of an action to consist in its being in harmony with the dictates *of all the faculties acting in harmonious combination, and duly enlightened.*

The moral faculties often do act singly, and while they keep within the limits of their virtuous sphere, the dictates of all of them harmonise. We have a similar example in music. Melody and time both enter into the constitution of music; but we may have time without melody, as in beating a drum; or melody without time, as in the sounds of an Æolian harp. But the two faculties which take cognisance of melody and time are constituted so as to be

capable of acting in harmony when they are both applied to the same object. So it is in regard to the moral sentiments. If a man fall into the sea, another individual who has a large organ of Benevolence, and who can swim, may be prompted by the instinctive impulse of Benevolence instantly to leap into the water and save him, without in the least thinking of the will of God or the obligations of duty. But when we calmly contemplate the action, we perceive it to be one falling within the legitimate sphere of Benevolence. It is approved of by enlightened intellect, and is also conformable at once to the Divine will and to the dictates of Conscientiousness.

In like manner, every action that is truly conformable to the will of God or agreeable to Veneration, when acting within its proper sphere, will be found just and beneficial in its consequences, and in harmony also with Conscientiousness and Benevolence. And every just and right action will be discovered to be beneficial in its consequences, and also in harmony with the will of God. It will be discovered also to be in harmony with the legitimate demands of all the propensities.

There is a distinction between *virtue* and *merit*, which it is important to understand. *Virtue*, as I have said, consists in actions in harmony with all our faculties; *merit*, in actions performed in obedience to the dictates of the moral sentiments and enlightened intellect, in *opposition* to the solicitations of the propensities. This distinction is ably elucidated by a writer, who says: "The idea of *merit* emanates solely from the operation of the selfish feelings and desires." "It is evident that Conscientiousness can see no *merit* in being just, for inclination can never perceive merit in its own gratification. In the same way, Veneration can discover no *merit* in yielding that deferential homage to superiority which is its natural tribute. And Benevolence is equally blind to the perception of merit, in being kind and charitable. Yet merit is a word which, in reference to justice, veneration, and charity, conveys a distinct idea; and we are bound, therefore, to account for its existence."

When the one of these faculties acts independently of the other, it does not *necessarily* err, but it is more liable to do so than when all operate in concert. This is the reason that any theory of morals founded on only one of them is generally imperfect or unsound.

Another question remains—What means do we possess for

discovering *the qualities of actions*, so that our whole faculties may give emotions of approval or disapproval upon sound data? For example—Veneration disposes us to obey the will of God, but how shall we discover what the will of God is? It is the office of the intellect to make this discovery.

The intellect must be employed, therefore, to discover the motives, relations, and consequences of the actions to be judged of, and the propensities and moral sentiments will give emotions of approval or of disapproval, according to the aspects presented to them. In many ordinary cases no difficulty in judging occurs; for instance, the mere perception of a fellow-creature struggling in the water is sufficient to rouse Benevolence, and to inspire us with the desire to save him.

But when the question is put—Is an hospital for foundling children benevolent?—if we look only at one result (saving the lives of individual children), and listen to Philoprogenitiveness exclusively, we should say that it is; but if the intellect observes *all* the consequences—for instance, first, the temptation to vice afforded by provision being made for illegitimate children; secondly, the mortality of the infants, which is enormous, from their being withdrawn from maternal care and entrusted to mere hireling keepers; thirdly, the isolation of the children so reared from all kindred relationship with the rest of the race; and fourthly, the expense which is thrown away in this very questionable arrangement; I say, after the intellect has discovered and contemplated all these facts and results, neither Philoprogenitiveness nor the moral sentiments would be gratified with foundling hospitals, but both would desire to apply the public funds to more purely beneficent institutions.

Without intellect, therefore, the propensities and the sentiments have not knowledge; and without propensities and moral sentiments, the intellect sees merely facts and results, and is destitute of feeling. The harmonious action of the whole gives the rule of virtue.

Science shows that different individuals possess the mental faculties in different degrees; I do not mean, therefore, to say that whatever the proportions of these may be in each individual, the dictates of *his* animal, moral, and intellectual powers, acting in harmonious combination, are rules of conduct not to be disputed. On the contrary, in most individuals one or several of the faculties are so deficient or

so excessive in proportion to the others, that their perceptions of duty will differ from the highest standards. The dictates of the animal, the moral, and the intellectual powers, therefore, acting in harmonious combination, which constitute rules of conduct, are the collective dictates of the best endowed and best balanced minds, illuminated by the greatest knowledge.

If, then, this theory of our moral constitution be well founded, it explains the darkness and confusion of the opinions entertained by previous philosophers on the subject.

To be able, then, to discover what courses of action are in harmony with all our powers, we must use our intellectual faculties in examining Nature. Believing that both man and the external world are the workmanship of the Creator, I propose, in the following Lectures, to consider—

1st, The constitution of man as an *individual;* and to endeavour to discover what duties are prescribed to him by its qualities and objects.

2ndly, Man as a *domestic being;* endeavouring to discover the duties prescribed to him by his constitution as a husband, a father, and a child.

3rdly, Man as a *social being;* discussing the duties arising from his social qualities. This will involve the principles of government and political economy.

4thly, Man as a *religious being;* discussing the duties which he owes to God, so far as these are discoverable from the light of Nature.

LECTURE II.

The Sanctions of the Moral Laws.

In my last Lecture I endeavoured to point out the foundation on which Moral Philosophy, inferred from the constitution of Nature, rests. The mental faculties being the gift of God, each has a legitimate sphere of activity, though liable to be abused; and the rule for discriminating between uses and abuses is that every act is morally *right* which is approved of by the whole faculties duly enlightened and acting harmoniously; while all actions disapproved of by the faculties thus acting are *wrong*. In all harmonious actions, the moral sentiments and the intellect, being superior in kind, direct the propensities. In cases of conflict the propensities must yield. Such is the *internal* guide to morality with which man has been furnished.

The next inquiry is, Whether the judgments of our faculties, when acting harmoniously, are supported by any *external* authority in nature? Every law supposes a lawgiver, and punishment annexed to transgression. Certain courses of action being prescribed, and certain courses forbidden by the constitutions of external nature and of our own faculties, God, who made these, is consequently the Lawgiver; but the question remains—Has He used any means to give sanction, *in this world*, to His commands revealed to us in nature? All are agreed that rewards and punishments have been established by God; but as to the *extent*, *manner*, and *time* of dispensing them, very different opinions are entertained. By some it is conceived *that God, like the human magistrate, watches the infringement of His laws in each particular instance, and applies punishment accordingly;* but that neither His punishments nor His rewards are the *natural* effects of the conduct to which they have reference.

Such is the view of the ways of Providence embodied in Parnell's "Hermit;" and many of us may recollect the pleasure with which, in youth, we perused that representation, and the regret we felt that experience did not support its beautiful theory. A servant is described as having been thrown over a bridge by his companion, and drowned:

which event at first shocks our Benevolence; but we are then told that the sufferer intended that evening to murder a kind and indulgent master, and that his companion was an angel sent by God to prevent and also to punish him for his intended crime. Another scene represents an hospitable rich man's son dying apparently of convulsions; but we are told that the same angel suffocated him to snatch him away from his parents, because their affections, doting too fondly on him, led them to forget their duty to Heaven.

These representations, of course, are fictitious; but notions of a similar character may be traced existing in the minds of many serious persons, and constituting their theory of the Divine government of the world. The grand feature of this system is that the punishment does not follow from the offence by any natural bond of connection, but is administered separately and directly by a special interposition of Providence. The servant's wicked design had no natural connection with his falling over the bridge; and the neglect of Heaven by the parents of the child had no such natural relation to its physiological condition that it should have died of convulsions in consequence of that sin.

There are, as I have said, some religious persons who really entertain notions similar to these: who believe that God, by special acts of providence or particular manifestations of His power, rewards and punishes men's actions in a manner not connected with their offences by any natural link of cause and effect; or, at least, so remotely connected that the link is not discernible by human sagacity. They conceive that this view imparts to the Divine government a sublime mysteriousness which renders it more imposing, solemn, and awful, and better calculated than any other to enforce obedience on men.

To me it appears, on the contrary, to be erroneous, and to be a fountain of superstition, at once derogatory to the dignity of the Divine Ruler, and injurious to the moral, intellectual, and religious character of His subjects. I shall, in a subsequent part of this Lecture, state the reasons for this opinion.

Another notion entertained regarding the moral government of the world is *that God has revealed in the Scriptures every duty which He requires us to perform, and every action which He forbids us to do;* that He leaves us at full liberty in this life to obey or to disobey these commands as we please; but that, in the world to come, He will call us to

account, and punish us for our sins or reward us for our obedience. There are strong objections to this theory also. Religious persons will at once recognise that the instruction communicated to man in the Scriptures may be classed under two great heads.

The first class embraces events that occurred before the existing state of nature commenced (such as the transactions in Paradise before the fall), also events that transcend nature (such as the resurrection of Jesus Christ), and events that are destined to occur when nature shall be no more (such as the final judgment); together with certain duties (such as belief, or faith) which are founded on those communications. In regard to all of these, science and philosophy are silent. The second head has reference to the practical conduct which man is bound to pursue with regard to the beings in the present world.

The first objection, then, to the theory of the Divine government last mentioned is that the Bible, however complete with respect to the former department of instruction, really does not contain a full exposition of man's secular duties.

A second objection to the theory in question is this—it implies that God exercises very little temporal authority in the government of this world, reserving His punishments and rewards chiefly for a future life. One cause of this view seems to be that most of the teachers of morals and religion have confined their attention to moral and religious duties, and often to their own peculiar and erroneous interpretation of them: instead of taking a comprehensive survey of human nature and of *all* the duties prescribed by its constitution. It humbly appears to me that God does exercise a very striking and efficient jurisdiction over this world, and that it is chiefly through our inattention to the manner in which He does so that we are blind to its existence and to its effects.

It is important to establish the reality and efficiency of the Divine government in this world, because a plausible argument has been reared on the contrary doctrine, to the effect that there can be *no* reward and punishment *at all*, if none is administered in this life. The line of reasoning by which this view is supported is the following:—We can judge of God, it is said, only by His works. His works in this world are all that we are acquainted with. If, therefore, in this life, we find that virtue goes unrewarded, and that

vice triumphs, the legitimate inference is that it will always be so.

Bishop Butler, indeed, in his celebrated "Analogy," has argued that *because* God has *not* executed complete justice here, He *must* intend to do so hereafter, for justice is one of His attributes; but Mr. Robert Forsyth, in his work on Moral Science, has stated the objection to this argument in strong terms. "If," says he, "God has created a world in which justice is not accomplished, by what analogy, or on what grounds, do we infer that any other world of His creation will be free from this imperfection?" Butler would answer, "Because justice is an attribute of the Divine mind." The opponents, however, reply, "How do you know that it is so? We know the Deity only through His works; and if you concede that justice is not accomplished in the only world of which we have any experience, the legitimate inference is that justice is *not* one of His attributes; at least, the inference that it is one of them is illogical."

It will serve the cause of moral science to present a valid answer to these objections; and the most satisfactory, to my mind, would be one which should show that the Divine Ruler actually does execute justice here, and that therefore we are entitled to infer that He will be just hereafter; and such, accordingly, is the argument which I respectfully propose to maintain.

The supposed anomalies in the Divine government are apparent only, and, when properly understood, form no exception to the Creator's attribute of justice. The key to them is the separate action of the different departments of our own constitution and of external nature, *the independent operation of natural beings and substances*, each regulated by laws peculiar to itself. Viewing the world on this principle, we discover that inorganic matter operates according to fixed laws, which are independent of the moral or the religious character of those whom it affects.

If, for example, six persons be travelling in a coach, and if it break down through insufficiency of the axle, or from any similar cause, the travellers will be projected against external objects according to the impetus communicated to their bodies by the previous motion of the vehicle, exactly as if they had been inanimate substances of the same texture and materials. Their vices or their virtues will not modify the physical influences that impel or resist them. The cause of the accident is simply physical imperfection in the

vehicle, and not the displeasure of God against the individual men who occupy it, on account of their sins. If one break a leg, another an arm, a third his neck, and a fourth escape unhurt, the difference of result is to be ascribed solely to the differences of the mechanical action of the coach on their bodies, according to their difference of size, weight, and position, or to differences in the objects against which they are projected; one falling against a stone, and another perhaps alighting on turf.

The whole calamity in such a case is to be viewed simply as a punishment for neglecting to have a coach sufficiently strong; and it serves to render men who have the charge of coaches more attentive to their duty in future.

In so far, then, as pain, distress, and calamity arise from the action of physical substances, they should be viewed merely as punishments for our not paying due attention to the laws by which the action of these substances is regulated. They forcibly tell us that if we wish to live in safety we must habitually exercise our understandings in accommodating our conduct to the agencies of the material objects around us. It seems irrational to expect that God will hereafter compensate good men for sufferings which they bring upon themselves by neglecting to study and obey His own institutions.

The next class of objects to which I solicit your attention is the *organic*. These have received definite constitutions, and observe specific modes of action; in other words, they also act under fixed and independent laws, impressed on their constitution by Nature.

Thus, the human body is subject to continual waste, to repair which, nutriment is necessary. This is supplied through the medium of the blood, which replaces decayed particles carried off by the absorbent vessels, and stimulates the brain and other organs to perform their functions aright. But to render it capable of accomplishing these objects, it must be supplied with chyle from the stomach and with oxygen from the lungs; and hence a necessity arises for eating wholesome food and for breathing pure air. The bones are composed of organised materials, and are supplied with certain vessels for their nutrition, and with others for the removal of their decayed particles: all of which act regularly, like the mechanism of a plant. Similar observations apply to the muscles, the skin, the blood-vessels, the brain, and all other portions of the body.

Growth and decay, health and disease, pleasure and pain, in all of these parts, take place according to fixed rules, which are impressed on the organs themselves; and the organs act invariably, independently, and immutably, according to these rules.

For instance—if we neglect to take exercise, the circulation of the blood becomes languid, the bones, muscles, nerves, and brain are imperfectly nourished; and the consequences are pain—loss of appetite, of strength, of mental vivacity, and vigour—and a general feeling of unhappiness. If we labour too intensely with our minds, we exhaust our brains, impair digestion, and destroy sleep. This renders the organs of the mind incapable of action; and we are visited at last with lassitude, imbecility, palsy, apoplexy, or death. If we exercise our muscles too severely and too long, we expend an undue amount of the nervous energy of our bodies on them, our brains become incapable of thinking and the nerves incapable of feeling, and dulness and stupidity seize on our mental powers.

It is, therefore, a *law* inscribed on the constitution of the body, that we should consume a sufficiency of wholesome food, and should breathe unvitiated air. And however moral our conduct—however constant our attendance in the house of prayer—however benevolent our actions may be—yet, if we neglect this organic law, punishment will be inflicted. In like manner, if the laws of exercise be infringed—if, for instance, we overwork the brain—we are visited with punishment, whether the offence be committed in reclaiming the heathen, in healing the sick, in pursuing commerce, in gaming, or in ruling a State. If we over-task the brain at all, it becomes exhausted, and its action is enfeebled; and as the efficiency of the mind depends on its proper condition, the mental powers suffer a corresponding obscuration and decay.

There is obvious reason in this arrangement, also. If the brain were to flourish under excessive toil in a good cause, and were to suffer under the same degree of exertion only in a bad one, the order of nature would be deranged. Good men would no longer be men; they might dispense with food, sleep, repose, and every other enjoyment which binds them to the general company of mankind.

But, according to the view which I am expounding, we are led to regard the constitution, modes of action, and relations of our organised system as all instituted directly

by the Creator—birth from organised parents, growth, decay, and death in old age, appear as inherent parts of our frames, designedly allotted to us; while pain, disease, *premature* decay, and early death appear, to a great extent, to be the consequences of not using our constitutions properly.

When, therefore, we see the children of good men snatched away by death in infancy or in youth, we should ascribe that calamity to these children having inherited feebly organised bodies from their parents, or having, through ignorance or improper treatment, been led, in their modes of life, to infringe the laws which regulate organic matter. The object of their death seems to be to impress on others the importance of attending to these laws, and to prevent the transmission of imperfect corporeal systems to future beings. If we see the children of the wicked flourishing in health and vigour, the inference is that they have inherited strong constitutions from their parents, and have not in their own lives seriously transgressed the organic laws.

We have no authority from our philosophy for supposing that Providence, in removing the just man's children, intends merely to try his faith or patience, to wean him from the world, or to give occasion for recompensing him hereafter for his suffering; nor for believing that the unjust man's family is permitted to flourish, with a view of aggravating his guilt by adding ingratitude for such blessing to his other iniquities in order to augment his punishment in a future life. We see, in these results, simply the consequences of obedience and disobedience to the laws impressed by the Creator on our constitution.

It still remains true that "those whom God loveth, He chasteneth," because the punishments inflicted for the breach of His laws are instituted in love, to induce us to obey them for our own good; but we escape from the contradiction of believing that He sometimes shows His love by *punishing* men who *obey* His laws: which would be the case if He afflicted good men by bad health, or by the death of their children, merely as trials and chastisements, independently of their having infringed the laws of their organic constitution.

We avoid also another contradiction. The most religious persons, who implicitly believe that disease is sent as a chastisement for sin or in token of Divine love, never hesitate, when they are sick, to send for a physician, and

they pay him large fees to deliver them as speedily as possible from this form of spiritual discipline. This is very inconsistent on their part. The physician, however, proceeds at once to inquire into the *physical causes* which have disordered the patient's organisation; he hears of wet feet, exposure to cold air, checked perspiration, excessive fatigue, or some similar influence, and he instantly prescribes *physical remedies*, and is often successful in removing the disorder. In all this proceeding the common sense of the patient and the physician leads them to practise the very doctrine which I am expounding. They view the suffering as the direct consequence of the departure of some of the bodily organs from their healthy course of action, and they endeavour to restore that state.

The human mind and its various faculties constitute a third class of objects which have received definite constitutions, and observe specific laws in their modes of action. These laws are inherent in the constitution of our mental faculties, and are divided into *moral, religious, and intellectual.* In my system of Mental Physiology the faculties are treated of under corresponding divisions: viz., of Animal Propensities, Moral Sentiments, and Intellectual Powers; and the primitive functions, the spheres of activity, and the uses and abuses of each are described, so far as these are ascertained.

Each of these faculties is related to certain objects beneficial to man, and there are laws regulating its action in attaining them: the faculties are so far independent of each other that we may pursue the objects of one or more of them, and omit the pursuit of the objects of the others. The results of the action of the faculties are fixed and certain, and by knowing the primitive functions, the objects, and the laws of our faculties, we may anticipate with considerable certainty the general issue of any course of conduct which we may systematically pursue. Further, when we have acted in conformity with the harmonious dictates of all our faculties, we shall find the issue pleasing and beneficial; whereas when we have yielded to the impulse of the lower propensities in opposition to the moral sentiments and enlightened intellect, which, in cases of conflict, are the ruling powers, we shall reap sorrow and disappointment.

I shall illustrate these principles by examples. The propensity of Acquisitiveness desires to acquire property; and

this is its primitive function. If it act independently of intellect—as it does in idiots, and sometimes in children—it may lead to the acquiring and the accumulating of things of no utility. If it be directed by enlightened intellect, it will desire to acquire and store up articles of real value. But it may act either with or without the additional guidance of the moral sentiments. When it acts *without* that direction, it may prompt the individual to appropriate to himself things of value, regardless of justice, or of the rights of others. When acting in harmony with the moral sentiments, it will lead to acquiring property by just and lawful means.

Further, it may act under the guidance of the moral sentiments so far as never to invade the rights of others, and yet its action may terminate in its own gratification, without any fixed ulterior object.

According to my perceptions of the Divine government, there are specified results attached by the Creator to each of the modes of action of the propensity. For example, when the propensity acts without intellect, the result, as I have said, is the accumulation of worthless trash. We see this occur occasionally in adult persons who are not idiots in other matters, but who, under a blind Acquisitiveness, buy old books, old furniture, or any other object which they can obtain very cheap, *or as a bargain:* as a cheap purchase is commonly called.

When the propensity acts independently of justice and leads to stealing, the moral faculties of impartial spectators are offended, and prompt them to use speedy measures to restrain and punish the thief.

When Acquisitiveness acts in conformity with intellect and justice, but with no higher aim than its own gratification, the result is success in accumulating wealth, but the absence of satisfactory enjoyment of it. The individual feels his life pervaded by vanity and vexation of spirit, because after he has become rich he discovers himself to be without pursuit, object, or possession calculated to gratify his moral and religious feelings, which must be satisfied before full happiness can be experienced. This is the direct result of the constitution of the mind; for as we possess moral faculties, moral objects alone can satisfy *them;* and mere wealth is not such an object.

When the aim of life is to communicate enjoyment to other beings, such as a family, relatives, or fellow-citizens,

and when Acquisitiveness is employed, under the guidance of moral sentiment and intellect, for the purpose of accomplishing this end, success will generally be obtained, and satisfaction will accompany it; because through the whole course of life the highest powers will have pursued a noble and dignified object, fitted for their gratification, and will have employed Acquisitiveness in its proper and subordinate capacity as their ministering servant. The faculties will have acted in harmonious combination.

I have mentioned that every faculty has a legitimate sphere of activity, and that happiness and duty consist in the proper application of them all. If we add to this the principle that we cannot attain the rewards or the advantages attached to the proper employment of any faculty unless we apply it, we shall have another example illustrative of the order of the moral government of the world.

For instance, as Providence has rendered property essential to our existence and welfare, and has given us a faculty prompting us to acquire it; if any individual born without fortune shall neglect to exercise Acquisitiveness, and shall abandon himself, as his leading occupation, to the gratification of Benevolence and Veneration, in gratuitously managing public hospitals, in directing charity schools, or in preaching to the poor, he will suffer evil consequences. He must live on charity, or starve. In such a case, Benevolence and Veneration act without allowing due weight to the duties which Acquisitiveness is appointed by Nature to perform.

Moreover, in pursuing such a course of action, he neglects justice as a regular motive; for if he had listened to Conscientiousness, it would have dictated to him the necessity either of making these pursuits his profession, and of acting for hire, or of practising another profession, and following *them* only in intervals of leisure. St. Paul, in similar circumstances, wrought with his hands and made tents, that he might be burdensome to no one.

The practical idea which I wish to fix in your minds by this example is, that if we pursue objects related exclusively to Benevolence and Veneration, although we may obtain *them*, we shall not thereby attain objects related to Acquisitiveness; and yet, that the world is so arranged that we must attend to the objects of *all* our faculties before we can properly discharge our duties or be happy.

Not only so; but there are *modes* appointed in Nature by

which the objects of our different faculties may be attained, by pursuing which we are rewarded with success, and by neglecting which we are punished with failure. The object of Acquisitiveness, for example, is to acquire things of use. But these cannot be reared from the ground, nor constructed by the hand, nor imported from abroad in exchange for other commodities, without a great expenditure of time, labour, and skill. Their *value* indeed is, in general, measured by the time, labour, and skill expended in their production.

The great law, then, which God has prescribed to govern Acquisitiveness, and by observing which He promises it success, is that we shall practise patient, laborious, and skilful exertion in endeavouring to attain its objects. "The hand of the diligent maketh rich" is the law of Nature. When, however, men, losing sight of this Divine law, resort to gaming and speculation, to thieving, cheating, and plundering, in order to acquire property, when "they *hasten* to become rich," they "fall into a snare."

Ruin is the natural result of such conduct; because, according to Nature, wealth can be produced only by labour; and although one acute, or strong, or powerful man may acquire wealth by cheating or plundering twenty or thirty honest and industrious neighbours, yet, as a general rule, their combined sagacity and strength will, in the end, defeat and punish him; while if all, or even the majority, of men were to endeavour to procure wealth by mere speculation, stealing, and swindling, there would speedily be no wealth to acquire.

The Scripture authoritatively declares, "Thou shalt not steal;" but when a man with strong Acquisitiveness and defective Conscientiousness enters into a great mercantile community in which he sees vast masses of property daily changing hands, he often does not perceive the force of the prohibition. On the contrary, he thinks that he may, with manifest advantage, speculate, lie, cheat, swindle, perhaps steal, as a more speedy and effectual means of acquiring a share of that wealth, than by practising laborious industry.

Nevertheless, this must be a delusion; because, although God does not state the reason why He prohibits stealing, it is certain that there must exist a reason replete with wisdom. He leaves it to human sagacity to discover *the philosophy of the precept;* and it is the duty of the Christian

teacher and the moral philosopher to unfold to the understandings of the young *why* it is *disadvantageous*, as well as sinful, to break the commandments of God.

When the *philosophy* of the practical precepts of the New Testament shall be taught in schools, in the domestic circle, and from the pulpit, the whole power of intellectual conviction will be added to the authority of Scripture in enforcing them, and men will probably be induced, by a clear perception of their own *interest* in this world, as well as by their hopes and fears in relation to the next, to yield obedience to the laws of their Creator. What a glorious theme will such a philosophy afford to vigorous and enlightened minds for the instruction of the people!

If we look at the living world only in the mass, without knowing the distinct existence of the mental faculties, their distinct objects and their distinct laws, the results of their activity appear to be enveloped in painful confusion. We see some moral and religious men struggling with poverty, and others prosperous in their outward circumstances; some rich men extremely unhappy, while others are apparently full of enjoyment; some poor men joyous and gay, others miserable and repining; some irreligious men in possession of vast wealth, while others are destitute of even the necessaries of life. In short, the moral world appears to be one great chaos—a scene full of confusion, intricacy, and contradiction.

But if we become acquainted with the primitive faculties, and their objects and laws, and learn that different individuals possess them from Nature in different degrees of strength, and also cultivate them with different degrees of assiduity, and that the consequences of our actions bear an established relation to the faculties employed, the mystery clears up.

Let us now take a brief and comprehensive survey of the point at which we have arrived.

If we are told that a certain person is extremely pious, benevolent, and just, we are entitled to conclude that he will experience within himself great peace, joy, and comfort from his own dispositions. We are entitled, further, to believe that he will be esteemed and beloved by all good men who know him thoroughly, and that they will be disposed to promote by every legitimate means his welfare and happiness, because his mental qualities naturally excite into activity corresponding faculties in other men, and create a sympathetic interest on their part in his enjoyment.

But if we hear that this good man has been upset in a coach, and has broken his leg, we conclude that this event has arisen from neglect of a physical law, which, being independent of the moral law, acted without direct relation to his mental qualities. If we hear that he is sick, we conclude that in some organ of his body there has been a departure from the laws which regulate healthy action and (these laws also being distinct) that the sickness has no direct relation to his moral condition. If we are told that he is healthy and happy, we infer that his organic system is acting in accordance with the laws of its constitution.

If, on the other hand, we know a man who is palpably cold-hearted, grasping, and selfish, we are authorised to conclude—first, that he is deprived of that delicious sunshine of the soul, and of all those thrilling sympathies with whatever is noble, beautiful, and holy, which attend the vivacious action of the moral and religious faculties; and secondly, that he is deprived of the reflected influence of the same emotions from the hearts and countenances of the good men around him.

These are the direct punishments in this world for his not exercising his moral and religious powers. But if he have inherited a fine constitution, and if he be temperate, sober, and take regular exercise, he may reap the blessing of health, which he will enjoy as the reward of his compliance with the organic laws. There is no inconsistency in this enjoyment being permitted to him, because the moral and organic laws are distinct, and he has obeyed the laws which reward him. If his children have received from him a sound frame, and have been treated prudently and skilfully, they also may live in health; but this, again, is the consequence of obedience to the same laws. If they have inherited feeble constitutions, or if they have been reared in a manner inconsistent with these laws, they will die, just as the children of good men in similar circumstances will perish. If the selfish man pursue wealth according to the laws that regulate its acquisition, he will by that obedience become rich; but if he neglect to exercise Acquisitiveness, or if he infringe these laws, he will become poor, just as the good man would become in similar circumstances.

It appears to me that in these arrangements we see the dictates of our whole faculties, when acting in harmonious combination, supported by the order of external

nature; and hence we obtain evidence of an actual moral government existing in full force and activity in this world.

According to this view, instead of there being confusion and a lack of justice in the Divine administration of human affairs, there is the reverse—there is a reward for every species of obedience and a punishment for every species of disobedience to the Creator's laws. And, as if to preserve our minds habitually under the impression of discipline, our duties correspond to the different parts of our constitution, rewards and chastisements are annexed to each of them, and so little of favouritism or of partiality is shown that, although we obey all the natural laws but one, we do not escape the punishment of infringing that single law; and although we break them all but one, we are not denied the reward of that solitary instance of obedience.

LECTURE III.

Man as an Individual.

Having in the previous Lectures considered what makes an action right or wrong, and also the punishments which attend neglect of duty, and the rewards which performance brings along with it, I proceed to remark that the views there unfolded correspond, to some extent, with those entertained by Bishop Butler, and which he has adopted as the groundwork of his treatise on the "Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion."

"Now," says he, "in the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power. For pleasure and pain are the consequences of our actions, and we are endued by the Author of our nature with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. I know not that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment but by the means of our own actions. And by prudence and care we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet; or, on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And many do please to make themselves extremely miserable: *i.e.*, they do what they know beforehand will render them so. They follow those ways the fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely death. This every one observes to be the general course of things; though, it is to be allowed, we cannot find by experience that all our sufferings are owing to our own follies." (Part I. Chap. II.)

The common sense of mankind yields a ready assent to this doctrine. We go further than Bishop Butler by showing the natural arrangements according to which the consequences mentioned by him take place. This is a point of material moment in philosophy; and it leads me to remark that one difference between the expositions of moral science which have been presented by preceding inquirers, and that which I am now endeavouring to elucidate, consists in this—that hitherto, moralists generally have laid down precepts without showing their foundation in our consti-

tution, or the mode in which disregard of them is punished by the ordinary operation of natural causes. They were imperfectly acquainted with the constitution of the mind and with the independent operation of the different natural laws, and, in consequence, they failed in this branch of their subject. In their expositions of Moral Philosophy they resemble those who teach us to *practise* an art without explaining the scientific principles on which the practice is founded.

In practical life we are ourselves active beings, and we are constantly influenced by agents whose original tendencies and capacities differ from each other—who are placed in varying circumstances, and who are acted on and excited or impeded by other beings. It is a knowledge of their nature alone that can enable us to understand the phenomena of such beings occurring under the diversified circumstances in which they are placed.

Moreover, when we know the *reason why* a particular line of conduct should be adopted, and the way in which reward is connected with performance and punishment with neglect, there is a higher probability of the duty being discharged than when a *precept* is our only motive to action. Mere rules may be apprehended and practised by ordinary minds ; but to understandings ignorant of their foundations and sanctions in nature, their importance and authority are far from being so evident as to carry with them a deep sense of obligation.

Although the natural laws act separately and independently, certain relations have been established between them which tend to support the authority of the whole. In consequence of these relations, obedience to each law increases our ability to observe the others, and disobedience to one diminishes, to some extent, our aptitude for paying deference to the rest.

The man, for example, who obeys the *physical* laws avoids physical injury and suffering, and gains all the advantages arising from living in accordance with inanimate nature. He consequently places himself in a favourable condition for observing the *organic*, the *moral*, and the *intellectual* laws.

By obeying the *organic* laws, he ensures the possession of vigorous health ; and when we view the muscular system of man as the instrument provided by the Creator for operating on physical nature, and the brain as the means of

acting on sentient and intelligent beings, we discover that organic health is a fundamental requisite of usefulness and enjoyment. We are led to see that the possession of it contributes, in the highest degree, to our obeying the physical laws, and also to our discharging our active duties: in other words, to our obeying the laws of morality and intellect.

General obedience to the organic laws also, by preserving the body in a favourable condition of health, fits it for recovering in the best manner from the effects of injuries sustained by inadvertent infringement of the physical laws. Disobedience of the organic laws, on the other hand, unfits us for obeying the other laws of our being.

A student, for instance, who impairs his brain and digestive organs by excessive mental application and by neglect of exercise, weakens his nervous and muscular systems, in consequence of which he becomes feeble and incapable of sustained bodily exertion: in other words, of coping with the law of gravitation, without suffering pain and fatigue. He is also more liable to disease.

If we obey the various laws instituted by the Creator, we find that they act harmoniously for our welfare, that they support each other, and that the world becomes a clear field for the active and pleasurable exercise of all our powers; while if we infringe one, not only does it punish us for the special act of disobedience, but the offence has the tendency to impair, to some extent, our power of obeying the others. We thus discover in the natural laws a system of independent, yet of combined and harmonious, action, admirably adapted to the mind of a being who has received not only observing faculties, fitted to study existing things and their phenomena, but who has also reflecting intellect, calculated to comprehend their relations, adaptations, and reciprocal influences.

Thus, the first step in comprehending the principles of the Divine government is to learn to look on the physical world as it actually exists, and not through the medium of a perverted imagination or of erroneous assumptions; and the second is to compare it with the constitution of man, physical and mental, as designedly adapted to it. We shall find that it is not an elysium, and we know that we are not angels; but we shall discover that while the heavens declare the glory of the Creator, and the revolving firmament of suns and worlds proclaims His might, the elements

and powers of man's mind and body, viewed in their tendencies and adaptations, bespeak, in a language equally clear and emphatic, His intelligence, beneficence, and justice.

Having thus expounded the general system of the Divine government, let us now consider the duties prescribed to us by our constitution and its relations.

Descending to *particular duties*, we may first consider those prescribed to man *as an individual* by his own constitution and that of the external creation.

The constitution of man seems to show that the object of his existence on earth is to discharge certain duties, to advance in knowledge, refinement, beneficence, and holiness; and thereby to enjoy his being. Divines add that another object is to "glorify God." According to my view, obedience to the Divine laws—or performance of our duties—is the prime requisite; enjoyment is the natural accompaniment of this conduct; and the glory of God is evolved as the result of these two combined. His wisdom and power are strikingly conspicuous when we discover a system, apparently complicated, to be, in fact, simple, clear, beautiful, and beneficent; and when we behold His rational creatures comprehending His will, acting in harmony with it, reaping all the enjoyments which His goodness intended for them, and ascending in the scale of being by the cultivation and improvement of their nobler powers, the glory of God appears surpassingly great.

A deep conviction thence arises, that the only means by which we can advance that glory is to promote, where possible, the fulfilment of the Creator's beneficent designs, and sedulously to co-operate in the execution of His plans. When the object of human existence is regarded in this light, it becomes evident that obedience to every natural law is a positive *duty* imposed on us by the Creator, and that infringement or neglect of it is a *sin* or transgression against His will.

Hence we do not promote the glory of God by singing His praises, by offering up prayers at His throne, and by performing other devotional exercises, if, at the same time, we shut our eyes to His natural institutions, neglect His physical, organic, and moral laws, and act in direct contradiction to His plan of government, presenting ourselves before Him as spectacles of pain and misfortune, suffering the punishment of our infringements of His institutions, and ascribing

those lamentable consequences of our own ignorance and folly to inherent imperfections in the world which He has made.

Every law of God, however proclaimed to us, has an equal claim to observance; and as religion consists in revering God and obeying His will, it is evident that the discharge of our daily secular duties is literally the fulfilment of *an essential part of our religious obligations.*

It is only by presenting before the Creator our bodies in as complete a condition of health and vigour, our minds as thoroughly disciplined to virtue and holiness, and as replete with knowledge, and, in consequence, our whole being as full of enjoyment as our constitution will admit, that we can really show forth His goodness and glory.

If these ideas be founded in nature, the first duty of man as an individual is obviously to acquire knowledge of himself and of God's laws, in whatever record these are contained. I infer this to be a duty, because I perceive intellectual powers bestowed on man, obviously intended for the purpose of acquiring knowledge; a wide range of action permitted to all his powers, corporeal and mental, with pleasure annexed to the use and pain to the abuse of them; and a liability to suffer by the influence of the objects and beings around him, unless, by means of knowledge, he accommodate his conduct to their qualities and action. He has only one alternative presented to him—of using his reason or of enduring evil.

It has too rarely been inculcated that the gaining of knowledge is a *moral* duty; yet, if our constitution be so framed that we cannot securely enjoy life and discharge our duties as parents and as members of society without it, and if a capacity for acquiring it has been bestowed on us, its acquisition is obviously commanded by the Creator as a duty of the highest moment. The kind of knowledge which we are bound to acquire is clearly that of God's will and laws. It is the office of divines to instruct you in the duties prescribed in the Bible, and of philosophers to teach the department of nature.

The ignorant man suffers many inconveniences and distresses, to which he submits as inevitable dispensations of Providence. His own health perhaps fails him; his children are perverse and disobedient; his trade is unsuccessful; and he regards all these as visitations from God, or as examples of the chequered lot of man on earth. If he be religious, he prays for a spirit of resignation, and directs his

hopes to heaven ; but if the foregoing view of the Divine administration be sound, he should ascribe his sufferings, in great part, to his own ignorance of the scheme of creation, and to his non-compliance with its rules. In addition to his religious duties, he should, therefore, fulfil the natural conditions appointed by the Creator as antecedents to happiness ; and then he may expect a blessing on his exertions and on his life.

Important, however, as the knowledge of nature thus appears to be, it is surprising how recently the efficient study of it has begun. It is not more than three centuries since the very dawn of inductive philosophy ; and some of the greatest scientific discoveries have been made within the last fifty or sixty years. These facts tell us plainly that the race of man, like the individual, is progressive ; that it has its infancy and youth ; and that we who now exist live only in the dayspring of intelligence. In Europe and America the race may be viewed as putting forth the early blossoms of its rational existence, while the greater part of the world lies buried in utter darkness. Even in Europe it is only the more gifted minds that see and appreciate their true position. These, from the Pisgah of knowledge, gaze upon the promised land of virtue and happiness stretched out before their intellectual eye ; although it is too remote to admit of their entrance on its soil, yet it lies sufficiently near to permit them to descry its beauty and luxuriance.

If the study of Nature and of Nature's laws be our first duty as rational and accountable beings, a moment's reflection will satisfy you that the instruction hitherto generally given even to the young of the higher ranks has been unavailing for purposes of practical utility. If a boy be taught the structure, uses, and laws of action of the lungs, he will be furnished with motives for avoiding sudden transitions of temperature, excessive bodily and mental exertion, and sleeping in ill-ventilated rooms ; for improving the purity of the air in his native city ; for constructing churches, theatres, lecture-rooms, and all places of public resort, in accordance with the laws of the human constitution in regard to temperature and ventilation : in short, this knowledge will enable him to avoid much evil and to accomplish much practical good.

If he do not acquire that knowledge, he will be exposed, in consequence of his ignorance, to suffer from many of these

external influences, operating injuriously both on his body and on his mind. If, on the other hand, he be taught that Romulus and Remus were suckled by a she-wolf; that Æneas was the son of Venus, who was the goddess of love; that in Tartarus were three Furies, called Alecto, Tisiphone, and Megæra, who sent wars and pestilence on earth, and punished the wicked after death with whips of scorpions; that Jupiter was the son of Saturn, and the chief among all the gods; that he dwelt on Mount Olympus, and employed one-eyed giants, called Cyclops, whose workshop was in the heart of Mount Ætna, to forge thunderbolts, which he threw down on the world when he was angry—the youth learns mere poetical fancies, often abundantly ridiculous and absurd, which lead to no useful actions. As all the personages of the heathen mythology existed only in the imaginations of poets and sculptors, they are not entities or agents; and they do not operate in any way whatever on human enjoyment. But if we neglect the study of God's laws, evil and misery most certainly ensue.

These observations, however, are not to be understood as an unqualified denunciation of classical learning. The sentiment of Ideality finds gratification in poetic fictions; but it is absurd to cultivate it, and the faculty of Language, to the exclusion of others not less important. Besides, it must be kept in view that in the pages of the Book of Nature, as well as in those of Homer, Virgil, and Ovid, ample materials are to be found for the cultivation and gratification of a refined taste.

The religious teachers of mankind also, in the education of their flocks, have too generally omitted instruction in the natural laws of God. The pastors of every sect have been more anxious to instil into the minds of the young peculiar views of religious faith than a correct and practical knowledge of the Divine wisdom and will inscribed in the Book of Nature. In consequence, even the best educated classes are, in general, very imperfectly informed regarding Nature, her laws, and her rewards and punishments. They have been instructed in classical literature, composed chiefly of elegant and ingenious fables. A certain portion of the people at large has been taught to read and write, but has been left at that point to grope their way to knowledge without teachers, without books, and without encouragement or countenance from their superiors; while countless multitudes have been left without any education whatever.

As *individuals*, our sphere of intellectual vision is so limited that we have great difficulty in discovering the indispensable necessity of knowledge to the discharge of our duties, and to the promotion of our happiness. We are too apt to believe that our lot is immutably fixed, and that we can do extremely little to change or to improve it. We feel as if we were overruled by a destiny too strong for our limited powers to control; and, as if to give strength and permanence to this impression, the man of the world asks us, What benefit could scientific information confer on the labourer, whose duty consists in digging ditches, in breaking stones, or in carrying loads all day long; and when the day is gone, whose only remaining occupation is to eat and to sleep? Or of what use is information concerning Nature's laws to the shopkeeper, whose duty in life is to manage his small trade, to pay his bills punctually, and to collect sharply his outstanding debts?

If these were *all* the duties of the labourer and of the shopkeeper, the man of the world would be right. But we discover in the individuals to whom these duties are allotted faculties capable of far higher aims; and Nature points out the necessity of cultivating them. The scheme of life of the day-labourer and of the shopkeeper, as now cast, is far short of the improvement which it is capable of reaching, and which it was evidently designed to attain. It does not afford scope for the exercise of their noblest and best gifts; and it does not favour the steady advance of these classes as moral, religious, and intellectual beings.

The objector assumes that they have already reached the limits of their possible attainments; and if the case were so, the conclusion might be sound that science is useless to them. But if they be at present far from enjoying the full sweets of existence; if the whole order of social life, and their condition in it, be capable of vast amelioration; and if the knowledge of ourselves and of Nature be a means of producing these advantages: then the duty of acquiring knowledge is at once fundamental and paramount—it lies at the foundation of all improvement. If the mass of the people be destined never to rise above their present condition of ignorance, suffering, and toil, we must abandon the idea that the attributes of justice and benevolence are manifested by God in this world.

I am anxious to press this idea earnestly on your consideration, because it appears to me to constitute the grand

difference between the old and the new philosophy. The characteristic feature of the old philosophy, founded on the knowledge, not of man's nature, but of his political history, is that Providence intended different lots for men (a point which the new philosophy concedes); and that, in the Divine appointment of conditions, the millions or masses of the people were destined to act the part only of industrious ministers to the physical wants of society, while a favoured few were meant to be the sole recipients of knowledge and refinement.

According to that philosophy, therefore, it is not a duty imposed on every individual to exercise his intellectual powers in extending his acquaintance with Nature. On the contrary, according to it, a working-man fulfils his destiny when he becomes master of his trade, acquires a knowledge of his moral and religious duties from the Bible, and quietly practises them, rears a family of labourers, and, unmoved by ambition, unenlightened by science, and unrefined by accomplishments, sinks into the grave in a good old age, to give place to an endless succession of beings like himself. Human nature was viewed as stationary, or at least was regarded as depending for its advance on Providence or on the higher classes, and in no degree on humbler men.

The new philosophy, on the other hand, which is founded on a knowledge of man's nature, admits the allotment of distinct conditions to different individuals, because it recognises differences in their mental and bodily endowments. But, in surveying the human faculties, it discovers that all men possess, in a greater or a less degree, powers of observation and reflection adapted to the study of Nature; the sentiment of Ideality prompting them to desire refinement and perfect institutions; the feeling of Benevolence longing for universal happiness; the sentiment of Conscientiousness rejoicing in justice; and emotions of Hope, Veneration, and Wonder causing the glow of religious devotion to spring up in their souls, and their whole being to love, worship, and obey the beneficent Author of their existence.

It proclaims that beings so gifted were not destined to exist as mere animated machinery, liable to be superseded at every stage of their lives by the steam-engine, the pulley, or the lever; but were clearly intended to advance in their mental attainments, and to rise higher and higher in the scale of intelligence, virtue, and happiness.

This conclusion is irresistible if the general idea of the

Divine administration, communicated in the previous Lecture, be sound : viz., that all the evolutions of physical nature proceed under fixed, independent, and harmonious laws. Under such a system, the Creator speaks forth from every element, and proclaims that every human being must acquire knowledge or must suffer evil. As it is not probable that the Creator has bestowed capacities and desires on His creatures which their inevitable condition renders it impossible for them to cultivate and gratify, we may reasonably presume that the fulfilment of every necessary duty is compatible with enlarged mental attainments in the race. It is delightful to perceive that these views are gaining ground, and are daily more and more advocated by the Press.

I conclude this Lecture by observing that the duty of acquiring knowledge implies that of communicating it to others when attained ; and there is no form in which the humblest individual may do more good, or assist more effectually in promoting the improvement and happiness of mankind, than in teaching them truth and its applications. I feel that I lie under a moral obligation to communicate to you the knowledge concerning the natural laws of the Creator which my own mind has been permitted to discover. I learn that other instructors of the people have considered it to be *their* duty to denounce, as *dangerous*, the knowledge which is here communicated, and to warn you against it.* But I am not moved by such declamations. What I teach you, I believe to be truth inscribed by the hand of God in the Book of Nature; and I have never been able to understand what is meant by a *dangerous truth.*

All natural truth is simply knowledge of what the Creator has instituted; and it savours of impiety, and not of reverence, to stigmatise it as injurious. The very opposite is the fact. Lord Bacon has truly said that "there are, besides the authority of Scripture, two reasons of exceeding great weight and force why religion should dearly protect all increase of natural knowledge : the one, because it leads to the greater exaltation of the glory of God ; for, as the

* These Lectures were reported in one of the newspapers in Edinburgh, and during the delivery of them, more than one of the clergy of the Established Church preached sermons against them. The audience to whom they were addressed belong to that class of society over whom the clergy exercise the most powerful influence, and this appeal appeared to be called for to induce them to continue their attendance. In this respect it was successful.

Psalms and other Scriptures do often invite us to consider and to magnify the great and wonderful works of God, so if we should rest only in the contemplation of those which first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like injury to the majesty of God as if we should judge of the store of some excellent jeweller by that only which is set out to the street in his shop. The other reason is, because it is a singular help, and a preservative against unbelief and error; for, says our Saviour, ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures nor the power of God; laying before us two books or volumes to study, if we will be secured from error—first, the Scriptures, revealing the will of God; and then the creatures, expressing His power." We have seen, however, that not the *power* of God only, but also His *will*, is expressed in the constitution of "the creatures;" and hence a double reason becomes manifest why it is our duty to study them.

I advance here, for your acceptance, no propositions based on the authority of my own discernment alone; but I submit them all to your scrutiny and judgment. I enable you, as far as in me lies, to detect the errors into which I may inadvertently have fallen, and I ask you to embrace only the ideas which seem to be supported by evidence and reason. We are told by a great authority to judge of all things by their fruits; and by this test I leave the doctrines of this philosophy to stand or fall. What are the effects of them on your minds? Do you feel your conceptions of the Deity circumscribed and debased by the views which I have presented—or, on the contrary, purified and exalted?

In the simplicity, adaptations, and harmony of Nature's laws, do you not recognise positive and tangible proof of the omniscience and omnipotence of the Creator—a solemn and impressive lesson, that in every moment of our existence we live, and move, and have our being, supported by His power, rewarded by His goodness, and restrained by His justice? Does not this sublime idea of the continual presence of God now cease to be a vague, and therefore a cold and barren, conception? and does it not, through the medium of the natural laws, become a deep-felt, encouraging, and controlling reality? Do your understandings revolt from such a view of creation as ill adapted to a moral, religious, and intelligent being? or do they ardently embrace it, and leap with joy at light evolving itself from the moral

chaos, and exhibiting order and beauty, authority and rule, in a vast domain where previously darkness, perplexity, and doubt prevailed?

Let the tree, I say, be known by its fruits. Look to heaven, and see if the doctrines which I teach have circumscribed or darkened the attributes of the Supreme; then turn your contemplation inwards, and examine whether they have degraded or exalted—chilled or inspired with humble confidence and hope—the soul which God has given you; and by your verdict, pronounced after this consideration, let the fate of the doctrines be sealed. In teaching them, be it repeated, I consider myself to be discharging a moral duty; and no frown of men will tempt me to shrink from proceeding in such a course. If my exposition of the Divine government be true, it is a noble vocation to proclaim it to the world: for the knowledge of it must be fraught with blessings and enjoyment to man. If you participate in these sentiments, let us advance, and fear not—encouraged by the assurance that if this doctrine be of man it will come to nought, but that if it be of God, no human authority can prevail against it!

LECTURE IV.

PRESERVING HEALTH, A DUTY.

THE next duty of man, as an individual, is to apply his knowledge in preserving himself in health, bodily and mental. Without health, he is unfit for the successful discharge of his duties. It is so advantageous and agreeable to enjoy sound health, that many persons will exclaim, "No prophet is needed to inform us that it is our duty and our interest sedulously to guard it:" but many who treat thus lightly the general injunction are grievously deficient in practical knowledge how to carry it into effect. It is true that every man in his senses takes care not to fall into the fire or to walk into a pool of water; but how many valuable lives are put in jeopardy by sitting in wet clothes, by overtasking the brain in study or in the cares of business, by too frequently repeated convivialities, or by other habits that sap the foundations of health!

In tracing to their source the calamities which arise to families and individuals from bad health and untimely death, attended by deep laceration of their feelings and numerous privations, it is surprising how many of them may be discovered to arise from slight but long-continued deviations from the dictates of the organic laws. These were apparently so trivial at first that scarcely any injurious, or even disagreeable, result was observed; nevertheless, they were from the beginning important errors, the injurious consequences of which constantly increased.

Perhaps the victim had an ardent mind, and, under the impulse of a laudable ambition to excel in his profession, studied with so much intensity, and for such long periods in succession, that he overtasked his brain and ruined his health. His parents and relations, equally ignorant with himself of the organic laws, were rejoicing at his diligence, and forming fond expectations of the brilliant future that must, in their estimation, await one so gifted in virtuous feeling, in intellect, and in industry; when suddenly he was seized with fever, with inflammation, or with consumption, and in a few days or weeks was carried to the tomb.

Another cause by which health and life are frequently destroyed is *occasional* reckless conduct, pursued in ignorance of the laws of the human constitution. Take as an example the following case, which I have elsewhere given :—A young man in a public office, after many months of sedentary occupations, went to the country on a shooting excursion, where he exhausted himself by muscular exertion, of which his previous habits had rendered him little capable ; he went to bed feverish, and perspired much during the night ; next day he came to Edinburgh, unprotected by a great-coat, on the outside of a very early coach : his skin was chilled, the perspiration was checked, the blood received an undue determination to the interior vital organs, disease was excited in the lungs, and within a few weeks he was consigned to the grave.

The great requisite of health is the preservation of *all* the leading organs of the body in a condition of regular and *proportionate* activity ; to allow none to become too languid, and none too active. The result of this harmonious activity is a pleasing consciousness of existence, experienced when the mind is withdrawn from all exciting objects and is turned inward on its own feelings. A philosophical friend once remarked to me that he never considered himself to be in complete health except when he was able to place his feet firmly on the turf, his hands hanging carelessly by his sides, his eyes wandering over space, and thus circumstanced, to feel such agreeable sensations arising in his mere bodily frame that he could raise his mind to heaven, and thank God that he was a living man. This description of the quiet, pleasing enjoyment which accompanies complete health appears to me to be admirable.

It can hardly be doubted that the Creator intended that the mere play of our bodily organs should yield us pleasure. It is probable that this is the chief gratification enjoyed by the inferior animals ; and although we have received the high gift of reason, it does not necessarily follow that that should deprive us of the delights which our organic nature is fairly calculated to afford.

How different is the enjoyment which I have described, arising from the temperate, active, harmonious play of every bodily function, from sensual pleasure, which results from the abuse of a few of our bodily appetites, and is followed by lasting pain ; and yet so perverted are human notions, in consequence of ignorance and vicious habits,

that thousands attach no idea to the phrase *bodily pleasure* but that of sensual indulgence. The pleasurable feelings springing from health are delicate and refined. They are the supports and the rewards of virtue, and are altogether incompatible with vicious gratification of the appetites.

So widely do the habits of civilised life depart from the standards of nature, that I fear this enjoyment is known, in its full exquisiteness, to comparatively few. Too many of us, when we direct our attention to our bodily sensations, experience only feelings of discomfort, anxiety, and discontent, which make us fly to an external pursuit that we may escape from ourselves. This undefined uneasiness is the result of slight, but extensive, derangement of the vital functions, and is the prelude of disease. The causes of these uneasy feelings may be traced in our erroneous habits, occupations, and physical condition; and until society shall become so enlightened as to adopt extensive improvements in all these particulars, there is no prospect of their termination.

It is instructive to compare with our own the modes of life of the lower animals, whose actions and habits are directly prompted and regulated by the Creator, by means of their instincts; because, in all circumstances in which our constitution closely resembles theirs, their conduct is really a lesson read to us by the Allwise Himself. If, then, we survey them attentively, we observe that they are incited to a course of action calculated to produce harmonious activity in all their vital organs, and thus to ensure their possession of health.

Animals in a state of nature are remarkably cleanly in their habits. You must have observed the feathered tribes dressing their plumage and washing themselves in the brooks. The domestic cat is most careful to preserve a clean, sleek, glossy skin; the dog rolls himself on grass or straw; and the horse, when grazing, does the same, if he has not enjoyed the luxury of being well curried. The sow, although our standard of comparison for dirt, is not deserving of this character. It is invariably clean wherever it is possible for it to be so; and its bad reputation arises from its masters too frequently leaving it no sphere of existence except dunghills and other receptacles of filth. In a stable-yard, where there is abundance of clean straw, the sleeping-place of the sow is unsoiled, and the creature makes great efforts to preserve it in this condition.

Again, in a state of nature there has been imposed on the inferior animals, in acquiring their food, an extent of labour which amounts to a regular exercise of their corporeal organs. And lastly, their food has been so adjusted to their constitutions, that without cookery they are well nourished, while they are very rarely rendered sick through surfeit, or the bad quality of what they eat.

The animals, I repeat, are impelled directly by the Creator to act in the manner now described; and when we study their organisation, and see its close resemblance to the human frame, we cannot fail, while admiring the wisdom and benevolence displayed in their habits and constitution, to draw thence lessons for the regulation of our own.

Man differs from the brutes in this—that, instead of blind instincts, he is furnished with reason, which enables him to study himself, the external world, and their mutual relations, and to pursue the conduct which these point out as beneficial. It is by examining the structure, modes of action, and objects of the various parts of his constitution, that man discovers what his duties of performance and abstinence in regard to health really are.

This proposition may be illustrated in the following manner. The skin has innumerable pores, and serves as an outlet for the waste particles of the body. The quantity of noxious matter excreted through these pores in twenty-four hours is, on the very lowest estimate, about twenty-four ounces. If the passage of this matter be obstructed so that it is retained in the body, the quality of the blood is deteriorated by its presence, and the general health, which greatly depends on the state of the blood, suffers. The nature of perspired matter is such that it is apt, in consequence of the evaporation of its watery portion, to be condensed, and to clog the pores of the skin; and hence the necessity for washing the surface frequently, so as to keep the pores open, and to allow perspiration freely to proceed. The clothing, moreover, must be so porous and clean as readily to absorb and allow a passage to the matter perspired; otherwise, the same result ensues as from the impurity of the skin: namely, the arrest or the diminution of the process of perspiration.

Nor is this all. The skin is an absorbing as well as an excreting organ, and foreign substances in contact with it are sucked into its pores and introduced into the blood. When cleanliness is neglected, therefore, the evil

consequences are twofold : first, the pores, as we have mentioned, are clogged, and perspiration is obstructed ; and secondly, part of the noxious matter left on the skin or the clothing is absorbed into the system, where it produces hurtful effects. When men become enlightened, attention to cleanliness will be regarded as an important duty, akin to temperance, honesty, or piety.

I might, in like manner, describe the structure and modes of action of the bones, muscles, blood-vessels, nerves, and brain ; and demonstrate to you that the necessity for bodily and mental labour, for temperance, for attention to ventilation, for judicious clothing, and a great variety of other observances, is written by the finger of God in the framework of our bodies. This, however, belongs to Physiology ; and here I assume that you have studied and understand the leading facts of that subject.

I limit myself to two observations. *First*, exercise of the bones and muscles is labour ; and labour, instead of being a curse to man, is a positive source of his well-being and enjoyment. It is only excessive labour that is painful ; and in a well-ordered community there should be no necessity for painfully exhausting exertion. *Secondly*, exercise of the brain is synonymous with mental activity, which may be intellectual, or moral, or animal, according to the faculties which we employ. Mental inactivity, therefore, implies inactivity of the brain ; and as the brain is the fountain of nervous energy to the whole system, the punishment of neglecting its exercise is great and severe—consisting in feelings of lassitude, uneasiness, fear and anxiety, vague desires, sleepless nights, and a general consciousness of discomfort, with incapacity to escape from suffering ; all which poison life at its source, and render it thoroughly miserable.

Well-regulated mental activity, combined with due bodily exercise, on the other hand, is rewarded with gay, joyous feelings, an inward alacrity to discharge all our duties, a good appetite, sound sleep, and a general consciousness of happiness that causes days and years to fleet away without leaving a trace of physical suffering behind.

While moderate and proportionate exercise of all the bodily and mental functions is essential to health, we must be equally careful, in order to preserve this invaluable blessing, to shun over-exertion and excessive mental excitement. Owing to the constitution of British society, it is very

difficult to avoid, in our habitual conduct, one or other of the extremes now mentioned. Many persons, born to wealth, have few motives to exertion; and such individuals, particularly females, often suffer grievously in their health and happiness from want of rational objects of pursuit calculated to excite and exercise their minds and bodies. Others, again, who do not inherit riches from their ancestors, are tempted to overtask themselves in acquiring them, and frequently to support an expensive style of living, which vanity leads them to regard as necessary to social consideration.

In opposition to these obvious dictates of reason, two objections are generally urged. The first is, that persons who are always taking care of their health generally ruin it; their heads are filled with hypochondriacal fancies and alarms, and they become habitual valetudinarians. The answer to this remark is that all such persons are already valetudinarians before they begin to experience the anxiety about their health here described; they are already nervous or dyspeptic, the victims of a morbid condition of body attended by uneasiness of mind, which last they ascribe to the state of their health.

The second objection is that many persons live in sound health to a good old age who never take any care of themselves at all; whence it is inferred that the safest plan is to follow their example, and to act on all occasions as impulse prompts, never doubting that our health, if we pursue this manly course, will take care of itself. In answer to this objection, I observe that constitutions differ widely in the amount of their native stamina, and consequently in the extent of tear and wear and bad treatment which they are able to sustain without being ruined; and that, for this reason, one individual may be comparatively little injured by a course of action which would prove fatal to another with a feebler natural frame.

The grand principle of the philosophy which I am now teaching is that the natural laws really admit of no exceptions; and that specific causes, sufficient to account for the apparent exceptions, exist in every instance. Some of these individuals may have enjoyed very robust constitutions, which it was difficult to subvert; others may have indulged in excesses only at intervals, passing an intermediate period in abstinence, and permitting the powers of nature to readjust themselves and recover their tone before

they committed a new debauch; while others may have led an extremely active life, passing much of their time in the open air: a mode of being which enables the constitution to withstand a greater extent of intemperance than it can resist with sedentary employment.

But of one and all of these men we may safely affirm that if they had obeyed the organic laws they would have lived still longer and more happily than they did by infringing them. In the course of my observations, I have never seen an example of an individual who perseveringly proceeded in a course of intemperance, either sensual or mental—that is, who habitually overtasked his stomach or his brain—who did not permanently ruin his health, usefulness, and enjoyment; I, therefore, cannot believe in the supposed exceptions to the organic laws.

One source of error on this subject may be traced to the widely prevailing ignorance which exists regarding the structure and functions of the body; in consequence of which danger is frequently present, unknown to those who unthinkingly expose themselves to its approach. If you have marked a party of young men, every one of whom is unacquainted with the currents, sand-banks, and rocks, visible and invisible, with which the Firth of Forth is studded, proceeding in a boat on a pleasure sail, you may have seen them all alert, and full of fun and frolic; and if the day was calm and the sea smooth, you may have observed them return in the evening well and happy, and altogether unconscious of the dangers to which their ignorance had exposed them.

They may repeat the experiment, and succeed, by a fortunate combination of circumstances, again and again; but how different would be the feelings of a prudent and experienced pilot, who knew every part of the channel, and who saw that on one day they had passed within three inches of a sunken rock, on which, if they had struck, their boat would have been smashed to pieces; on another, had escaped by a few yards a dangerous sand-bank; and on a third, had with great difficulty been able to extricate themselves from a current which was rapidly carrying them on a precipitous and rocky shore. The pilot's anxiety would probably be fully justified at length by the occurrence of one or other of those mischances, or by the upsetting of the boat in a squall, its destruction in a mist, or its driving out to sea when the wind aided an ebbing tide.

Thus it is with rash, reckless, ignorant youth in regard to health. Each folly or indiscretion that, through some combination of fortunate circumstances, has been committed without immediate punishment, emboldens them to venture on greater irregularities, until, in an evil hour, they are caught in a violation of the organic laws that consigns them to the grave. Those who have become acquainted with the structure, functions, and laws of the vital organs see the conduct of these blind adventurers on the ocean of life in the same light. There is an unspeakable difference between a belief in safety founded only on utter ignorance of the existence of danger, and that which arises from a knowledge of all the sunken rocks and eddies in the stream, and from a practical pilot's skill in steering clear of them all.

The last observation which I make on this head is that, in regard to health, Nature may be said to allow us to run with her an account-current, in which many small transgressions seem at the time to be followed by no penalty, when, in fact, they are all charged to the debit side of the account, and, after the lapse of years, are summed up and closed by a fearful balance against the transgressor.

Do any of you know individuals, who for twenty years have persevered in frequent feastings, who all that time have been constant diners out or diners at home, or the soul of convivial meetings, prolonged into far advanced hours of the morning, and who have resisted every warning and admonition from friends, and have proceeded in the constant belief that neither health nor strength was impaired by such a course?

Nature kept an account-current with such men. She had at first placed a strong constitution and vigorous health to their credit, and they had drawn on it day by day; believing that, because she did not instantly strike the balance against them and withdraw her blessing, she was keeping no note of their follies. But mark the close. At the end of twenty years, or less, you will find them dying of palsy, apoplexy, water in the chest, or some other disease clearly referable to their protracted intemperance; or if they escape death, you will see them become walking shadows, the ghosts of their former selves—the beacons, in short, set up by Nature to warn others that she does not, in any instance, permit her laws to be transgressed with impunity.

It must be allowed, however, that the dangers arising to

health from improper social habits and arrangements cannot be altogether avoided by the exertions of individuals acting singly in their separate spheres. I shall have occasion hereafter, in explaining the social law, to point out that the great precept of Christianity (that we must love our neighbours as ourselves) is inscribed in every line of our constitution; and that, in consequence, we must render our neighbours as moral, intelligent, and virtuous as ourselves, and induce them to form a public opinion in favour of wisdom and virtue, before we can reap the full reward even of our own knowledge and attainments.

As an example in point, I observe that if there be among us any one merchant, manufacturer, or lawyer who feels, in all its magnitude and intensity, the evil of an overstrained pursuit of wealth, he cannot, with impunity, abridge his hours of toil unless he can induce his rivals to do so also. If they persevere, they will outstrip him in the race of competition and impair his fortune. We must, therefore, produce a general conviction among the constituent members of society that Providence forbids that course of incessant action which obstructs the path of moral and intellectual improvement, and leads to mental anxiety and corporeal suffering; and induce them, by a simultaneous movement, to apply an effectual remedy in a wiser and better distribution of the hours of labour, relaxation, and enjoyment.

Every one of us can testify that this is *possible*, so far as the real, necessary, and advantageous business of the world is concerned; for we perceive that, by a judicious arrangement of our time and our affairs, all necessary business may be compressed within many fewer hours than those we now dedicate to that object. I should consider eight hours a day amply sufficient for business and labour; there would remain eight hours more for enjoyment, and eight for repose: a distribution that would cause the current of life to flow more cheerfully, agreeably, and successfully than it can do under our present system of ceaseless competition and toil.

It appears, then, from the foregoing considerations, that the study and observance of the laws of health is a *moral* duty, revealed by our constitution as the will of God, and, moreover, necessary to the due discharge of all our other duties. We rarely hear from divines an exposition of the duty of preserving health founded on and enforced by an exposition of our natural constitution; because divines confine themselves to what they find in the Scriptures.

But the Scriptures, in prescribing sobriety and temperance, moderation and activity, clearly coincide with the natural laws on this subject: and we ought not to study the former to the exclusion of the latter; for, by learning the structure, functions, and relations of the human body, we are rendered more fully aware of the excellence of the Scriptural precepts, and we obtain new motives to observe them in our perception of the punishments by which, even in this world, the breach of them is visited.

Why the exposition of the will of God, when strikingly written in the Book of Nature, should be neglected by divines, is explicable only by the fact that when the present standards of theology were framed, that book was sealed, and its contents were unknown. We cannot, therefore, justly blame our ancestors for the omission; but it is not too much to hope that modern divines may take courage and supply the deficiency. By teaching the people to regard all natural institutions as Divine, they may remove this obstacle to improvement, and thus religion may be brought to lend her powerful aid in enforcing obedience to the natural laws.

In my Introductory Lecture I explained that Veneration, as well as the other moral sentiments, is merely a blind feeling, and needs to be directed by knowledge. I humbly propose, that in a sound education, the sentiment of Veneration should be directed to all that God has really instituted. If the structure and functions of the body were taught to youth as God's workmanship, and if the duties deducible from them were clearly enforced as His commands, the mind would feel it to be sinful to neglect or to violate them; and a great additional efficacy would thereby be given to all precepts recommending exercise, cleanliness, and temperance.

As closely connected with health, I proceed to consider the subject of amusements, regarding which much difference of opinion prevails. When we have no true philosophy of mind, this question becomes altogether inextricable, because every individual disputant ascribes to human nature those tendencies, either to vice or to virtue, which suit his favourite theory, and then he has no difficulty in proving that amusements either are, or are not, necessary and advantageous to a being so constituted. Philosophy gives us a firmer basis. Man cannot make and unmake mental and bodily faculties, nor vary their functions and laws of action to suit his different theories and views.

From the law of our constitution, therefore, it is plain that variety of employment is necessary to our welfare, and was so intended by the Creator. Hence He has given us a plurality of faculties, so that some may rest while others are actively employed.

Among these various faculties, there are several which appear obviously destined to contribute to our amusement: a circumstance which (as Addison has remarked) "sufficiently shows us that Providence did not design this world should be filled with murmurs and repinings, or that the heart of man should be involved in gloom and melancholy." We have received a faculty of the ludicrous, which, when active, prompts us to laugh and to excite laughter in others; we have received faculties of Tune and Time, which inspire us with the desire, and give us the talent, to produce music. Our organs of voluntary motion are so connected with these faculties, that when we hear gay and vivacious music played in well marked time, we instinctively desire to dance; and when we survey the effect of dancing on our corporeal frame, we discover that it is admirably calculated to promote the circulation of the blood and nervous influence all over the body, and by this means to strengthen the limbs, the heart, the lungs, and the brain: in short, to invigorate the health, and to render the mind cheerful and alert.

The faculty of Intellect, combined with Secretiveness, Imitation, and Ideality, confers a talent for acting, or for representing by words, looks, gestures, and attitudes the various emotions, passions, and ideas of the soul; and these representations excite the faculties of the spectators into activity in a powerful and pleasing manner. Further, the Creator has bestowed on us faculties of Constructiveness, Form, Size, Locality, and Colouring, which, combined with Imitation and Ideality, prompt us to represent objects in statuary or painting: and these representations also speak directly to the mind of the beholder, and fill it with delightful emotions. Here, then, we trace directly to Nature the origin of the stage and of the fine arts.

Again, I am forced to remark that to those individuals who have not seen evidence of the existence and functions of the faculties here enumerated, this reference of the fine arts, and of the drama in particular, to Nature, or, in other words, to the intention of the Creator, will appear unwarranted, perhaps irreverent or impious. To such persons I

reply that, having satisfied myself by observation that the faculties *do* exist, and that they produce the effects here described, I cannot avoid the conclusion in question; and in support of it I may refer also to the existence of the stage, and to the delight of mankind, in all ages and all civilised countries, in scenic representations.

If, therefore, the faculties which produce the love of the stage and the fine arts have been instituted by Nature, we may justly infer that they have legitimate, improving, and exalting objects; although, like our other talents, they may be abused. The line of demarcation between their use and their abuse may be distinguished by a moderate exercise of judgment. They are in themselves mere arts of expression and representation, a species of natural language, which may be made subservient to the gratification of all the faculties, whether propensities, moral sentiments, or intellect.

The applications made of these powers, by particular nations or individuals, bear reference to their general mental condition. The ancient Greeks and Romans enjoyed very immoral plays, and also combats of gladiators and of wild beasts, in which men and animals tore each other to pieces, and put each other to death. Such scenes were the direct stimulants of Amativeness, Combativeness, and Destructiveness, and proclaim to us, more forcibly than the pages of the most eloquent, veracious, and authentic historians, that these nations, with all their boasted refinement, were essentially barbarians, and that, in the mass of the people, the moral sentiments had not attained any important ascendency.

In the days of Queen Elizabeth and Charles the Second, plays of a very indelicate character were listened to by the nobles and common people of Britain without the least expression of disapprobation: and this indicated a general grossness of feeling and of manners to be prevalent among them. Even in our own day we become spectators of plays of very imperfect morality and questionable delicacy; and the same conclusion follows, that there still lurks among us no small portion of unrefined animal propensity and semi-barbarism: in other words, that the moral and intellectual faculties have not yet achieved the full conquest over our inferior nature.

But even in these instances there is an evident advance from the Greek and Roman standard towards a more legitimate use of the faculties of representation; and I conclude

from this fact that future generations will apply them to still higher and more useful objects. Nor is it too enthusiastic to hope that some future Shakespeare, aided by the true philosophy of mind, and by a knowledge of the natural laws according to which good and evil are dispensed in the world, may teach and illustrate the philosophy of human life with all the splendour of eloquence and soul-stirring energy of conception which lofty genius can impart; and that a future Kemble or Siddons may proclaim such lessons in living speech and gestures to mankind.

If there be any truth in the principles on which these remarks are founded, we cannot avoid lamenting that helpless (although well-meaning and amiable) imbecility which, alarmed at the abuses of amusements, decries them altogether.

In urging you to "try all things," and to distinguish between the uses and the abuses of every gift, my aim is to impart to you *knowledge to distinguish virtue* and *courage to maintain it*; to render you bold in advocating what is right, and to induce you, while there is a principle of reason and morality left to rest upon, never to abandon the field, whether of duty, instruction, or amusement, to those whom you consider the enemies of human happiness and virtue.

LECTURE V.

Man as a Domestic Being.

The previous Lectures have been devoted to consideration of the duties incumbent on man as an individual—those of acquiring knowledge and of preserving health. My reason for thus limiting his individual duties is, that I consider man essentially as a social being; and that, with the exception of his duties to God, which we shall subsequently consider, he has no duties as an individual beyond those I have mentioned, any more than a particular wheel of a watch has functions independently of performing its part in the general movements of the machine. I mean by this, that although man subsists and acts as an individual, yet that the great majority of his faculties bear reference to other beings as their objects, and show that his leading sphere of life and action is in society.

The domestic character of man is founded in, or arises from, the innate faculties of Amativeness, Philoprogenitiveness, and Adhesiveness. These give him desires for a companion of a different sex, for children, and for the society of human beings in general. Marriage results from the combination of these three faculties with the moral sentiments and the intellect, and is thus a natural institution.

Some persons conceive that marriage, or the union for life, is an institution only of ecclesiastical or of civil law; but this idea is erroneous. Where the faculties above enumerated are *adequately* and *equally* possessed, and the moral and intellectual faculties predominate, union for life, or marriage, is a natural result. It prevailed among the ancient Greeks and Romans, and it exists among the Chinese and many other nations who have not embraced either Judaism or Christianity.

It is true that certain individuals find the marriage tie a restraint, and would prefer that it should be abolished. It is also true that some tribes of savages may be found among whom it can scarcely be said to exist. But men so constituted do not form the standard by which human nature should be estimated. Viewing marriage as the

result of man's constitution, we ascribe to it a Divine origin. It is written in our minds; and, like other Divine institutions, it is supported by reward and punishment peculiar to itself. The reward attached to it is enjoyment of some of the purest and sweetest pleasures of which our nature is susceptible; and the punishment inflicted for inconstancy in it is moral and physical degradation.

Among the duties incumbent on the human being in relation to marriage, one is that the parties to it should not unite before a proper age. The civil law of Scotland allows females to marry at twelve, and males at fourteen; but the law of Nature is widely different. The female frame does not, in general, arrive at its full vigour and perfection in this climate earlier than twenty-two, nor the male earlier than from twenty-four to twenty-six. Before these ages, maturity of physical strength and of mental vigour is not, in general, attained; and the individuals, with particular exceptions, are neither corporeally nor mentally prepared to become parents, or to discharge, with advantage, the duties of heads of a domestic establishment. Their corporeal frames are not yet sufficiently matured and consolidated; their animal propensities are strong; and their moral and intellectual organs have not yet reached their full development.

The statement of the evidence and the consequences of this law belongs to physiology. Here I can only remark that if Nature has prescribed ages previous to which marriage cannot be undertaken with advantage, we are bound to pay deference to its enactments; and that civil and ecclesiastical laws, when standing in opposition to them, are not only absurd, but are also mischievous. Conscience is misled by these erroneous human statutes; for a girl of fifteen has no idea that she sins if her marriage be authorised by the law and the Church. In spite, however, of the sanction of acts of Parliament and of clerical benedictions, the Creator punishes severely if His laws be infringed. His punishments assume the following, among other forms:

The parties, being young, ignorant, inexperienced, and actuated chiefly by passion, often make unfortunate selections of partners, and entail lasting unhappiness on each other;

They transmit imperfect constitutions and inferior dispositions to their earliest born children; And

They often involve themselves in pecuniary difficulties, in

consequence of a sufficient provision not having been made before marriage to meet the expenses of a family.

These punishments indicate that a law of Nature has been violated : in other words, that marriage at too early an age is forbidden by the Author of our being.

There should not be a great disparity between the ages of the husband and the wife. A physical and mental mode of being is natural to each age; whence persons whose faculties correspond in their condition sympathise in their feelings, judgments, and pursuits, and form suitable companions for each other. When the ages are widely different, not only is this sympathy wanting, but the offspring also is injured. In such instances it is generally the husband who transgresses ; old men are fond of marrying young women. The children of such unions often suffer grievously from the disparity.

Another natural law in regard to marriage is that the parties should not be related to each other by blood. This law holds good in the transmission of all organised beings. Even vegetables are deteriorated if the same stock be repeatedly planted in the same ground. In the case of the lower animals, a continued disregard of this law is almost universally admitted to be detrimental, and human nature affords no exception to the rule. It is written in our organisation ; and the consequences of its infringement may be discovered in the degeneracy, physical and mental, of many noble and royal families, who have long and systematically set it at defiance.

It is curious to observe the inconsistency of the enactments of legislators on the subject. According to the *Levitical* law, which we in this country have adopted, "marriage is prohibited between relations within *three* degrees of kindred, computing the generations through the common ancestor, and accounting affinity the same as consanguinity. Among the *Athenians*, brothers and sisters of the half-blood, if related by the father's side, might marry ; if by the mother's side, they were prohibited from marrying.

"The same custom," says Paley, "probably prevailed in *Chaldea*, for Sarah was Abraham's half-sister. 'She is the daughter of my father,' says Abraham, 'but not of my mother ; and she became my wife' (Gen. xx. 12). The *Roman* law continued the prohibition without limits to the descendants of brothers or sisters." *

* Paley's "Moral Philosophy," p. 228.

Here we observe Athenian, Chaldean, and Roman legislators prohibiting or permitting certain acts, apparently according to the degree of light which had penetrated into their own understandings concerning their natural consequences. The real Divine law is written in the structure and modes of action of our bodily and mental constitutions, and it prohibits the marriage of all blood relations, diminishing the punishment, however, according as the remoteness from the common ancestor increases, but allowing marriages among relations by affinity, without any prohibition whatever.

According to the law of Scotland, a man may marry his cousin-german, or his *great* niece, both of which connections the law of Nature declares to be inexpedient; but he may not marry his deceased wife's sister, against which connection Nature declares no penalty whatever. He might have married either sister at first without impropriety, and there is no reason *in nature* why he may not marry them in succession—the one after the other has died. There may be other reasons of expediency for prohibiting this connection, but the organic laws do not condemn it.

In Scotland, the practice of full cousins marrying is not uncommon, and you will meet with examples of healthy families born of such unions; and from these an argument is maintained against the existence of the natural law which we are now considering. But it is only when the parents have both had excellent constitutions that the children do not attract attention by their imperfections. The first alliance against the natural laws brings down the tone of the organs and functions, say, one degree; the second two degrees, and the third three; and perseverance in transgression ends in glaring imperfections or in extinction of the race. This is undeniable; and it proves the reality of the law.

The children of healthy cousins are not so favourably organised as the children of the same parents, if married to equally healthy partners, not all related in blood, would have been. If the cousins have themselves inherited indifferent constitutions, the degeneracy is striking even in their children. Besides, I have seen the children of cousins continue healthy till the age of puberty, and then suffer from marked imperfections of constitution. Their good health in childhood was looked on by the parents as a proof that they had not in their union infringed any natural

law, but the subsequent events proved a painful retribution for their conduct. We may err in interpreting Nature's laws; but when we do discover them in their full import and consequences, we never find exceptions to them.

Another natural law relative to marriage is that the parties should possess sound constitutions. The punishment for neglecting this law is, that the transgressors suffer pain and misery in their own persons from bad health, perhaps become disagreeable companions to each other, feel themselves unfit to discharge the duties of their condition, and transmit feeble constitutions to their children. They are also exposed to premature death; and hence their children are liable to all the melancholy consequences of being left unprotected and unguided by parental experience and affection at a time when these are most needed. The natural law is that a weak and imperfectly organised frame transmits one of a similar description to offspring; and the children, inheriting weakness, are prone to fall into disease and to die. Indeed, the transmission of various diseases, founded in physical imperfections, from parents to children is a matter of universal notoriety; thus, consumption, rheumatism, gout, scrofula, hydrocephalus, and insanity are well known to descend from generation to generation. Strictly speaking, it is not *disease* which is transmitted, but organs of such imperfect structure that they are incapable of adequately performing their functions, and so weak that they are drawn into a morbid condition by causes which sound organs could easily resist.

As to the transmission of mental qualities, I observe that form and quality of brain descend, like those of other parts of the body, from parents to children; and that hence dispositions and talents, which depend upon the condition of the brain, are transmitted also—a fact which has long been remarked both by medical authors and by observant men in general.

The qualities of the stock of each parent are apt to reappear in their children. If there be insanity in the family of the father or the mother, although both of these may have escaped it, the disease, or some imperfection of brain allied to it, frequently reappears in one or more of their children. The great characteristic qualities of the stock, in like manner, are often reproduced in distant descendants.

While the father's constitution undoubtedly exerts an

influence, the constitution of the mother seems to have more effect in determining the qualities of the children, particularly when she is a woman possessing a fine temperament and an energetic mind. There are few instances of men of distinguished vigour and activity of mind whose mothers did not possess a considerable amount of the same endowments; and the fact of eminent men having so frequently children far inferior to themselves is explicable by the circumstance that men of talent often marry women whose minds are comparatively weak. When the mother's brain is *very* defective, the minds of the children are feeble.

"We know," says the great German physiologist Haller, "a very remarkable instance of two noble females who got husbands on account of their wealth, although they were nearly idiots, and from which this mental defect has extended for a century into several families, so that some of all their descendants still continue idiots in the fourth and even the fifth generation."* In many families the qualities of both father and mother are seen blended in the children. Finally, it often happens that the mental qualities of the father are transmitted to some of the children, and those of the mother to others.

It is pleasing to observe that in Würtemburg, Baden, and some other German States, there are two excellent laws calculated to improve the moral and physical condition of the people. First, "It is illegal for any young man to marry before he is twenty-five, or any young woman before she is eighteen." Here the human legislator pays much more deference to the Divine Lawgiver than he does in our country. Secondly, "A man, at whatever age he wishes to marry, must show to the police and the priest of the commune where he resides that he is able, and has the prospect, to provide for a wife and family." This also is extremely judicious.

Another natural law in regard to marriage is that the mental qualities and the physical constitutions of the parties should *be adapted to each other.* If their dispositions, tastes, talents, and general habits harmonise, the reward is domestic felicity—the greatest enjoyment of life. If these differ so widely as to cause jarring and collision, the home, which should be the palace of peace and the mansion of the softest affections of our nature, becomes a

* "Elem. Physiol.," Lib. xxix., Sec. 2, § 8.

theatre of war ; and of all states of hostility, that between husband and wife is the most interminable and incurable, because the combatants live constantly together, have all things in common, and are continually exposed to the influence of each other's dispositions.

The importance of this law becomes more striking when we attend to the fact that, by ill assortment, not only are the parties themselves rendered unhappy, but their immoral condition directly affects the dispositions of their children. It is a rule in Nature that the effects even of temporary departures from the organic laws descend to offspring produced during that state, and injure their constitutions.

Thus—children produced under the influence of inebriety appear to receive an organisation which renders them liable to a craving appetite for stimulating fluids. Children produced when the parents are depressed with misfortune, and suffering under severe nervous debility, are liable to be easily affected by events calculated to induce a similar condition ; children produced when the parents are under the influence of violent passion inherit a constitution that renders them liable to the same excitement. Hence, on the other hand, children produced when the parents are happy, and under the dominion of the higher sentiments and the intellect, inherit qualities that render them naturally disposed to corresponding states of mind.

In my second Lecture I laid down the principle that man's first duty, as an individual, is to acquire knowledge of himself, of external nature, and of the will of God ; and I beg your attention to the application of this knowledge when acquired. If organic laws relative to marriage be really instituted by the Creator, and if reward and punishment be annexed to each of them, of what avail is it to know these facts abstractly, unless we know also the corresponding duties, and are disposed to perform them? We want such a knowledge of the human constitution as will carry home to the *understanding* and the *conscience* the law of God written in our frames, and will induce us to obey it. The sanction of public sentiment, religion, and civil enactments are all necessary to enforce the observance of that law; and we need training also to render obedience habitual.

Knowledge of the constitutions of individuals about to marry can be attained only by the study of the structure, functions, and laws of the body. If anatomy and physiology,

and their practical applications, formed branches of general education, we should be led to view this subject in all its importance, and, where our own skill was insufficient to direct us, we should call in higher experience.

Believing, as I do, that the Creator has constituted Man a rational being, I am prepared to maintain that average men, if *adequately instructed and trained*, could not avoid giving effect to the natural laws in forming marriages. If, before the domestic affections come into full activity, the youth of both sexes were instructed in the laws of the Creator relative to marriage, and if the sanctions of religion and the opinion of society were added to enforce the fulfilment of them, it is not to be presumed that the propensities would still hurry average men to act in disregard of all these guides. This assumption would imply that man is *not* rational, and that the Creator has laid down laws for him which he is incapable, under any natural guidance, of obeying — a proposition which to me is incredible.

LECTURE VI.

Polygamy and Divorce.

My last Lecture related to the constitution of marriage. Moralists generally discuss also the questions of polygamy, fidelity to the marriage vow, and divorce.

On the subject of polygamy, I may remark that it is pretty well ascertained by statistical researches that the proportions of the sexes born are thirteen males to twelve females. From the greater hazards to which the male sex is exposed, this disparity is reduced, in adult life, to equality; indeed, in almost all Europe, owing to the injurious habits and pursuits of the men, the balance among adults is turned the other way, the females of any given age above puberty preponderating over the males.

In some Eastern countries more females are born than males; and it is said that this indicates a design in nature that *there* each male should have several wives. But there is reason to believe that the variation from the proportion of thirteen to twelve is the consequence of vicious habits in the males. In our own country and race it is observed that when old men marry young females the progeny are generally daughters; and I infer that, in the Eastern countries alluded to, in which an excess of females exists, the cause may be found in the superior vigour and youth of the females.

The equality of the sexes, therefore, when the organic laws are duly observed, affords one strong indication that polygamy is not a natural institution. This conclusion is strengthened by considering the objects of the domestic affections. Harmonious gratification of the faculties constituting the domestic group, in accordance with the moral sentiments and the intellect, is attended with the greatest amount of pure enjoyment and the most advantageous results; but this can be attained only by the union of one male with one female.

If the male have several wives, there is a diminution of gratification to Adhesiveness and Philoprogenitiveness; for his attachment, diffused among a multitude of objects, can never glow with the intensity, nor act with the softness and

purity, which inspire it when directed to one wife and her offspring. The females also, in a state of polygamy, must be deprived of gratification to their Self-Esteem and Adhesiveness, for none of them can claim an undivided love.

There is injustice to the females, therefore, in the practice; and no institution that is unjust can proceed from nature. Further, when we consider that in married life the pleasures derived from the domestic affections are unspeakably enhanced by the habitual play of the moral feelings, and that polygamy is fatal to the close sympathy, confidence, respect, and reciprocal devotion which are the attendants of active moral sentiments, we shall be fully convinced that the Creator has not intended that men should unite themselves to a plurality of wives.

Regarding fidelity: Every argument tending to show that polygamy is forbidden by the natural law goes to support the obligation of fidelity to the marriage vow. As this point is one on which, fortunately, no difficulty or difference of opinion among rational persons exists, I shall not dwell on it, but shall proceed to the subject of divorce.

The law of Scotland permits divorce on account of infidelity to the marriage vow; of non-adherence, or wilful desertion, as it is called, by the husband, of his wife's society; and of personal imbecility. The law of Moses permitted the Jewish husband to put away his wife; and under Napoleon the French law permitted married persons to dissolve their marriage by consent, after giving one year's judicial notice of their intention, and making suitable provisions for their children. The New Testament confines divorce to the single case of infidelity in the wife.

The question now occurs—What does the law of Nature, written in our constitutions, enact?

The first fact that presents itself to our consideration is that in persons of well-constituted minds, Nature not only institutes marriage, but makes it indissoluble, except by death: even those lower animals which live in pairs exemplify permanent connection. In regard to man, I remark that where the domestic affections bear a just proportion to each other, and where the moral and intellectual are favourably developed and cultivated, there is not only no desire on either side to bring the marriage tie to an end, but there is the utmost repugnance to do so.

Where the marriage union is formed according to Nature's laws, no civil enactments are needed to render it indissoluble during life. It is clear that life-endurance is stamped upon it by the Creator when He renders its continuance so sweet, and its bursting asunder so indescribably painful. It is only where the minds of the parties are ill-constituted, or the union is otherwise unfortunate, that the desire for separation exists.

The causes which may lead married individuals to wish to terminate their union may be briefly considered.

If, in either of them, the inferior faculties predominate greatly over Adhesiveness, Philoprogenitiveness, and the moral sentiments, there is a feeling of restraint in the married state which is painful.

To compel a virtuous and amiable partner to live in inseparable society with a person thus constituted, and to be the unwilling medium of transmitting immoral dispositions to children, appears directly contrary to the dictates both of benevolence and of justice. Paley's argument against permitting dissolution of the marriage tie at the will of the husband is, "that new objects of desire would be continually sought after, if men could at will be released from their subsisting engagements. Supposing the husband to have once preferred his wife to all other women, the duration of this preference cannot be trusted to. Possession makes a great difference, and there is *no other* security against the invitations of novelty than the known impossibility of obtaining the object."

This argument is good when applied to men with unfavourably balanced brains: viz., to those in whom the inferior faculties predominate over Adhesiveness and the moral sentiments; but it is unfounded as a general rule, and the question is, whether it be desirable to deny absolutely to the great body of the people all available means of dissolving the connection with such beings. It appears not to be so. The husband, certainly, should not have the power to dissolve the marriage tie at his pleasure; but the French law seems more reasonable, which permitted the parties to dissolve the marriage when both of them, after twelve months' deliberation, and after suitably providing for their children, desired to bring it to a close.

The same argument applies to the voluntary dissolution of marriage in cases of irreconcilable differences in temper and dispositions. "The law of Nature," says Paley,

"admits of divorce in favour of the injured party in cases of adultery, of obstinate desertion, of attempts upon life, of outrageous cruelty, of incurable madness, and perhaps of personal imbecility; but by no means indulges the same privileges to mere dislike, to opposition of humours and inclination, to contrariety of taste and temper, to complaints of coldness, neglect, severity, peevishness, jealousy: not that these reasons are trivial, but because such objections may always be alleged, and are impossible by testimony to be ascertained; so that to allow implicit credit to them, and to dissolve marriages whenever either party thought fit to pretend them, would lead in its effects to all the licentiousness of arbitrary divorces.

"If a married pair, in actual and irreconcilable discord, complain that their happiness would be better consulted by permitting them to determine a connection which is become odious to both, it may be told them that the same permission, as a general rule, would produce libertinism, dissension, and misery among thousands who are now virtuous, and quiet, and happy in their condition; and it ought to satisfy them to reflect that, when their happiness is sacrificed to the operation of an unrelenting rule, it is sacrificed to the happiness of the community."

In my view, this argument is a grand fallacy. Actual and irreconcilable discord arises from want of harmony in the natural dispositions of the parties, and agreement arises from the existence of such harmony. The natures of the parties in the one case differ irreconcilably; but to maintain that if two persons of such discordant minds were permitted to separate, thousands of accordant minds would instantly fly asunder, is as illogical as it would be to assert that if the humane spectators of a street fight were to separate the combatants, they would forthwith be seized with the mania of fighting among themselves.

In point of fact, the common arguments on this subject have been written in ignorance of the real elements of human nature, and are applicable only to particularly constituted individuals. Married persons may be divided into three classes: First, those whose dispositions naturally accord, and who, consequently, are happy; secondly, those in whom there are some feelings in harmony, but many in discord, and who are in the medium state between happiness and misery; and thirdly, those between whose dispositions there are irreconcilable differences, and who

are, in consequence, altogether unhappy in each other's society.

Paley's views, if applied to persons who are bordering on the middle line of like and dislike towards each other, would be sound. To hold up to such persons extreme difficulty or impossibility in obtaining a dissolution of the marriage tie will present them with motives to cultivate those feelings in which they agree; while to offer them easy means of terminating it might lead to a reckless aggravation of their quarrels.

But this is only one class, and their case does not exhaust the question. Where the union is really accordant in nature, the facility of undoing it will not alter its character, nor produce the desire to destroy the happiness which it engenders. Where it is irremediably unsuitable and unhappy, the sacrifice of the parties will not mend their own condition; and as the happy are safe in the attractions of a reciprocal affection, the only persons who can be said to be benefited by the example of the inseparability of the wretched are the class of waverers to whom I have alluded.

I humbly think that Nature has attached not a few penalties to the dissolution of the marriage tie, which may have some effect on this class; and that these, aided by proper legal impediments to the fulfilment of their caprices, might render the restraints on them sufficient, without calling for the absolute sacrifice of their completely unhappy brethren for the supposed public good.

Such a conclusion is greatly strengthened by the consideration that the dispositions of children are determined, in an important degree, by the predominant dispositions of the parents; and that to prevent the separation of wretched couples is to entail misery on the offspring, not only by the influence of example, but by the transmission of ill-constituted brains.

The argument that an indissoluble tie presents motives to the exercise of grave reflection before marriage might be worthy of some consideration if persons contemplating that state possessed *adequate* means of rendering reflection successful; but while the law permits matrimonial unions at ages when the parties are destitute of foresight, and while the system of moral and intellectual education pursued in this country furnishes scarcely one sound element of information to guide the judgment in its choice, the argument is a mockery at once of reason and of human suffering.

It appears to me that until mankind shall be instructed in the views which I am now advocating (in so far as experience shall prove them to be sound), and shall be trained to venerate them as institutions of Nature, and to practise them in their conduct, they will not possess adequate means of acting rationally and successfully in forming marriages. While sources of error encompass them on every side, they ought not to be deprived of the possibility of escaping from the pit into which they may have inadvertently fallen; and not only divorce for infidelity to the marriage vow, but dissolution of marriage by voluntary consent under proper restrictions, and after due deliberation, should be permitted.*

* The revised statutes of Massachusetts (chapter 76, sect. 5) permit divorce "for adultery, or defect in either party, or when either of them is sentenced to confinement to hard labour in the State prison, or in any jail or house of correction, for the term of life, or for seven years or more; and no pardon granted to the party so sentenced, after a divorce for that cause, shall restore the party to his or her conjugal rights." This last is a just and humane provision; for it is calculated for the relief of the innocent partner of a confirmed criminal.

LECTURE VII.

The Duties of Parents.

Having now considered the general subject of marriage, I proceed to make some remarks on the duties of parents to their children.

Their first duty is to transmit sound constitutions, bodily and mental, to their offspring; and this can be done only by their possessing sound constitutions themselves, and living in habitual observance of the natural laws.

In the next place, parents are bound by the laws of Nature to support and educate their children, and to provide for their welfare and happiness. The foundation of this duty is laid in the constitution of the mind. Philoprogenitiveness, acting along with Benevolence, gives the impulse to its performance, and Veneration and Conscientiousness invest it with all the sanctions of moral and religious obligation. When these faculties are adequately possessed, there is in parents a strong and never slumbering desire to promote the real advantage of their offspring; and in such cases, only intellectual enlightenment and pecuniary resources are wanting to ensure its complete fulfilment.

The views of Mr. Malthus on population may be adverted to in connection with the duty of parents to support their families. Stated simply, they are these:—The productive power of healthy, well fed, well lodged, and well clothed human beings is naturally so great, that fully two children will be born for every person who will die within a given time; and as a generation lasts about thirty years, at the end of that period the population will, of course, be doubled. In point of fact, in the circumstances here enumerated, population is observed actually to double itself in twenty-five years. This rate of increase takes place in the newly settled and healthy states of North America, independently of immigration.

To become aware of the effects which this power of increase would produce in a country of circumscribed territory, like Great Britain, we need resort only to a very simple calculation. If, for example, Great Britain in 1800 had contained twelve millions of inhabitants, and this rate of

increase had taken place, the population in 1825 would have amounted to twenty-four millions; in 1850 it would amount to forty-eight millions; in 1875 to ninety-six millions; and so on, always doubling every twenty-five years.*

Now, Malthus maintained that food cannot be made to increase in the same proportion. We cannot *extend the surface* of Britain, for Nature has fixed its limits; and no skill or labour will suffice to augment the productive powers of the soil in a ratio doubling every twenty-five years. As the same power of increase exists in other countries, similar observations are applicable to them.

He, therefore, drew the conclusion that human beings (in the absence of adequate means of emigration, and of procuring food from foreign countries) should restrain their productive powers by the exercise of their moral and intellectual faculties: in other words, should not marry until they are in possession of sufficient means to maintain and educate a family. He added that if this rule were generally infringed, and if the practice of marrying early and exerting the powers of reproduction to their full extent became common, in a densely populated country, Providence would check the increase by premature deaths, resulting from misery and starvation.

This doctrine has been loudly declaimed against; but its merits may be easily analysed. The domestic affections are powerful, and come early into play, apparently to afford a complete guarantee against extinction of the race; but along with them, we have received moral sentiments and intellect, bestowed for the evident purpose of guiding and restraining them, so as to lead them to their best and most permanent enjoyments. Now, what authority is there in nature for maintaining that these affections alone are entitled to emancipation from moral restraint and intellectual guidance; and that men have a right to pursue their own gratification from the first moment of their energetic existence to the last, if only the marriage vow shall have been taken and observed?

I see no foundation in reason for this view. From the imperfections of our moral education, we have been led to

* In point of fact, the population of Great Britain in 1831 was 16,261,000; in 1861 it was 23,128,000; in 1891 it was 33,026,000. That is to say, it had taken sixty years to double itself, not twenty-five. But, of course, emigration has greatly increased.—ED., 1893.

believe that if a priest solemnise a marriage, and if the vow of fidelity be observed, there is no sin, although there may be imprudence or misfortune, in rearing a family for whom we are unable to provide. But if we believe in the natural laws as institutions of the Creator, we shall be satisfied that there is great sin in such conduct.

We know that Nature has given us strong desires for property, and has fired us with ambition, the love of splendour, and other powerful longings; yet no rational person argues that these desires may, with propriety, be gratified when we have not the means of legitimately doing so; or that any ecclesiastical ceremony or dispensation can render such gratification allowable. Why, then, should the domestic affections form an exception to the universal rule of moral guidance and restraint?

Mr. Sadler, a writer on this subject, argues that marriages naturally become less prolific as the population becomes more dense, and that in this way the consequences predicted by Malthus are prevented. But this is trifling with the question; for the very misery of which Malthus speaks is the cause of the diminished rate of increase. This diminution may be owing either to fewer children being born, or to more dying early in a densely than in a thinly peopled country or district. The causes why fewer children are born in densely peopled countries are easily traced. Some persons, finding subsistence difficult of attainment, practise moral restraint and marry late. Others who neglect this precaution are, by the competition inseparable from that condition, oppressed with cares and troubles, whereby the fruitfulness of marriage is diminished; but these are instances of misery attending on a dense state of population.

Again, it is certain that in such circumstances the mortality of children is greater; but this is the result of confined dwellings, imperfect nutrition, depressed energies, and care and anxiety, which, through competition, afflict many parents in that social condition.

If the opponents of Malthus could show that there is a law of Nature by which the productiveness of marriage is diminished in proportion to the density of the population, *without an increase of misery*, they would completely refute his doctrine. This, however, they cannot do. A healthy couple, who marry at a proper age, and live in comfort and plenty, are able to rear as numerous and vigorous a family in the county of Edinburgh, which is densely peopled, as in

the thinly inhabited county of Ross. Mr. Malthus, therefore, does well in bringing the domestic affections, equally with our other faculties, under the control of the moral and intellectual powers.

The next duty of parents is to preserve the life and health of their children after birth, and to place them in circumstances calculated to develop favourably their physical and mental powers. It is painful to contemplate the extent to which human ignorance and wickedness cause this duty to be neglected. "A hundred years ago," says Dr. A. Combe, "when the pauper infants of London were received and brought up in the workhouses, amidst impure air, crowding, and want of proper food, not above one in twenty-four lived to be a year old; so that out of 2,900 annually received into them, 2,690 died. But when the conditions of health came to be a little better understood, and an Act of Parliament was obtained obliging the parish officers to send the infants to nurse in the country, this frightful mortality was reduced to 450 instead of 2,690!"

In 1781, when the Dublin Lying-in Hospital was imperfectly ventilated, "every sixth child died within nine days after birth of convulsive disease; and after means of thorough ventilation had been adopted, the mortality of infants, within the same time, in five succeeding years, was reduced to nearly one in twenty." Even under private and maternal care, the mortality of infants is extraordinary.

"It appears from the London bills of mortality, that between a fourth and a fifth of all the infants baptised die within the first two years of their existence. This extraordinary result is not a part of the Creator's designs; it does not occur in the case of the lower animals, and must therefore have causes capable of removal."* It is the punishment of gross ignorance and neglect of the organic laws. Before birth, the infant lives in a temperature of 98°, being that of the mother; at birth it is suddenly ushered into the atmosphere of a cold climate, and among the poorer classes through want, and among the richer through ignorance or inattention, it is often left very inadequately protected against the effects of this sudden change. In the earlier stages of infancy, improper food, imperfect ventilation, deficient cleanliness, and want of general attention, consign many to the grave; while in childhood and youth great

* "Physiology applied to Health and Education."

mischief to health and life are often occasioned by direct infringements of the organic laws.

When you study this subject with a view to practice, you will find that the principles which I laid down in the fourth Lecture are of great importance as guides—namely, that each organ of the body has received a definite constitution, and that health is the result of the harmonious and favourable action of the whole. Hence, it is not sufficient to provide merely airy bedrooms for children if at the same time the means of cleanliness be neglected, or their brains be over-exerted in attending too many classes and learning too many tasks. The delicate brain of youth demands frequent repose.

In short, a practical knowledge of the laws of the human constitution is highly conducive to the successful rearing of children; and the heartrending desolation of parents, when they see the dearest objects of their affections successively torn from them by death, should be viewed as the chastisement of ignorance or negligence alone, and not as proofs of the world being constituted unfavourably for the production of human enjoyment.

In this matter, however, parents should not look to *their own* happiness merely; they are under solemn obligations to the children whom they bring into the world. Improper treatment in infancy and childhood, at which period the body grows rapidly, is productive of effects far more prejudicial and permanent than at any subsequent age.* Assuredly those parents are not guiltless who wilfully keep themselves in ignorance of the organic laws, or who, knowing these, refrain from acting in accordance with them in the rearing of their children. The latter have a positive claim (which no parent of right feeling will disregard or deny) on those who have brought them into existence that they shall do all in their power to render it agreeable.

Perhaps some may think that the importance of obedience to the organic laws has been insisted on more than the subject required. Such an idea is natural enough, considering that an exposition of these laws forms no part of ordinary education, and that obedience to them is enjoined by no human authority. There is no trace of them in the

* The principles which should guide parents in the treatment of children are stated and enforced in Dr. A. Combe's work on the "Physiological and Moral Treatment of Infancy."

statute-book, none in the catechisms issued by authority of the Church ; and you rarely, if ever, hear them mentioned as laws of God by His servants who teach His will from the pulpit. Nay, even the general tongue of society, which allows few subjects to escape remark, is silent with regard to them. Hence, it is probable that the importance of obeying the organic laws may, to some, appear to be over-estimated in these Lectures.

But the universal silence which prevails in society has its source in ignorance. Physiology is still unknown to nineteen-twentieths even of educated persons, and to the mass it is a complete *terra incognita*. Even by medical men it is little studied as a practical science, and the idea of its beneficial application as a guide to human conduct in general is only now beginning to engage their attention.

On this subject I would observe that there is a vast difference between the uncertain and the unascertained. It is now universally admitted that all the movements of matter are regulated ; and that they are never uncertain, although the laws which they observe may, in some instances, be unascertained. The revolutions of the planets can be predicted, while those of some of the comets are still unknown ; but no philosopher imagines that the latter are uncertain.

The minutest drop of water that descends the mighty Fall of Niagara is regulated in all its movements by definite laws, whether it rise in mist and float in the atmosphere to distant regions, there to descend as rain ; or be absorbed by a neighbouring shrub and reappear as an atom in a blossom adorning the Canadian shore ; or be drunk up by a living creature, and mingle with its blood ; or become a portion of an oak, which at a future time shall career on the ocean. Nothing can be less ascertained, or probably less ascertainable by mortal study, than the revolutions of such an atom ; but every philosopher, without a moment's hesitation, will concede that not one of them is uncertain.*

The first element of a philosophic understanding is the capacity of extending the same conviction to the events evolved in every department of nature. A man who sees disease occurring in youth or in middle age, and whose mind is not capable of perceiving that it is the result of

* I owe this forcible illustration to Dr. Chalmers, having first heard it in one of his lectures.

imperfect or of excessive action in some vital organ, and that imperfect or excessive action is just another name for deviation from the proper healthy state of that organ, is not capable of reasoning. It may be true that in many instances our knowledge is so imperfect that we are unable to discover the chain of connection between the disease and its organic cause; but, nevertheless, he is no philosopher who doubts that such a connection exists, and that the discovery of it is presented as an important practical problem to the human understanding to solve.

One cause of the obscurity that prevails on this subject in the minds of persons not medically educated is ignorance of the structure and functions of the body; and another is, that diseases appear under two very distinct forms —structural and functional; only the former of which is considered by common observers to constitute a proper malady.

If an arrow be shot into the eye, there is derangement of structure, and the most determined opponent of the natural laws will at once admit the connection between the blindness which ensues and the lesion of the organ. But if a watchmaker or an optical instrument-maker, by long-continued and excessive exertion of the eye, have become blind, the disease is called functional, because the function from being over-stimulated is impaired; but frequently no alteration of structure can be perceived.

No philosophic physiologist, however, doubts that there *is*, in the structure, a change corresponding to the functional derangement, although human observation cannot detect it. He never says that it is nonsense to assert that the patient has become blind in consequence of infringement of the organic laws. It is one of these laws that the function of the eye shall be exercised moderately, and it is a breach of that law to strain it to excess.

The same principle applies to a great number of diseases occurring under the organic laws. Imperfections in the tone, structure, or proportions of certain organs may exist at birth, so hidden by their situation, or so slight, as not to be readily perceptible, but not on that account the less real and important; or deviations may be made gradually and imperceptibly from the proper and healthy standards of exercise, and from one or other of these causes diseases may invade the constitution.

Religious persons term disease occurring in this manner

a dispensation of God's providence; the careless name it an unaccountable event; but the philosophic physician invariably views it as the result of imperfect or excessive action of some organ or another, and he never doubts that it has been caused by deviations from the laws of the animal economy. Neither disease nor death, in early or middle life, can take place under the ordinary administrations of Providence, except when these laws have been infringed.

My reason for insisting so strongly on this subject is a profound conviction of the importance of the organic laws. They are fundamental to happiness: that is, the consequences of errors in regard to them cannot be compensated for or removed by any other means than obedience.

I daily see melancholy results of inattention to their dictates. When you observe the husband, in youth or in middle age, removed by death from the partner of his love, and the other dear objects of his affections; or when you see the mother at a similar age torn from her infant children, her heart bleeding at the thought of leaving them in the hand of the stranger while they most need her maternal care: the cause of the calamity is either that the dying parent inherited a defective constitution in consequence of disobedience by his ancestors of the organic laws, or that he himself has infringed them grievously.

Again, if we see the lovely infant snatched from the mother's bosom by the hand of death while it caused every affection of her mind to thrill with joy, and fed her hopes with the fondest and brightest visions of its future talent, virtue and happiness—let us trace the cause, and we shall find that the organic laws have been infringed.

If you see an aged man walking with heavy step and deeply dejected mien, the nearest follower after a bier adorned with white—it is a father carrying to the grave his first-born son, the hope and stay of his life, torn from him in the full bloom of manhood, when already he had eased the hoary head of half its load of care. The cause of this scene also is infringement of the organic laws.

If, therefore, we desire to diminish this class of calamities, we must study and obey the organic laws. As these laws operate independently of all others, we may manifest the piety of angels, and yet we shall suffer if we neglect them. If there be any remedy on earth for this class of evils, it is obedience to the laws of our constitution, and

this alone. If, then, these laws be fundamental—if the consequences of disobeying them be so formidable, and if escape be so impossible, you will forgive the anxiety with which I have endeavoured to expound them.

I might draw pictures the converse of all that I have here represented, and show you health, long life, happiness, and prosperity as the rewards of obeying these and the other natural laws, and I should still be justified by philosophy ; but the principle, if admitted, will carry home these counter results to your own understandings.

I beg permission further to remark that all philosophy and theology which have been propounded by men ignorant of these laws, may be expected to be imperfect ; and that, therefore, we arrogate no undue superiority in refusing to yield the convictions of our own judgments to the dictates of such guides, who had not sufficient data on which to found their opinions. The events of human life, viewed through the medium of their principles, and of the philosophy which I am now expounding, must appear in very different lights. In their eyes many events appear inscrutable which to us are clear. According to our view, an all-wise and beneficent Creator has bestowed on us, the highest of His terrestrial creatures, the gift of reason, and has arranged the whole world as a theatre for its exercise.

In concluding, it is proper to add one observation. Mankind have lived so long without becoming acquainted with the organic laws, and have, in consequence, so extensively transgressed them, that there are few individuals in civilised society who do not bear in their persons, to a greater or a less extent, imperfections derived from this source. It is impossible, therefore, even for the most anxious disciples of the new doctrine, all at once to yield perfect obedience to these laws. If none were to marry in whose family stock, and in whose individual person, any traces of serious departures from the organic laws were to be found, the civilised world would become a desert. The return to obedience must be gradual, and the accomplishment of it the result of time.

It is deeply mysterious that man should have been so formed as to err for thousands of years through ignorance of his own constitution and the laws under which he suffers or enjoys ; but it is equally mysterious that the globe itself underwent the successive revolutions revealed by geology, destroying myriads of living creatures, and extinguishing

whole races of beings, before it attained its present state. It is equally mysterious, also, why the earth presents such striking inequalities of soil and climate—in some regions so beautiful, so delightful, so prolific: in others so dreary, sterile, and depressing. It is equally mysterious that men have been created mortal creatures, living, even at the best, but for a season on the earth, and then yielding their places to successors, whose tenures will be as brief as their own.

These are mysteries which reason cannot penetrate, and for which fancy cannot account; but they all relate, not to our conduct here, but to the will of God in the creation of the universe. Although we cannot unravel the counsels of the Omnipotent, that is no reason why we should not study and obey His laws. What He has presented to us we are bound to accept with gratitude at His hand as a gift; but in using it we are called on to exercise our reason, the noblest of His boons; and we may rest assured that no impenetrable darkness will hang over the path of our duty when we shall have fairly opened our eyes and our understandings to the study of His works.

There is no difficulty in believing that man, having received reason, was intended to use it—that by neglecting to do so, he has suffered evils—and that when he shall duly employ it, his miseries will diminish; and this is all that I am now teaching. It may be inexplicable why we should not earlier have gone into the road that leads to happiness; but let us not hesitate to enter it now, if we see it fairly open before us.

Next to the duty of providing for the physical health and enjoyment of their children, parents are bound to train and educate them properly, so as to fit them for the discharge of the duties of life. The grounds of this obligation are obvious. The human body and mind consist of a large assemblage of organs and faculties, each possessing native energy and an extensive sphere of action, and capable of being used or abused, according as it is directed. The extensive range of these powers—a prime element in the dignity of man—renders education exceedingly important. As parents are the authors and guardians of beings thus endowed, it is clearly their duty to train their faculties, and to direct them to their proper objects. "To send an uneducated child into the world," says Paley, "is little better than to turn out a mad dog or a wild beast into the streets."

To conduct education properly, it is necessary to know the physical and mental constitution of the being to be educated,

and also the world in which he is to be an actor. Generally speaking, the former knowledge is not possessed, and the latter object is very little regarded. How many parents are able to call up, even in their own minds, any satisfactory view of the mental faculties (with their objects and spheres of action) which they aim at training in their children? How many add to this knowledge an acquaintance with the physical constitution of the human being, and of the kind of treatment which is best calculated to develop favourably its energies and capabilities? Nay, who can point out even a body of professional teachers who are thus highly accomplished? I fear few of us can do so.

I do not blame either parents or teachers for the present imperfect state of their knowledge, because they themselves were not taught; indeed, the information here described did not exist a few years ago, and it exists but to a very limited extent still. Ignorance, therefore, is our misfortune rather than our fault; and my sole object in adverting to its magnitude is to present us with motives to remove it. While it continues so profound and extensive as it has hitherto generally been, sound and salutary education can no more be accomplished than you can cause light to shine forth out of darkness.

Scotland has long boasted of her superior education; but her eyes are now opening to the groundlessness of this pretension. In May, 1835, Dr. Welsh, in the General Assembly, told the nation that Protestant Germany, and even some parts of Catholic Germany, are, in that respect, far before us. The public mind is becoming so much alive to our deficiencies, that better prospects open up for the future.

The objects of education are—to strengthen the faculties that are too weak, to restrain those that are too vigorous, to store the intellect with moral, religious, scientific, and general knowledge, and to direct all to their proper objects. In cultivating the intellect, we should bear in view that external nature is as directly adapted to our different intellectual powers as light is to the eye; and that the whole economy of our constitution is arranged on the principle that we shall study the qualities and relations of external objects, apply them to our use, and also adapt our conduct to their operation.

The three great means of education are domestic training, public schools, and literature or books. The first will be improved by instructing parents; the second by the diffusion

of knowledge among the people at large; while the third is now—through the efforts of those philanthropists who have given birth to really cheap moral and scientific literature (particularly Messrs. Chambers, of Edinburgh)—placed within the reach of every class of the community.

In the present course of Lectures I am treating merely of *duties;* and when I point out to you the foundation and extent of the duty of educating your children, it is all that I can accomplish. I cannot here discuss the *manner* in which you may best discharge this obligation. After you have become acquainted with Anatomy and Physiology as the keys to the physical constitution of man; with the Philosophy of Mind as the development of his mental constitution; with Chemistry, Natural History, and Natural Philosophy as expositions of the external world, and with Political Economy and Moral Philosophy as the sciences of human action: you will be in possession of the rudimentary or elementary knowledge necessary to enable you to comprehend and profit by a course of lectures on practical education, which is really the application of this knowledge to the most important of all purposes: that of training the body to health, and the mind to virtue, intelligence, and happiness.

The process of education consists in training faculties and communicating knowledge; and it appears to me to be about as hopeless a task to attempt to perform this duty by mere rules and directions as it was for the Israelites to make bricks in Egypt without straw. I am the more anxious to insist on this point, because no error is more common in the practical walks of life than the belief that a parent can learn how to educate a child without undergoing the labour of educating himself. Many parents of both sexes, but particularly mothers, have told me, that if I would lecture on Education, they would come and hear me, because they considered the education of their children to be a duty, and were disposed to sacrifice the time necessary for obtaining instruction how to discharge it.

When I recommended them to begin by studying Physiology, Chemistry, Natural Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Mind, at least to such an extent as to be able to comprehend the nature of the body and mind which they proposed to train, and the objects by which the mind and body are surrounded, and on which education is intended to enable them to act—they instantly declared that they had

no time for these extensive inquiries, and that information about *education* was what they wanted, as *it* alone was necessary to their object. I told them, in vain, that these were preliminary steps to any available knowledge of education. They were so ignorant of mind and of its faculties and relations, that they could not conceive this to be the case, and refused to attend these courses of instruction.

The next duty of parents is to provide suitably for the outfit of their children in the world. If I am right in the fundamental principle that happiness consists in well-regulated activity of the various functions of the body and the mind, and that the world is designedly arranged by the Creator with a view to the maintenance of our powers in this condition of activity—it follows that a parent who shall have provided a good constitution for his child, preserved him in sound health, thoroughly educated him, trained him to some useful calling, and supported him until he shall have become capable of exercising it, will have discharged the duty of maintenance in its highest and best sense.

It is of much importance to children to give them correct views of the real principles, machinery, and objects of life, and to train them to act systematically in relation to them, in their habitual conduct. What should we think of a merchant who should embark himself, his wife, family, and fortune, on board of a ship, take the command of it himself, and set sail on a voyage of adventure without knowledge of navigation, without charts, and without having any particular port of destination in view? We should consider him as a lunatic. And yet many men are launched forth on the sea of active life as ill provided with knowledge and objects as the individual here imagined.

Suppose, however, our adventurous navigator to use the precaution of placing himself under convoy, to attach himself to a fleet, to sail when they sailed, and to stop when they stopped, we should still lament his ignorance, and reckon the probabilities great of his running foul of his companions in the voyage, foundering in a storm, being wrecked on shoals or sunken rocks, or making an unproductive speculation, even if he safely attained a trading port.

This simile appears to me to be scarcely an exaggeration of the condition in which young men in general embark on the business of the world. The great mass of society is the fleet to which they attach themselves; it is moving

onwards, and they move with it; sometimes it is favoured with prosperity, sometimes overtaken by adversity, and they passively undergo its various fates; sometimes they make shipwreck of themselves by running foul of their neighbours' interests, or by deviating from the course, and encountering hazards peculiarly their own; but in all they do, and in all they suffer, they obey an impulse from without, and rarely pursue any definite object, except the acquisition of wealth; and they follow even that without a systematic plan.

In rude ages the leaders and the people loved "the pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war," they moved to the sound of the trumpet and rejoiced in the clang of arms. In our day, the leaders steer to wealth and fame, and the mass toils after them as best it may. In one year, a cotton mania seizes the leaders, and vast portions of the people are infected with the disease. In another year, a mania for joint-stock companies attacks them, and their followers again catch the infection. In a third year, a fever for railroads seizes on them, and all rush into speculations in stock.

In these varying aspects of social movements we discover nothing like a well-considered scheme of action adopted from knowledge, and pursued to its results. The leaders and the multitude appear equally to be moved by impulses which control and correct each other by collision and concussion, but in each of which thousands of individuals are crushed to death, although the mass escapes and continues to move forward in that course which corresponds to the direction of the last force which was applied to it.

It appears to me that by correct and enlarged knowledge of human nature and of the external world, the young might be furnished with a chart and plan of life suited to their wants, desires, and capacities as rational beings. If they should subsequently become leaders, this would enable them to steer the social course with greater precision and advantage than has been done in bygone times; or, if they remained humble members of the body-politic, to shape their individual courses, so as in some degree to avoid the collisions and concussions which reckless ardour, in alliance with ignorance, is ever encountering.

Under the present system of impulsive and imitative action, the one or the other of two errors generally infects the youthful mind. If the parents of a family have long

struggled with pecuniary difficulties and the depression of poverty, but ultimately, after much exertion and painful self-denial, have attained to easy circumstances, they teach their children almost to worship wealth; and at the same time fill their minds with vivid ideas of laborious exertions, sacrifices, difficulties, cares, and troubles, as almost the only occurrences of life.

They represent expense and enjoyment as closely allied with sin; and young persons thus trained, if they possess well-constituted brains, often become rich, but rarely reap any reasonable satisfaction from their earthly existence. They plod, and toil, and save, and invest; they are often religious, on the principle of laying up treasures in heaven; but they cultivate neither their moral nor their intellectual faculties, and at the close of life they complain that all is vanity and vexation of spirit.

The second error is diametrically the opposite of this one. Parents of easy, careless dispositions, who have either inherited wealth or have been successful in business without much exertion, generally teach their children the art of enjoying life, without that of acquiring the means of doing so; and such children enter into trade, or engage in professions, under the settled conviction that the paths of life are all level, clear, and smooth; that they need only to put the machinery of business into motion; and that thereafter all will go smoothly forward, affording them funds and leisure for enjoyment, with little anxiety and very moderate exertion.

Young persons thus instructed, if they do not possess Cautiousness and Conscientiousness, go gaily on in active life for a brief space of time, and then become the victims of a false system and of inexperience. They are ruined, and suffer countless privations. The errors of both these modes of training the young should be avoided.

After health, education, and virtuous habits, the best provision that a parent can make for his son is to furnish him with sound views of his real situation as a member of the social body. The Creator having destined man to live in society, the social world is so arranged that an individual illuminated by a knowledge of the laws which regulate social prosperity, by dedicating himself to a useful pursuit, and fulfilling ably the duties connected with it, will meet with very nearly as certain a reward, in the means of subsistence and enjoyment, as if he raised his food directly from the soil.

Astonishing stability and regularity are discoverable in the social world, when its constitution and laws of action are understood. If legislators would cease to protect what they call national, but what are really class interests, and if they would leave the business world free to its spontaneous movements, enforcing by law only the observance of justice, the labourer, artisan, manufacturer, and professional practitioner would find the demands for their labour, goods, or other contributions to the social welfare, to follow with so much constancy and regularity that, with ability, attention, and morality on the part of each, they would very rarely indeed be left unprovided for.

In our own country, the duty of teaching sound and practical views of the nature of man as an individual, and of the laws which regulate his social condition, to the young, has become doubly urgent since the passing of the Reform Act (1832). Under the previous system of government, only the wealthy were allowed to exercise the political franchise ; and as education was a pretty general concomitant of wealth, power and knowledge (as far as knowledge existed) were to a great degree united in the same hands.

Now, however, when great property is no longer indispensable to the exercise of political influence, it is necessary to extend and improve general education. The middle classes of this country have in their own hands the power of returning a majority of the House of Commons ; and as the Commons hold the strings of the national purse, and, when nearly unanimous, exercise an irresistible influence in the State, it is obvious that those who elect them ought to be educated and rational men.*

In past ages, government has been conducted too often on short-sighted and empirical principles, and rarely on the basis of a sound and comprehensive philosophy of man's nature and wants. Hence the wars undertaken for futile and immoral purposes ; hence the heavy taxes which oppress industry and obstruct prosperity ; hence, also, the restrictions, protections, and absurd monopolies which disgrace the statute-book of the nation : all of which are not only direct evils, but are attended by this secondary disadvantage—that they have absorbed the funds, and consumed the time and the mental energy which, under a better system,

* Further extensions of the franchise in recent years have, of course, shifted the political centre of gravity to a still lower point.—ED., 1893.

would have been dedicated to the improvement of national and public institutions.

Henceforth the government of this country must be animated by, and must act up to, the general intelligence of the nation, but it will be impossible for it to advance to any considerable extent beyond it. Every patriot, therefore, will find in this fact an additional motive to qualify himself for expanding the minds and directing the steps of the rising generation, that Britain's glory and happiness may pass, untarnished and unimpaired, to the remotest posterity of virtuous and enlightened men.*

The question next arises, What provision in money or land is a parent bound to make for his children? To this no answer, that would suit all circumstances, can be given. As parents cannot carry their wealth to the next world, it must of course be left to someone; and the natural feelings of mankind dictate that it should be given to those who stand nearest in kindred and highest in merit in relation to the testator.

With respect to children, in ordinary circumstances, this cannot be questioned; for it is clearly the duty of parents to do all in their power to make happy the existence of those whom they have brought into the world. But difference of customs in different countries, and difference of ranks in the same country, render different principles of *distribution* proper. In Great Britain, a nobleman who should distribute £100,000 equally among ten children would do great injustice to his eldest son, to whom a title of nobility would descend, with its concomitant expenses; but a merchant who had realised £100,000 would act more wisely and justly in leaving £10,000 to each of ten children, than in attempting to found a family by entailing £82,000

* The remarks in the text apply with still greater force to the United States of America. There, the supreme political power is wielded by the mass of the people. No rational person will maintain that one ignorant man is a proper ruler for a great nation; but additions to numbers do not alter the species. Twenty, or a hundred, or a thousand ignorant men are not wiser than one of them, while they are much more dangerous. They inflame each other's passions, keep each other's follies in countenance, and add to each other's strength. If the United States, therefore, desire to avoid anarchy and ruin, they must educate the mass of their people. [This remark has its counterpart in the saying of Mr. Robert Lowe, after the passing of the Reform Act of 1867: "Now we must educate our masters."—ED., 1893.]

on his eldest son, and leaving only £2,000 to each of the other nine.

I consider hereditary titles as an evil to society, and desire their abolition; but while they are permitted to exist, the distribution of wealth should bear reference to the expenses which they necessarily entail on those who inherit them. The United States of America have wisely avoided this institution: by the laws of most of these States, an equal distribution of the family estate, real and personal, among all the children, ensues on the death of the parents. This practice appears to me to be wise and salutary. It tends to lessen that concentration of all thought and desire on themselves and their families which is the besetting sin of the rich; and it teaches parents to perceive that the prosperity of their children is indissolubly linked with that of their country.

As a general rule, parents ought to make the largest provisions for those members of their families who are least able, from sex, constitution, capacity, or education, to provide for themselves.

In the lower ranks of life, where both sexes engage in labour, an equal distribution may, other circumstances being equal, be just; in the middle ranks (in which it is the custom for males to engage in business, but in which females in general do not), if the parents have a numerous family and a moderate fortune, I should consider the sons amply provided for by being furnished with education and a calling; while the property of the parents should be given chiefly to the dependent daughters. It is impossible, however, as I have already hinted, to lay down rules that will be universally applicable.

It is a grave question whether the indefinite accumulation of wealth should be allowed; but however this may be determined, there should be no restriction on the power of spending and disposing of property. Entails are a great abuse, introduced by Self-Esteem and Love of Approbation, acting apart from Benevolence and Conscientiousness. Reason dictates that wealth should be enjoyed only on the condition of the exercise of at least average discretion by its possessor; yet the object of entails is to secure it and its attendant influence to certain heirs, altogether independently of their intelligence, morality, and prudence.

Laws have been enacted by which estates may be transmitted unimpaired from sire to son, through endless generations,

although each possessor, in his turn, may be a pattern of vice and imbecility. But the law of Nature is too strong to be superseded by the legislation of ignorant and presumptuous men. The children of intelligent, virtuous, and healthy parents are so well constituted as to need no entails to preserve their family estates and honours unimpaired; while, on the other hand, descendants with imbecile intellects and immoral dispositions are prone, in spite of the strictest entail, to tarnish that glory and distinction which the law vainly attempts to maintain.

Accordingly, many families in which superior qualities descend flourish for centuries without entails; whereas others, in which immoral or foolish minds are hereditary, live in constant privation, notwithstanding the props of erroneous laws. Each immoral heir of entail mortgages his life-rent right, and lives a beggar and an outcast from his artificial sphere of life.

Obedience to the organic laws affords the only means of maintaining family possessions undissolved; and until men shall seek the aid which they present, in order to secure a great, virtuous, and flourishing posterity, they will in vain frame Acts of Parliament to attain their object.

Parents, however, have *rights* as well as *duties* in relation to their children. They are entitled to the produce of the child's labour during its nonage; to its respect and obedience; and, when infirm, to maintenance, if they be in want. These rights on the part of parents imply corresponding duties incumbent on children. The obligation on children to discharge them flows directly from the dictates of Veneration, Conscientiousness, and Benevolence.

In the lower and middle ranks of life, parents often complain of want of respect and obedience on the part of their children; but a common cause of this evil may be found in the deficient knowledge, the harsh dispositions, and the rude manners of the parents themselves, which are not calculated to render them really objects of respect to the higher sentiments of their children, especially when the latter are better educated than their parents.

The mere fact of being father or mother to a child is obviously not sufficient to excite its moral affections.* The

* An American clerical Reviewer objected to the text that it sets aside the Bible, which commands children to honour their father and mother without regard to their qualities. He forgot that the

parent must manifest superior wisdom, intelligence, and affection, with a desire to promote his child's welfare ; and then respect and obedience will naturally follow. The attempt to render a child respectful and obedient by merely telling it to be so is as little likely to succeed as the endeavour to make it fond of music by assuring it that filial duty requires that it should love melody.

If a parent desire to have docile, affectionate, and intelligent children, he must habitually address himself to their moral and intellectual powers ; he must make them feel that he is wise and good—exhibit himself as the natural object of attachment and respect ; and then, by average children, the reciprocal duties of love and obedience will not be withheld.

If parents knew and paid a just regard to the natural and reasonable desires of the young, they would be far less frequently disobeyed than they actually are. Many of their commands forbid the exercise of faculties which in children pant for gratification, and which Nature intended to be gratified ; and the misery and disappointment consequent on baulked desire have an effect very different from that of disposing to affection and obedience.

The love of muscular motion, for instance, is irrepressible in children, and physiology proves that the voice of Nature ought to be listened to ; yet the young are frequently prohibited from yielding to this instinct, that the family or the teacher may not be disturbed by noise ; tasks unsuitable to their age and dispositions are imposed ; their health and happiness are impaired ; and when peevishness, unpalatable to the parents, ensues, the children are blamed for being cross and disobedient !

In exacting obedience from children, parents should never forget that their brains are very differently constituted, and that their mental dispositions vary in a corresponding degree. The faculty of Veneration is generally late in being developed, so that a child may be stubborn and unmanageable under one kind of treatment, or at one age, who will prove tractable and obedient under a different discipline, or at a future period.

As some individuals are really born with such deficiencies

Scriptures require parents to adorn themselves with all the Christian virtues, and that the Fifth Commandment obviously implies that they shall have fulfilled this duty as the condition of receiving the reverence of their children.

of the moral faculties as incapacitate them for pursuing right courses of action, although they may possess average intellectual power, and are free from diseased action of the brain; and as there is no legal method of restraining them unless they commit what the law accounts crime: great misery is often endured by their relatives in seeing them proceed from one step of folly and iniquity to another, until they are plunged into irretrievable ruin and disgrace.

If parents have transmitted to their children well balanced and favourably developed brains, and have discharged their duty in training and educating them, and in fitting them out in the world, they will rarely have cause to complain of ingratitude or of want of filial piety. Where the brains of the children are ill-constituted, or where training and education have been neglected or improperly conducted, the parents, in reaping sorrow and disappointment from the behaviour of their offspring, are only suffering the natural consequences of their own actions; and if these are punishments, they should read in them an intimation of the Divine displeasure of their conduct.

In proportion to the development and cultivation of the moral and intellectual faculties are gratitude and filial piety strongly and steadily manifested by children. By the well-principled and respectable members of the middle and lower ranks, parents are scarcely ever left in destitution by their children, if they are at all capable of maintaining them; but among the heartless, reckless, and grossly ignorant, this is not uncommon. The legal provision established for the poor has tended to blunt the feelings of many individuals in regard to this duty; yet great and beautiful examples of its fulfilment are frequent, and we may expect that the number of these will increase as education and improvement advance.

LECTURE VIII.

Man as a Social Being.

I proceed now to consider those *social duties and rights* which are not strictly domestic. The first subject of inquiry is into the origin of society itself. On this question many fanciful theories have been given to the world. It has engaged the imagination of the poet and the intellect of the philosopher. Ovid has described mankind as at first in a state of innocence and happiness during what is termed the golden age, and as declining gradually into vice and misery through the silver, brazen, and iron ages :—

"The golden age was first, when man, yet new,
No rule but uncorrupted reason knew;
And with a native bent did good pursue.
Unforced by punishment, unawed by fear,
His words were simple, and his soul sincere.

* * * * * *

"No walls were yet; nor fence, nor moat, nor mound;
No drum was heard, nor trumpet's angry sound;
Nor swords were forged; but void of care and crime,
The soft creation slept away their time.

* * * * * *

"The flowers unsown, in fields and meadows reigned,
And western winds immortal springs maintained.
In following years the bearded corn ensued
From earth unasked, nor was that earth renewed.
From veins of valleys milk and nectar broke,
And honey sweating through the pores of oak."

To this succeeded too rapidly the silver, the brazen, and the iron ages; which last the world had reached in the days of Ovid, and in which, unfortunately, it still remains.

Rousseau, who was rather a poet than a philosopher, has written speculations "on the origin and foundations of the existing inequalities among men," which have powerfully attracted the attention of the learned. He informs us that he "sees man such as he must have proceeded from the hands of Nature, less powerful than some animals, less active than others, but, taking him on the whole, more

advantageously organised than any. He sees him satisfying his hunger under an oak, quenching his thirst at the first rivulet, finding his bed under the trees whose fruit had afforded him a repast, and thus satisfied to the full of every desire."*

From these premises Rousseau draws the conclusion that "the first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, took upon himself to call it '*mine*,' and found individuals so foolish as to believe him, was the true founder of civil society." "What crimes, what wars, what murders, what miseries and horrors, would he have spared to the human race, who, tearing up the land-marks or filling up the ditches, had cried to his equals, 'Beware how you listen to this impostor! You are undone if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all, and the soil to none!'"

The fundamental error in Rousseau's speculations consists in his endowing man, in his primitive condition, with whatever faculties he pleases; or rather, in bestowing upon him no principles of action except such as suited his own theory. Numerous antagonists have combated these speculations; but their absurdity is so evident, that I do not consider it necessary to enter into any lengthened refutation of them. The mistake of such theorists is that they assume the mind to be altogether a blank—to have no spontaneous desires and activity. They imagine it to be similarly constituted to the ear, which, in a state of health, hears no sounds till they are excited by the vibrations of the air; and they ascribe the origin of almost all our passions and inclinations to the circumstances which first evolve them.

This mode of philosophising resembles that which should account for an eruption of Mount Vesuvius by ascribing it to the rent in the surface of the mountain, through which the lava bursts, instead of attributing it to the mighty energies of the volcanic matter buried beneath its rocks.

Other philosophers besides Rousseau have theorised on the constitution of society without previously investigating the constitution of the human mind. Lord Kames, one of the shrewdest and most observant philosophers of the old school, has taken a more rational view of the origin of society. Perceiving that man has been endowed with natural aptitudes and desires, he founds upon these every

* "Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondemens d'Inégalité parmi les Hommes." 4to edit., Geneva, 1782, p. 48.

institution which is universal among mankind. He attributes the origin of society to "the social principle."

Men became hunters from a natural appetite to hunt, and by hunting they appeased their hunger. They became shepherds from seeing that it was easier to breed tame animals than to catch wild ones, after hunting had made them scarce. As they were shepherds, population increased, and necessity made them desire an increase of food. They saw the earth in some climates producing corn spontaneously, and the idea arose that by forwarding its growth, and by removing obstructing weeds, more corn could be produced; hence they became agriculturists. The idea of property sprang from the "hoarding appetite." Lord Kames ascribes the various institutions which exist in society to principles innate in the mind, and not to chance, or to factitious circumstances.

Locke and some other writers have assigned the origin of society to reason, and have represented it as springing from a compact by which individual men surrendered, for the general welfare, certain portions of their private rights, and submitted to various restraints; receiving, in return, protection and other advantages arising from the social state. This idea also is erroneous. Society has always been far advanced before the idea of such a compact began to be entertained; and even then it has occurred only to the minds of philosophers.

Man possesses mental faculties endowed with spontaneous activity, which give rise to many desires equally definite with the appetite for food. Among these are several social instincts, from the spontaneous activity of which society has obviously proceeded.

From the three faculties of Amativeness, Philoprogenitiveness, and Adhesiveness the matrimonial compact derives its origin. Adhesiveness has a yet wider sphere of action: it is the gregarious instinct, or propensity to congregate; it desires the society of our fellow-men generally. Hence its existence indicates that we are intended to live in the social state. The nature and objects of other faculties besides Adhesiveness lead to the same conclusion. Neither Benevolence, which prompts us to confer benefits—nor Love of Approbation, whose gratification is the applause and good opinion of others—nor Veneration, which gives a tendency to respect, and to yield obedience to, superiors—nor Conscientiousness, which holds the balance between competing

rights—has full scope, except in general society. The domestic circle is too contracted for their gratification.

The adaptation of the intellectual faculties to society is equally conspicuous. The faculty of Language implies the presence of intelligent beings, with whom we may communicate by speech. The faculties of Causality and Comparison, which are the fountains of reasoning, imply our associating with other intellectual beings with whose perceptions and experience we may compare our own. Without combination, what advance could be made in science, arts, or manufactures? As food is related to hunger, and light to the sense of vision, so is society adapted to the social faculties of man. The presence of human beings is indispensable to the gratification and excitement of our mental powers in general.

The balmy influence of society on the human mind may be discovered in the vivacious and generally happy aspect of those who live in the bosom of a family, or who mingle freely with the world, contrasted with the cold, starched, and stagnant manners and expression of those who retire from social sympathies and life.

A man whose muscular, digestive, respiratory, and circulating systems greatly predominate in energy over the brain and the nervous system stands less in need of society to gratify his mental faculties than an individual oppositely constituted. He delights in active muscular exercise, and is never so happy as with the elastic turf beneath his feet, and the blue vault of heaven over his head. But where the brain and the nervous system are more energetic, there arise mental wants which can be gratified only in society. Residence in a city is felt indispensable to enjoyment. The mind flags and becomes feeble when not stimulated by collision and converse with kindred spirits. Hence, the social state appears to be as natural to man as it is to the bee, the raven, or the sheep. This question being set at rest, the duties implied in the constitution of society are next to be considered.

The first duty imposed on man in relation to society is *industry*—a duty the origin and sanction of which are easily discoverable. Man is sent into the world naked, unprotected, and unprovided for. He does not, like the lower animals, find his skin clothed with a sufficient covering of hair, feathers, or scales, but must provide garments for himself. He cannot perch on a bough, or burrow

in a hole, but he must rear a dwelling to protect himself from the weather. He does not, like the ox, find his nourishment under his feet, but he must hunt, or cultivate the ground. To capacitate him for the performance of these duties he has received a body fitted for labour, and a mind calculated to animate and direct his exertions; while the external world has been created with the wisest adaptation to his constitution.

Many of us have been taught, by our religious instructors, that labour is a curse imposed by God on man as a punishment for sin. I remarked in the first Lecture that Philosophy cannot tell whether sin *was* or *was not* the cause which induced the Almighty to constitute man such as we now see him—an organised being composed of bones, muscles, blood-vessels, nerves, respiratory and digestive organs, and a brain calculated to manifest a rational mind, and to confer on external nature its present qualities, adapted to give scope and exercise to these powers—but that, constituted as we actually are, labour which, in its proper sense, means *exertion, either bodily or mental, for useful purposes,* is not only no calamity, but is the grand fountain of our enjoyment.

Unless we exercise our limbs, what pleasure can they afford to us? If we do not exercise them, they become diseased, and we are punished with positive pain; hence the duty of bodily exertion is a law of God, written in our frames as strikingly as if it were emblazoned on the sky. Constituted as we are, it is not labour, but inactivity, that is an evil—that is visited by God with suffering and disease. The misery of idleness has been a favourite theme of moralists in every age, and its baneful influence on the bodily health has equally attracted the notice of the physician and of general observers.

Happiness, in truth, is nothing but the gratification of active faculties; and hence, the more active our faculties are, within the limits of health, the greater is our enjoyment.

> "Life's cares are comforts; such by Heaven designed:
> He that has none must make them, or be wretched.
> Cares are employments, and without employ
> The soul is on a rack, the rack of rest,
> To souls most adverse—action all their joy."

The prevalent notion that labour is an evil must have

arisen from ignorance of the constitution of man, and from contemplating the effects of labour carried to excess.

Bodily and mental activity, therefore, being the law of our nature, and the fountain of our enjoyment, I observe, first, that they may be directed to *useful* or to *useless* purposes; and that they may be carried to excess. Exertion for the attainment of useful objects is generally termed labour, and because of its utility, men have, with strange perversity, looked upon it as degrading! Exertion for mere capricious self-gratification, and directed to no useful end, has, on the other hand, been dignified with the name of pleasure, and is esteemed honourable. These notions appear to be injurious errors, which obtain no countenance from the natural laws.

Indeed, the proposition ought to be reversed. Pleasure increases in proportion to the number of faculties employed, and it becomes purer and more lasting the higher the faculties are which are engaged in the enterprise. The pursuit of a great and beneficial object, such as providing for a family, or discharging an important duty to society, calls into energetic action not only a greater variety of faculties, but also faculties of a higher order—namely, the moral sentiments and the intellect—than those frivolous occupations, miscalled pleasures, which are directed to self-indulgence and the gratification of vanity alone.

The reason why labour has so generally been regarded as an evil is its very unequal distribution among individuals—many contriving to exempt themselves from all participation in it (though not to the increase of their own happiness), while others have been oppressed with an excessive share. Both extremes are improper; and the hope may reasonably be indulged that when society shall become so far enlightened as to esteem that honourable which God has rendered at once profitable and pleasant—and when labour shall be properly distributed and confined within the bounds of moderation—it will assume its true aspect, and be hailed by all as a rational source of enjoyment.

Regarding bodily and mental activity, therefore, as institutions of the Creator, I observe, in the next place, that, as man has been destined for society, *a division of occupations* is indispensable to his welfare. If every one were to insist on cultivating the ground, there would be no manufacturers, no carpenters, or builders. If all were to prefer the exercise

of the constructive arts, we should have no agriculturists and no food.

The Creator has arranged the spontaneous division of labour among men by the simplest, yet most effectual, means. He has bestowed the mental faculties in different degrees of relative strength on different individuals, and thereby has given them at once the desire and the aptitude for different occupations. The new philosophy renders clear the origin of differences of employment.

The metaphysicians treat only of general powers of the mind. They enumerate among the active principles ambition, the love of power, the love of kindred, and so forth; while their catalogue of intellectual faculties embraces only Perception, Conception, Abstraction, Attention, Memory, Judgment, and Imagination. Many of them deny that individuals differ in the degrees in which they possess these powers; and ascribe all actual differences to education, association, habit, and a variety of accidental circumstances.

With their philosophy for our guide, we are called on to explain by what process of arrangement, or by what chapter of accidents, the general powers of Perception, Memory, Judgment, and Imagination fit one man to be a carpenter, another to be a sailor, a third a merchant, a fourth an author, a fifth a painter, a sixth an engineer; and how they communicate to each a special predilection for his trade. How comes it to pass, according to their views, that some who utterly fail in one pursuit succeed to admiration in another? and whence is it that there was no jostling in the community at first, and that very little harsh friction occurs now in arranging the duties to be performed by each individual member?

We next require a solution of the problem—by what cause one man's ambition takes the direction of war, another's that of agriculture, and a third's that of painting or of making speeches, if all their native aptitudes and tendencies are the same, both in kind and degree; how one man delights to spend his life in accumulating wealth, and another knows no pleasure equal to that of dissipating and squandering it?

I do not detain you with the ingenious theories that have been propounded by the metaphysicians as solutions of these questions, but come at once to the explanation afforded by the new philosophy. It shows that man has

received a variety of primitive faculties, each having a specific sphere of action, and standing in specific relations to certain external objects, that he takes an interest in these objects in consequence of their aptitude to gratify his faculties.

Every sane individual of the human race possesses the same faculties, but these faculties are combined in different relative proportions in different individuals, and give rise to differences of talents and dispositions. Hence, the individual in whom Combativeness and Destructiveness are the leading faculties desires to be a soldier; he in whom Veneration, Hope, and Wonder are the strongest desires to be a minister of religion; he in whom Constructiveness, Weight, and Form predominate desires to be a mechanician; and he in whom Constructiveness, Form, Colouring, Imitation, and Ideality predominate is inspired with the love of painting.

The Creator, by bestowing on all the race the same faculties, and endowing them with the same functions, has fitted us for constituting one common family. In consequence of our common nature, we understand each other's instincts, desires, talents, and pursuits, and are prepared to act in concert; while by the superiority in particular powers conferred on particular individuals, variety of character and talent, and the division of labour, are effectually provided for.

The division of labour, therefore, is not an expedient devised by man's sagacity, but a direct result of his constitution: exactly as happens in the case of some of the inferior animals, which live in society and divide their duties without possessing the attribute of reason. The differences in the faculties of different individuals afford another proof that man has been created expressly to live and act as a social being.

Gradations of social condition being thus institutions of God, those men are wild enthusiastic dreamers, and not philosophers, who contemplate their abolition. This proposition, however, does not imply approval of artificial distinctions of rank, independent of natural endowments. These are the inventions of ignorant and selfish men; they are paltry devices to secure, by means of parchments, the advantages of high qualities, without the necessary possession of them.

As civilisation and knowledge advance, these will be

renounced as ridiculous, like the ponderous wigs, cocked hats, laced coats, and swords of bygone centuries. It is unfortunate for society when a fool or a rogue is the possessor of high rank and title; for these attract the respect of many to his foolish or vicious deeds, and to his erroneous opinions.

Nature has instituted still another cause of social differences. Man has received faculties, or capacities, adapted to external nature, but he has not been inspired with information concerning the qualities and adaptations of objects, or with intuitive *knowledge* of the best manner of applying his own powers. He has been left to find out these by observation and reflection.

If we select twenty men whose mental faculties, temperament, and bodily constitution are alike, but of whom ten have sedulously applied their faculties to the study of Nature and her capabilities, while the other ten have sought pleasure only in trivial pursuits, it is obvious that in all social attainments the former will speedily surpass the latter. If both classes wished to build a house, you would find the observing and reflecting men in possession of the lever, the pulley, the hammer, the axe, and the saw; while the hunters and the fishers would be pushing loads with their hands, or lifting them with their arms, and shaping timber with sharp-edged stones.

In civilised society the same results appear. An individual who has learned how to use his natural powers to the best advantage—in other words, who has acquired knowledge and skill—is decidedly superior to him who, although born with equal native talents, has never been taught the best method of applying them.

When we view Nature's scheme of social gradation, we recognise in it an institution beneficial to all. The man who stands at the bottom of the scale does so because he is actually lowest either in natural endowments or in acquired skill; but even in that lowest rank he enjoys advantages superior to those he could have commanded by *his* talents, if he had stood alone. He derives many advantages from the abilities and acquirements of his fellow-men. In point of fact, an able-bodied, steady, and respectable labourer in Great Britain is better clothed, better fed, and better lodged, than the chief of a savage tribe.

LECTURE IX.

The Condition of Society.

In the last Lecture we considered the origins of society, the division of labour, and differences of rank. I proceed to discuss an objection which may be urged against some of the views then stated—namely, that occasionally persons of defective moral principle, though of considerable talent—and, in other instances, weak and indolent men, are found in possession of high rank and fortune, while able, good, and enlightened individuals stand low in the scale of public honour. Let us endeavour to investigate the cause of this anomaly, and inquire whether the evil admits of a remedy.

Man is endowed with two great classes of faculties, so different in their nature, desires, and objects, that he appears almost like two beings conjoined in one : I refer to the animal propensities and the moral sentiments. All the propensities have reference to self-sustenance, self-gratification, or self-aggrandisement, and do not give rise to a single feeling of disinterested love or regard for the happiness of other beings. Even the domestic affections, when acting independently of the moral sentiments, prompt us to seek only a selfish gratification, without regard to the welfare of the beings who afford it.

Examples of this kind may be met with every day. Parents deficient in intellect, in their ecstasies of fondness for their offspring, inspired by Philoprogenitiveness, often spoil them, and render them miserable : which is just indulging their own affections, without enlightened regard for the welfare of their objects. When Combativeness and Destructiveness are active, their object is either to assail other individuals, or to protect *ourselves* against their aggressions. When Acquisitiveness is pursuing its objects, the appropriation of property to ourselves is its aim.

When Self-Esteem inspires us with its emotions, we are prompted to place ourselves, and our own interests and gratifications, first in all our considerations. When Love of Approbation is supremely active, we desire esteem, glory, praise, or advancement, as public acknowledgments of our

own superiority over other men. Secretiveness and Cautiousness, from which arise *savoir faire* and circumspection, are apt allies of the selfish desires.

All these feelings are necessary to the subsistence of the individual or of the race, are good in themselves, and produce beneficial results when directed by the higher faculties. But, nevertheless, self-gratification is their primary object, and the advantages conferred by them on others follow only as secondary consequences.

The other class of faculties alluded to is that of the moral sentiments—Benevolence, Veneration, and Conscientiousness; these take a loftier, a more disinterested and more beneficent range. Benevolence desires universal happiness. It is not satisfied with mere self-enjoyment. As long as it sees a sentient being miserable, whom it could render happy, it desires to do so; and its own satisfaction is not complete till that be accomplished. Veneration desires to invest with esteem, and to treat with deference and respect, every human being who manifests virtue and wisdom; and to adore the Creator as the fountain of universal perfection. Conscientiousness desires to introduce and maintain an all-pervading justice; a state of society in which the merits of the humblest individuals shall not be overlooked, but shall be appreciated and rewarded; and in which the pretensions of the egotist and the ambitious shall be circumscribed within the limits of their real deserts.

There are certain faculties which may be regarded as auxiliaries of these. Ideality desires to realise the excellent and the beautiful in every object and action. It longs for a world in which all things shall be fair and lovely, and shall be invested with the most perfect attributes of form, colour, proportion and arrangement, and in which the human mind shall manifest only dispositions in harmony with such a scene. Wonder desires the new and the untried, and serves to urge us forward in our career of improvement; while the sentiment of Hope smooths and gilds the whole vista of futurity presented to the mind's eye; representing every desire as possible to be fulfilled, and every good as attainable.

The intellectual faculties are the servants equally of both orders of faculties. Our powers of observation and reflection may be employed in perpetrating the blackest crimes, or in performing the most beneficent actions, according

as they are directed by the propensities or by the moral sentiments.

We have seen that among these faculties there are several which render man a social being: and we find him, accordingly, living in society in all circumstances and in all stages of refinement. Society does not all at once attain the highest degree of virtue, intelligence, and refinement. Like the individual, it passes through stages of infancy, youth, full vigour, and decay. Hence it has different standards at different times, by which it estimates the qualities of its individual members.

In the rudest state, the selfish faculties have nearly unbridled sway—rapine, fraud, tyranny, and violence prevail; while, on the other hand, among a people in whom the moral sentiments are vigorous, private advantage is pursued with a constant respect to the rights of other men. In the former state of society we should naturally expect to see selfish, ambitious, and unprincipled men, who are strong in mind and body, in possession of the highest rank and the greatest wealth; because, in the contention of pure selfishness, such qualities alone are fitted to succeed. In a society animated by the moral sentiments and the intellect as the governing powers, we should expect to find places of the highest honour and advantage occupied by the most moral, most intelligent, and most useful members of the community: because these qualities would be most esteemed.

The former state of society characterises all barbarous nations; and the latter, which is felt by well-constituted minds to be the great object of human desire, has never yet been fully realised. By many, the idea of realising it is regarded as Utopian; by others, its accomplishment is believed possible; by all, it is admitted to be desirable. It is desired, because the moral sentiments exist, and instinctively long for the reign of justice, good-will, refinement, and enjoyment, and because they are grieved by the suffering which so largely abounds in the present condition of humanity.

The question is an important one, Whether man be destined to proceed, in this world, for an indefinite time, constantly desiring pure and moral institutions, yet ever devoting himself to inferior objects—to the unsatisfying labours of misdirected selfishness, vanity, and ambition: or whether he will, at length, be permitted to realise his

loftier conceptions, and enter on a thoroughly rational state of existence.

The fact of the higher sentiments being constituent elements of our nature seems to warrant us in expecting an illimitable improvement in the condition of society. Unless our nature had been fitted to rise up to the standard which these faculties desire to reach, we may presume that they would not have been bestowed on us. They cannot have been intended merely to dazzle us with phantom illusions of purity, intelligence, and happiness, which we are destined ever to pursue in vain.

But what encouragement does experience afford for trusting that under any future social arrangements rank will be awarded only to merit? Man is a progressive being, and, in his social institutions, he ascends through the scale of his faculties, very much as an individual does in rising from infancy to manhood. In his social capacity he commences with institutions and pursuits related almost exclusively to the simplest of his animal desires and his most obvious intellectual perceptions.

Men, in their early condition, are described by historians as savages, wandering amidst wide-spreading forests or over extensive savannas, clothed in the skins of animals, drawing their chief sustenance from the chase, and generally waging bloody wars with their neighbours. This is the outward manifestation of feeble intellect and Constructiveness, of dormant Ideality, of very weak moral sentiments, and of active propensities. In this condition there is little distinction of rank, except the superiority conferred on individuals by age, by energy, or by courage; and there is no division of labour or diversity of employment, except that the most painful and laborious duties are imposed on the women. All stand so near the bottom of the scale, that there is yet little scope for social distinctions.

In the next stage, we find men congregated into tribes, possessed of cattle, and assuming the aspect of a community, although still migratory in their habits. This state implies the possession of implements and utensils fabricated by means of ingenuity and industry; also a wider range of social attachment, and so much of moral principle as to prompt individuals to respect the property of each other in their own tribe. This is the pastoral condition, and it proclaims an advance in the development of Intellect, Constructiveness, Adhesiveness, and the moral sentiments

In this stage, however, of the social progress there is still a very imperfect manifestation of the moral and intellectual faculties. Acquisitiveness, unenlightened by intellect, and undirected by morality, desires to acquire wealth by plunder rather than by industry; and the intellectual faculties have not yet comprehended the advantages of manufactures and commerce. In this stage, men regard neighbouring tribes as their natural enemies—make war on them, spoil their substance, murder their males, and carry their females and children into captivity. They conceive that they crown themselves with glory by these achievements.

In such a state of society, it is obvious that those individuals who possess in the highest degree the qualities most useful to the community, and most esteemed according to their standard of virtue, will be advanced to the highest rank, with all its attendant advantages and honours. Great physical strength, an active temperament, with predominating Combativeness, Destructiveness, Self-esteem, Love of Approbation, and Firmness, with a very limited portion of morality and reflecting intellect, will carry an individual to the rank of a chief or leader of his countrymen.

The next step in the progress of society is the agricultural condition: and this implies a still higher evolution of intellect and moral sentiment. To sow in spring with a view of reaping in autumn requires not only economy and prudence in preserving stores and stock, and the exercise of ingenuity in fabricating implements of husbandry, but a stretch of reflection embracing the whole intermediate period, and a subjugation of the impatient animal propensities to the intellectual powers. To ensure to him who sows that *he* shall also reap requires a general combination in defence of property, and a practical acknowledgment of the claims of justice, which indicate decided activity in the moral sentiments.

In order to reach the highest rank in this stage of society, individuals must possess a greater endowment of reflecting intellect and moral sentiment, in proportion to their animal propensities, than was necessary to attain supremacy in the pastoral state.

When nations become commercial, and devote themselves to manufactures, their pursuits demand the activity of still higher endowments, together with extensive knowledge of natural objects, and their relations and qualities. In this condition, arts and sciences are sedulously culti-

vated; processes of manufacture of great complexity, and extending over a long period of time, are successfully conducted; extensive transactions between individuals, living often in different hemispheres, and who probably never saw each other personally, are carried on with regularity, integrity, and despatch; laws regulating the rights and duties of individuals engaged in the most complicated transactions are enacted; and this complicated social machinery moves, on the whole, with a smoothness and regularity which are truly admirable.

Such a scene is a high manifestation of moral and intellectual power; and man, in this condition, appears, for the first time, invested with his rational character. Observation shows that the organs of the superior faculties develop themselves more fully in proportion to the advances of civilisation, and that they are *de facto* largest in the most moral and enlightened nations.*

This is the stage at which society has arrived in our day, in a great part of Europe and of America.† But, even in the most advanced nations, the triumph of the rational portion of man's nature is incomplete. Our institutions, manners, desires, and aspirations still partake, to a great extent, of the characteristics of the propensities. Wars from motives of aggrandisement or ambition; unjust, and sometimes cruel, laws; artificial privileges in favour of classes or individuals; restrictions calculated to impede general prosperity for the advantage of a few; inordinate love of wealth; overweening ambition; and many other inferior desires, still flourish in vigour among us. In such a state of society it is impossible that the virtuous and intelligent alone should reach the highest social stations.

In Great Britain that individual is fitted to be most successful in the career of wealth and its attendant advantages who possesses vigorous health, industrious habits, great selfishness, a powerful intellect, and just so much of the moral feelings as will serve for the profitable direction of his inferior powers. This combination of endowments

* This discrimination of the stages in the development of society is now generally accepted as rational, and as warranted by facts. It regards man in the first stage as a *hunter*, in the second as a *shepherd*, in the third as a *farmer*, and in the fourth as a *manufacturer* and *merchant*.—ED., 1893.

† We should now add in Australia, and in some parts of Asia and Africa.—ED., 1893.

renders self-aggrandisement the leading impulse to action. It provides sufficient intellect to attain the object in view, and morality enough to restrain every desire which would tend to defeat it.

A person so constituted feels his faculties to be in harmony with his external condition : he has no lofty aspirations after either goodness or enjoyment which the state of society does not permit him to realise ; he is satisfied to dedicate his undivided energies to the active business of life, and he is generally successful. He acquires wealth and distinction, stands high in social esteem, transmits respectability and abundance to his family, and dies in a good old age.

Although his mind does not belong to the highest order ; yet, being in harmony with external circumstances, and little annoyed by the imperfections which exist around him, he is one of that class which, in the present social condition of Great Britain, is reasonably happy. We are in that stage of moral and intellectual progress which corresponds with the supremacy of the above-mentioned combination of faculties.

In savage times, the rude athletic warrior was the chief of his tribe ; and he was also probably the happiest, because he possessed, in the greatest degree, the qualities necessary for success, and was deficient in all the feelings which, in his circumstances, could not obtain gratification. If he had also had Benevolence, Ideality, Veneration, and Conscientiousness largely developed, he would have been unhappy, by the aspirations after higher objects and conditions which they would have introduced into his mind.

The same rule holds good in our own case. Those individuals who have either too little of the selfish propensities or too much of the moral feelings are neither successful nor happy in the present state of British society. The former cannot successfully maintain their ground in the great struggle for property which is going on around them ; while the latter, although they may be able to keep their places in the competition for wealth, are constantly grieved by the misery and imperfection which they are compelled to witness, but which they cannot remove. They have the habitual consciousness, also, that they are labouring for the mere means of enjoyment, without ever reaching enjoyment itself ; and that their lives are spent, as it were, in a vain show or a feverish dream.

In these examples we observe that society has been slowly, but regularly, advancing towards elevating virtue and intelligence to public honour ; and we may reasonably hope that, in proportion to the increase of knowledge, especially of the law which renders moral and intellectual attainment indispensable to the highest enjoyment, will the tendency to do homage to virtue increase. The impediments to a just reward of individual merit do not appear to be inherent in human nature, but contingent.

There are, however, *artificial* impediments to the accomplishment of this end, among which stand conspicuous hereditary titles of honour.

The feudal kings of Europe early acquired, or assumed, the power of conferring titles of honour and dignity on men of distinguished qualities, as a mark of approbation of their conduct, and as a reward for their services to the State. As reason and morality urge no objections to a title of honour being conferred on a man who has done an important service to his country, the practice of ennobling individuals was easily introduced. The favoured peer, however, naturally loved his offspring ; and without considering any consequences beyond his own gratification, he induced the king to add a right of succession, in favour of his children, to the dignities and privileges conferred on himself.

We now know that if he himself had really been one of *Nature's* nobility, and if he had allied himself to a partner also possessing high qualities of brain and general constitution, and if the two had lived habitually in accordance with the natural laws, he would have transmitted his noble nature to his children ; and they, having the stamp of native dignity upon them, would have needed no patent from an earthly sovereign to maintain them in their father's rank.

But this law of Nature being then unknown ; or the noble, perhaps, having attained to distinction by one or two distinguished qualities merely, which were held in much esteem in his own day, and being still deficient in many high endowments ; or having from passion, love of wealth, ambition, or some other unworthy motive, married an inferior partner, he is conscious that he cannot rely on his children inheriting natural superiority, and he therefore desires, by artificial means, to preserve to them for ages the rank, wealth, titles, and power which he has acquired, and which Nature intended to be the rewards in every generation solely of superior endowments.

The king grants a right of succession to the titles and dignity; and Parliament authorises the father to place his estates under entail: by these means, his heirs, however profligate, imbecile, and unworthy of honour and distinction, are enabled to hold the highest rank in society, to exercise the privileges of hereditary legislators, and to receive the revenues of immense estates, which they may squander, or may devote to the most immoral of purposes. In these instances legislators have directly contradicted Nature.

All this, you will perceive, is following out the principle that individual aggrandisement is the great object of each successive occupant of this world. These measures, however, are not successful. They are productive often of misery, as every one knows who has observed the wretched condition of many nobles and heirs of entail, whose profligacy and imbecility render them unfit for their artificial station.

In regard to society at large, this practice produces baneful effects. A false standard of consideration is erected; the respect and admiration of the people are directed away from virtue and intelligence to physical grandeur and ostentation; and low objects of ambition are presented to the industrious classes of every grade. When extraordinary success in trade raises the banker or the merchant to great wealth, instead of devoting it, and the talents by means of which it was acquired, to the improvement and elevation of the class from which he has sprung, he becomes ashamed of his origin, he is fired with the ambition of being created a noble, and is generally found wielding his whole energies, natural and acquired, in the ranks of the aristocracy against the people.

If the distinctions instituted by Nature were left to operate, the effect would be that the people would, as a general rule, venerate in others, and would themselves desire, the qualities most estimable according to their own moral and intellectual perceptions. The standard of consideration would be rectified and raised in proportion to their advance in knowledge and wisdom; and a great obstruction to improvement, created by artificial and hereditary rank, would be removed.

We are told that in the United States of America, where no distinct class of nobility exists, aristocratic feelings and all the pride of ancestry are at least as rampant as in England, in which the whole framework of society is constituted

with reference to the ascendency of an ancient and powerful aristocracy; and I see no reason to doubt the statement. Differences of rank were instituted when the Creator bestowed the mental organs in different degrees on different men, and rendered them all improvable by education.

It is natural and beneficial, therefore, to esteem and admire Nature's nobility—men greatly gifted with the highest qualities of our nature, and who have duly cultivated and applied them. The Creator, also, in conferring on man the power to transmit, by means of his organisation, his qualities and condition to his offspring, has laid the foundation for our admiration of a long line of illustrious ancestors. This direction of ambition may become a strong assistant to morality and reason, in inducing men to attend to the organic laws in their matrimonial alliances, and in their general conduct through life.

At a time when war and rapine were the distinguishing occupations of nobles, men were proud of their descent from a great warrior—perhaps a border chieftain, who was, in fact, only a thief and a robber on a great scale. At present great self-congratulation is experienced by many individuals, because they are descended from a family which received a patent of nobility five hundred years ago, and has since been maintained, by means of entails, in possession of great wealth, although during the intervening period their annals have commemorated as many profligates and imbeciles as wise and virtuous men. Many commoners, also, who have inherited sound brains and respectable characters from their own obscure but excellent ancestors, are ashamed of their humble birth, and proud of an alliance with a titled family, although feeble and immoral.

But all this is the result of a misdirection of Veneration and Love of Approbation, which increasing knowledge will assuredly bring to a close. It indicates an infatuation of vanity, compared with which, wearing bones in the nose and tattooing the skin are harmless and respectable customs. If, in a country like Great Britain, a family have preserved property and high social consideration for successive centuries without a patent of nobility and without entails, its members must have possessed sound understandings and respectable morality; and they are, therefore, really worthy of respect. The fact that there are several (I might say many) such families is a proof that the objects aimed at by charters of hereditary rank and entails may be better and

more effectually attained by obedience to the laws of organisation.

It forms no argument against these views that in America there is as jealous a distinction of ranks, and as strong an admiration of ancestry, as in Great Britain; because these feelings are admitted to be natural, while it is certain that the mass of American society is not better informed in regard to their proper direction than our own countrymen are. The founders of the American republic, however, were great and enlightened men, and they conferred a boon of the highest value on their posterity when, by prohibiting artificial hereditary ranks and titles, they withdrew the temptations to misdirected ambition which they inevitably present. In America the field is left clear for the operation of reason and morality, and we may hope that in time ambition will take a sounder direction, corresponding with the increase of knowledge. In our own country the law not only obstructs reason, but adds a mighty impulse to our natural liability to err.

We thus account for the fact that the best of men do not always attain the highest stations and the richest social rewards, first, by the circumstance of society being progressive —of its being yet only in an early stage of its career, and of its honouring in every stage those qualities which it prizes most highly at the time, although they may be low in the scale of moral and intellectual excellence; and secondly, by the impediments to a right adjustment of social honours presented by the institution of artificial hereditary dignities and entails.

It is an interesting inquiry, Whether society is destined to remain for ever in its present or in some analogous state, or to advance to a more perfect condition of intelligence, morality, and happiness; and if the latter be a reasonable expectation, by what means its improvement is likely to be accomplished. In considering these questions, I shall attempt to dissect and represent with some minuteness the principles which chiefly characterise our present social condition, and then compare them with our faculties, as revealed by mental physiology. We shall, by this means, discover to what class of faculties our existing institutions are most directly related. If they gratify our highest powers, we may regard ourselves as having approached the limits of improvement permitted by our nature; if they do not gratify these, we may hope still to advance.

There are two views of human nature relating to this subject, both of which are plausible, and each of which may be supported by many facts and arguments. The first is, that man is merely a superior animal, destined to draw his chief enjoyments from a regulated activity of his animal nature, and adorned by such graces as are compatible with its supremacy. Life, for example, may be regarded as given to us that we may enjoy the pleasures of sense, of rearing a family, of accumulating wealth, of acquiring distinction, and also of gratifying the intellect and imagination by literature, science, and the arts.

According to this view, self-interest, individual aggrandisement, and intellectual attainment would be the leading motives of all sensible men during life; and the moral faculties would be used chiefly to control and direct these selfish propensities in seeking their gratifications, so as to prevent them from unduly injuring their neighbours, and from endangering their own prosperity. There would, in that case, be no leading moral object in life: our enjoyments would not necessarily depend on the happiness and prosperity of our fellow-men; and the whole duty of the higher sentiments would be to watch over and direct the lower propensities, so as to prevent them from defeating their own aims.

The other view is that man is essentially a rational and moral being, destined to draw his chief happiness from the pursuit of objects related directly to his moral and intellectual faculties; the propensities acting merely as the servants of the sentiments, to maintain and assist them while pursuing their high and beneficent behests.

History represents man, in past ages, as having been ever in the former condition, either openly pursuing the gratification of the propensities as the avowed and only object of life, or merely curbing them so far as to enable him to obtain higher satisfaction from them, but never directly pursuing moral ends or universal happiness as the chief object of his existence. This also is our present condition.

Even in civilised communities, each individual who is not born to hereditary fortune must necessarily enter into an active competition for wealth, power, and distinction with all who move in his own sphere. Life is spent in one incessant struggle. We initiate our children into the system at the very dawn of their intelligence. We place them in classes at school, and offer them marks of merit and prizes

to stimulate their ambition ; and we estimate their attainments, not by the extent of useful knowledge which they have gained, but according to the place which they hold in relation to their fellows. It is proximity to the station of *dux* that is the grand distinction, and this implies the marked inferiority of all below the successful competitor.

On entering into the business of life, the same system is pursued. The manufacturer taxes his invention and his powers of application to the utmost, that he may outstrip his neighbours in producing better and cheaper commodities, and reaping a greater profit than they ; the trader keeps his shop open earlier and later, and promises greater bargains than his rival, that he may attract an increased number of customers. If a house is to be built or a steam-engine fitted up, a specification or a minute description of the object wanted is drawn up, copies are presented to a number of tradesmen ; they make offers to execute it for a certain sum, and the lowest offerer is preferred.

The extent of difference in these offers is enormous. I was one of several public commissioners who received offers for building a bridge, the highest of which amounted to £21,036, and the lowest to £13,749. Of six offers which I received for building a house, the highest was £1,975, and the lowest £1,500. Differences equally great have been met with in tenders for furnishing machinery and works of various kinds.

I have made inquiries to ascertain whence these differences arise, and I find them accounted for by the following causes :—Sometimes an offer is made by a tradesman who knows himself to be insolvent—who, therefore, has nothing to lose, but who is aware that the state of his affairs is not publicly known, so that his credit is still good. As long as he can proceed in trade, he obtains the means of supporting and educating his family, and every year passed in accomplishing this object is so much gained. He can preserve his trade only by obtaining a regular succession of employment, and he secures this by under-bidding every man who has a shilling of capital to lose.

Bankruptcy is the inevitable end of this career, and the men who have property ultimately sustain the loss arising from this unjust and pernicious course of action ; but it serves the purpose for a time, and this is all that the individual who pursues it regards.

Another and a more legitimate cause of low bidding is

the reverse of this. A trader has accumulated capital, and buys every article at the cheapest rate with ready money; he is frugal, and spends little money in domestic expenses; he is active and sharp in his habits and temper, and exacts a great deal of labour from his workmen in return for their wages. By these three circumstances combined, he is enabled to underbid every rival who is inferior to him in any one of them.

Viewed on the principle that the object of life is self-aggrandisement, all this order of proceeding appears to be proper and profitable. But if you trace out the moral effects of it, they will be found extremely questionable.

The tendency of the system is to throw an accumulating burden of mere labour on the industrious classes. I am told that in some of the great machine manufactories in the west of Scotland men labour for sixteen hours a day, stimulated by additions to their wages in proportion to the quantity of work which they produce. Masters who push trade on a great scale exact the most energetic and long-continued exertion from all the artisans whom they employ. In such circumstances man becomes a mere labouring animal.

Yet this system pervades every department of practical life in these islands. If a farm be advertised to be let, tenants compete with each other in bidding high rents, which, when carried to excess, can be paid only by their converting themselves and their servants into labouring animals, bestowing on the land the last effort of their strength and skill, and resting satisfied with very little enjoyment from it in return.

By the competition of individual interests, directed to the acquisition of property and the attainment of distinction, the practical members of society are not only powerfully stimulated to exertion, but are actually forced to submit to a most jading, laborious, and endless course of toil: in which neither time, nor opportunity, nor inclination is left for the cultivation and enjoyment of the higher powers of the mind.

The order and institutions of society are framed in harmony with this principle. The law prohibits men from using force and fraud in order to acquire property, but sets no limits to their employment of all other means. Our education and mode of transacting mercantile business support the same system of selfishness. It is an approved maxim that secrecy is the soul of trade; and each manufacturer and merchant pursues his speculations secretly, so

that his rivals may know as little as possible of the kind and quantity of goods which he is manufacturing, of the sources whence he draws his materials, or the channels by which he disposes of his products.

The direct advantage of this system is that it confers a superiority on the man of acute and extensive observation and profound sagacity. He contrives to penetrate many of the secrets which are attempted, though not very successfully, to be kept; and he directs his own trade and manufacture, not always according to the current in which his neighbours are floating, but rather according to the results which he foresees will take place from the course which they are following; and then the days of their adversity become those of his prosperity.

The general effect of the system, however, is that each trader stretches his capital, his credit, his skill, and his industry to produce the utmost possible quantity of goods, under the idea that the more he manufactures and sells the more profit he will reap. But as all his neighbours are animated by the same spirit, *they* manufacture as much as possible also; and none of them knows certainly how much the other traders in his own line are producing, or how much of the commodity in which he deals the public will really want, pay for, and consume, within any specific time.

The consequence is that a superfluity of goods is produced, the market is glutted, prices fall ruinously low. All the manufacturers who have proceeded on credit, or who possess limited capital, become bankrupt, and the effects of their rash speculations fall on their creditors. They are, however, excluded from trade for a season—the other manufacturers restrict their operations; the operatives are thrown idle, or their wages are greatly reduced. The surplus commodities are at length consumed, demand revives, prices rise, and the rush towards production again takes place; and thus in all trades the pendulum oscillates, generation after generation, first towards prosperity, then to the equal balance, then towards adversity—back again to equality, and once more to prosperity.

The ordinary observer perceives in this system what he considers to be the natural, the healthy, and the inevitable play of the constituent elements of human nature. He discovers many advantages attending it, and some evils; but the latter he regards as inseparable from all that belongs to mortal man.

The competition of individual interests, for example, he assures us, keeps the human energies alive, and stimulates all to the highest exercise of their bodily and mental powers, whence abundance of every article that man needs is poured into the general treasury of civilised life, even to superfluity.

We are all interested, he continues, in cheap production; and although we apparently suffer by an excessive reduction in the prices of our own commodities, the evil is transitory, and the ultimate effect is unmixed good, for all our neighbours are running the same career of over-production with ourselves.

The evils attending the rise and fall of fortunes, the heart-breaking scenes of bankruptcy, and the occasional degradation of one family and the elevation of another, such men regard as storms in the moral, corresponding to those in the physical world; which, although inconvenient to the individuals whom they overtake, are, on the whole, beneficial, by stirring and purifying the atmosphere: and, regarding this life as a mere pilgrimage to a better, they view these incidental misfortunes as means of preparation for a higher sphere.

This representation has so much of actual truth in it, and such infinite plausibility, that it is somewhat adventurous to question its soundness; yet I am forced to do so, or to give up my best and brightest hope of human nature and its destinies.

In all the systems which I have described, you will discover no motives higher than those furnished by the propensities regulated by justice, animating the competing members of society in their evolutions. The grand object of each is to gain as much power and distinction to himself as possible. He pursues this object without any direct regard to his neighbour's interest or welfare; and no high moral or intellectual aim elevates, ennobles, or adorns his career. The first effect is that he dedicates his whole powers and energies to the production of the mere *means of living*, and he forces all his fellows to devote their lives to precisely the same pursuits. If leisure for moral and intellectual cultivation be necessary to the enjoyment of a rational, a moral, and a religious being, this is excluded; for the labour is incessant during six days of the week, the effect of which is to benumb his faculties on the seventh.

If the soft play of the affections, if the enjoyment of the

splendid loveliness of nature and the beauties of art, if the expansion of the intellect in the pursuits of science, if refinement of manners, if strengthening and improving the tone and forms of our physical frames, and if the adoration, with minds full of knowledge and souls melting with love of our most bounteous Creator, constitute the real objects of human life in this world—the end for which we live; and if the fulfilment of this end be the only rational idea of preparation for a higher state of existence, then the system of action which we have contemplated, when viewed as the leading object of human life, appears stale, barren, and unprofitable.

It no doubt supports the activity of our minds and bodies, and surrounds us with innumerable temporal advantages, not to be lightly valued; but its benefits end there. It affords an example of the independence of the several natural laws. The system is one in which the mind and body are devoted for ten or twelve hours a day, on six days in the week, to the production of those useful and ornamental articles which constitute wealth; and in this object we are eminently successful.

Verily we have our reward; for no nation in the world possesses so much wealth as Great Britain: none displays such vast property in the possession of individuals: none approaches her in the general splendour of living, and none in the multitude of inhabitants who live in idleness and luxury on the accumulated fruits of industry.

But still, with all the dazzling advantages which Great Britain derives from her wealth, she is very far from being happy. Her large towns are overrun with pauperism and heathenism. The overwrought manufacturers are too frequently degraded by intemperance, licentiousness, and other forms of vice.

In the classes distinguished by industry and morality, the keen competition for employment and profit imposes excessive labour and anxiety on nearly all; while the higher classes are often the victims of idleness, vanity, ambition, vice, *ennui*, and a thousand attendant sufferings of body and mind. The pure, calm, dignified, and lasting felicity which our higher feelings pant for, and which reason whispers ought to be our aim, is seldom or never attained.

The present condition of society, therefore, does not seem to be the most perfect which human nature is capable of reaching. Hitherto man has been progressive, and there is no reason to believe that he has yet reached the goal.

LECTURE X.

Effects of the Selfish System.

I proceed to point out some additional examples of the results of the competition of individual interests.

Apparently the evils of the selfish system have the tendency to prolong and extend themselves indefinitely. We have seen, for example, that the institution of different employments is natural, springing from differences in native talent and inclination. This leads to the division of labour, by which every person has it in his power to confine his exertions to that species of art for which he has the greatest aptitude and liking; while, by interchanging commodities, each may acquire the things necessary to his own enjoyment.

But under the present system, this institution is attended with considerable disadvantages. Workmen are trained to perform the minutest portions of labour on a particular article, and to do nothing else; one man can point a pin, and do no more; another can make the pin's head, but can finish no other part of it; one can make the eye of a needle, but can neither fashion the body nor point it. In preparing steam-engines, there are different branches of trade and different workshops for the different parts of the machine. One person makes boilers, another casts the framework and heavy iron beams, a third makes cylinders, a fourth pistons, and so on; and the person who furnishes steam-engines to the public merely goes to these different workshops, buys the different parts of the skeleton, and his own trade consists in fitting them together, and selling the engine entire.

These arrangements produce commodities better and cheaper than if one man made the whole needle or pin, or if one manufactory fabricated the whole steam-engine; but when we view the system in its moral effects, there is an attendant disadvantage. It rears a large number of workmen who are ignorant of every practical art beyond the minute details of their own branch of industry, and who are altogether useless and helpless, except when combined under one employer. If not counteracted in its effects by

education, it renders the workmen incapable of properly discharging their duties as parents or as members of society, by leaving them ignorant of everything except their narrow mechanical operations.

It leaves them also exposed, by ignorance, to become the dupes of agitators and fanatics, and makes them dependent on the capitalist. They are mere implements of trade in the hands of men of more enlarged minds and more extensive property; and as these men also compete keenly, talent against talent, and capital against capital, each of them is compelled to throw back a part of the burden on his artisans, demanding more labour, and giving less wages, to enable him to maintain his own position.*

While the competition of individual interest continues to prevail in society, the field even of benevolence itself is limited. It becomes difficult to do good to one individual, or one class of individuals, without doing injury to others. Nothing, for example, can at first sight appear more meritorious and beneficial than the institution of charitable endowments. Yet objections to them have been stated, on very plausible grounds. Children do not, in general, become destitute, except in consequence of great infringement of one or more of the natural laws by their parents.

Now, there is always a considerable number of meritorious persons, who stand in the middle line between high and low endowments, who, with great difficulty, are able to maintain themselves and their families in the station in which they were born, and who succeed in doing so only by submitting to incessant toil. Surely there must be some defect in the leading principle of our social institutions when a benevolent provision for certain favoured persons really has the effect of obstructing the path and hindering the prosperity of the children of more meritorious individuals.

There is more of benevolent arrangement in the tendency of barbarous tribes to wage furious wars with each other than at first sight appears. The Irish peasantry, in general, were till lately barbarous in their minds and habits, and, but for the presence of a large army of civilised men, who preserved the peace, they would have fought with and slain each other. It is questionable whether the miseries that

* I confine the observations in the text to the case of mechanics who are uneducated. If they receive a good education, the more monotonous their employment is, they have the more spare energy for thought.

would have attended such a course of action would have exceeded those which are actually endured from starvation.

The bane of Ireland has been that, owing to England keeping the peace, her population increased far more rapidly than her capital, morality, and knowledge. Where a nation is left to follow its own course, this does not occur. While it is ignorant and barbarous, it is pugnacious, reckless, licentious, and intemperate—qualities which naturally restrain or destroy population; and it is only after morality and intelligence have been introduced that capital and industry follow, and population naturally and beneficially increases. England prevented the Irish from fighting, but she did little to improve their moral, intellectual, and physical condition. The consequence has been, as the purest philanthropist will confess, that a destroying angel who in one night should slay a million of human beings—men, women, and children—in that country, would probably occasion less suffering than would arise from any considerable deficiency in their potato crop.

At this moment (June, 1835) the peasantry in the west of Ireland are suffering all the horrors of famine through failure of that portion of their food.* Although corn is abundant, and is daily exported to England, they are too poor to purchase it. The Irish peasantry, habitually on the brink of starvation, and exposed to the greatest destitution, stand at one end of the agricultural scale; and the great landed proprietors of England, with revenues of £100,000 per annum, and rolling in every kind of luxury, occupy the other. The hand-loom weavers of Britain, earning five shillings a week by the labour of six days of fourteen hours each, are at the base of the manufacturing pyramid; † while the Peels and Arkwrights, possessing millions of pounds, appear at the summit.

There is something *not* agreeable to our moral sentiments, and *not* conformable to the brother-loving and wealth-despising precepts of Christianity, in a system of which these are the natural fruits, and according to which, even benevolence cannot be manifested towards one human being without indirectly doing injury to another.

* By a singular coincidence, starvation, from *disease* in the potato crop, is again afflicting unhappy Ireland, at the time when this edition is in the press (April, 1846).

† It must be remembered that this was written in 1835.—ED., 1893.

It is worthy of remark that if the system of individual aggrandisement be the necessary, unalterable, and highest result of the human faculties as constituted by Nature, it altogether excludes the possibility of Christianity ever becoming practical in this world. The leading and distinguishing moral precepts of Christianity are those which command us to do to others as we would wish that they should do unto us; to love our neighbours as ourselves; and not to permit our minds to become engrossed in the pursuit of wealth, or infatuated by the vanity and ambition of the world.

But if a constant struggle for supremacy in wealth and station be unavoidable among men, it is clearly impossible for us to obey such precepts, which must therefore be as little adapted to our nature and condition as the command to love and protect poultry, but never to eat them, would be to that of the fox. Instead, therefore, of divines teaching Christian morality (if the system of competition of individual interests be the highest that our nature admits of), it would be wiser in them to follow the example of the political economists, and to suit their precepts to the human constitution.

Political economists in general regard the existing forms and condition of society as the result of our natural faculties, and as destined to be the lot of man to the end of time. In perfect consistency with this view, they propose to provide for the increasing welfare of the race by exalting the aim of the selfish principles, and directing them more beneficially by extended knowledge. They would educate the operative classes, and thereby confer on them mental energy, fortitude, and a rational ambition—after which it might be expected that these classes would not consent to labour, like the lower animals, merely for the humblest subsistence; but would consider decent comforts, if not simple luxuries, essential to their enjoyment, and would demand wages adequate to the command of these as the recompense of their industry and skill.

As long, however, as the system of individual aggrandisement is maintained, it will be the interest of the class immediately above the operatives, which subsists on the profits of their labour, to prevent the growth of improved notions and principles of action among them; for the labourer is in the most profitable condition for his master's service when he possesses just intelligence and morality sufficient to enable

him to discharge his duties faithfully, but so little as to feel neither the ambition nor the power of effectually improving his own circumstances. And accordingly, the maintenance of the labouring classes in this state of contentment and toil is the *beau ideal* of practical philosophy with many excellent individuals in the higher and middle ranks of life.

LECTURE XI.

Man's Capacity for Improvement.

It is now time, however, to consider the question, Whether the human faculties, and their relations to external objects, admit of man ascending in the scale of morality, intelligence, and religion to that state in which the evils of individual competition shall be obviated, and full scope be afforded for the actual supremacy of the highest powers?

On contemplating man's endowments in a general point of view, nothing would appear more simple and easy than practically to realise the general and permanent supremacy of the moral powers. We have seen that aptitude for labour is conferred on him by the Creator; and that, if enlightened in regard to his own constitution and the sources of his own welfare, he would desire to labour for his own gratification, even independently of the reward in the form of food, raiment, and physical abundance, which it is the means of procuring.

Again, the earth and the external world generally are created with an admirable adaptation to his bodily and mental powers, so as to recompense him with great rewards for a very moderate extent of exertion in applying them to his own advantage. Further, man has been endowed with inventive and co-operative faculties, which confer on him a vast ingenuity, and which render him capable of impressing, not only the inferior animals, but fire, air, earth, and water, into his service as labourers.

Finally, he has received a faculty of Benevolence, prompting him to love all sentient beings, and to delight in their happiness; a faculty of Conscientiousness, desiring to see universal justice reign; a faculty of Ideality, which aspires after universal perfection and loveliness; with faculties of Veneration, Wonder, and Hope, leading him to desire communion with God, and to rejoice in the contemplation of all that is pure, excellent, and beneficent.

With such a constitution, and placed in such circumstances, the wonder is that he has wandered in error and misery so long.

In addition to these high moral and intellectual endow-

ments, man possesses animal propensities, which are blind and selfish impulses. They are prone to produce evil until they are directed and enlightened by his moral and intellectual powers.

His ignorance of himself and of external nature, and his consequent inexperience of the happiness which he is capable of reaching, appear to have been the chief causes of his past errors; and the following among other reasons authorise us to hope for happier scenes hereafter:—His propensities, although strong, are felt by all well-constituted minds to be inferior in dignity and authority to the moral and the intellectual faculties. There is, therefore, in man a natural longing for the realisation of a more perfect social condition than any hitherto exhibited, in which justice and benevolence shall prevail.

Plato's "Republic" is the most ancient recorded example of this desire of a perfect social state. Josephus describes the sect of the Essenes, among the Jews, as aiming at the same object. The "Essenes," says he, "despise riches, and are so liberal as to excite our admiration. Nor can any be found amongst them who is more wealthy than the rest; for it is a law with them that those who join their order should distribute their possessions among the members, the property of each being added to that of all the rest, as being all brethren."—"They reject pleasure as evil; and they look upon temperance and a conquest over the passions as the greatest virtue."—(*Wars*, ii., ch. 7.)

In the days of the Apostles, an attempt was made by the Christians to realise these principles by possessing all things in common. The same end is aimed at also by the Society of Shakers and by the Harmonites of North America, and by the followers of Mr. Owen in Britain. Plato's Republic and Sir Thomas More's Utopia, which was a similar scheme, were purely speculative, and have never been tried. The word "Utopian," indeed, is usually applied to all schemes too perfect and beautiful to admit of being reduced to practice.

The Essenes laboured in agriculture and in various trades, and seem to have maintained their principles in active operation for a considerable period of time. The Harmonites are stated to have been a colony of Moravians united under one or more religious leaders. In their own country they had, from infancy, been taught certain religious tenets, in which they were generally agreed; they had all been

trained to industry in its various branches, and disciplined in practical morality; and thus prepared, who emigrated with some little property, purchased a considerable territory in Indiana, which was then one of the back settlements of the United States, and proceeded to realise the scheme of common property and Christian brotherhood.

This community existed for many years, enjoyed great prosperity, and became rich. Mr. Owen at last appeared, bought their property, and proceeded to try his own scheme. They then retired again into the wilderness, and re-commenced their career. At that time they were about two thousand in number. Here the vice and misery which prevail in common society were in a great measure excluded; and though the external circumstances of the Harmonites were peculiarly favourable, their history shows what human nature is capable of accomplishing.

The leading principle of Mr. Owen is, that human character is determined mainly by external circumstances; and that natural dispositions, and even established habits, may be easily overcome. Accordingly, he invited all persons who approved of his scheme to settle at New Harmony; but as those who acted on his invitation had been trained in the selfish system, and were, in many instances, mere ignorant adventurers, they failed to act in accordance with the dictates of the moral sentiments and the intellect, and Mr. Owen's benevolent scheme proved completely unsuccessful.

The establishment at Orbiston, in Lanarkshire, set on foot ten years ago by the admirers of that gentleman, fell closely under my personal observation; and there the same disregard of the principles of human nature and of the results of experience was exhibited. Without in the least benefiting the operatives, the scheme ruined its philanthropic projectors, most of whom are now either in premature graves or emigrants to distant lands; while every stone which they reared has been razed to the foundation.

I proceed to state some of the reasons which render it probable, in spite of these failures, that the capacity of man for improvement is greater than experience may, at first sight, lead us to suppose.

In the first place, man is obviously progressive in the evolution of his mental powers. The moral and intellectual faculties bear a far higher sway in the social life of Europe in the present day than they did five hundred years ago;

and the development of the brain also appears to improve with time, exercise, and the amelioration of social institutions. Moreover, individuals are fitted to institute, maintain, and enjoy a highly moral and intellectual social condition in proportion to the predominance of their superior sentiments and intellectual powers.

Further—As the firmest believers in man's capability of improvement are those persons who themselves possess a high moral development, they are inspired in this faith, not by a demon, but by Heaven; for the moral sentiments are the God-like elements of our nature; and the very fact that these ennobling expectations are entertained by men possessing the best moral affections affords an indication that Providence intends that they should be realised. In proportion, then, as a large development of the higher faculties becomes general, the conviction of the possibility of improvement, the desire for it, and the power of realising it, will increase.*

Again—Man, as already mentioned, is clearly and undeniably progressive in knowledge; and this single fact authorises us to rely with confidence on his future improvement. In proportion as he shall evolve a correct knowledge of the elements of external nature, and of his own constitution, out of the chaos in which they have hitherto existed, will his means of acting wisely and advantageously for his own happiness be augmented. If we trace in history the periods of the direst sufferings of human nature, we shall find them uniformly to have been those of the most benighted ignorance.

If the progress of knowledge be destined to augment virtue and enjoyment, our brightest days must yet be in reserve; because knowledge is at this moment only dawning even on civilised nations. It has been well observed that we who now live are only emerging out of the ignorance and barbarism of the dark ages; we have not yet fully

* The failure of the disciples of Mr. Owen at Orbiston, in Lanarkshire, may be supposed to be a refutation of this remark; but they followed the aspirations of their moral sentiments without consulting the dictates of enlightened intellect. They assembled a number of selfish and ignorant people, and expected that, by a few speeches and by living in a community, they could alter their mental condition, and render them in the highest degree disinterested and moral. This was irrational, and failure was the natural result; but this does not show that wiser means might not have led to happier ends.

escaped. This is proved by the mass of uneducated persons everywhere existing, by the imperfect nature of the instruction usually given, and by the vast multitude of prejudices which still prevail, even in the best informed classes of society.

It is, in truth, an error to believe that even modern Europe is enlightened, in any reasonable meaning of the term. A few of her ablest men are comparatively well instructed when tried by the standards of other ages; but the wisest of them have the most forcible conviction that the field of their knowledge of nature, physical and mental, when compared with the vast regions of territory still unexplored, is as a span to the whole terrestrial globe; and as to the multitude of mankind, their ignorance is like the loftiest mountain in extent, and their knowledge as the most diminutive mole-hill.

The external world is clearly constituted with the intention that man should exert his highest faculties, illuminated by knowledge, and that his happiness should be by that means increased. Civilised man, with his numerous inventions and his admirable command over physical and animal nature, appears almost like a God, compared with the savages of New Holland and other helpless tribes bearing the human form without manifesting human intelligence.

Another reason for believing in human capability of improvement is that, imperfect as our scientific acquaintance with ourselves and with external nature at present is, we are able to trace many of our sufferings to causes which are removable by knowledge and by the practice of moral duty. The evils of sickness and premature death may, in general, and with the exception of accidents, be traced to feeble constitutions inherited from parents, or to direct disobedience of the organic laws in our own persons. If knowledge of the causes of health and disease were generally diffused, and if the sanctions of religion and of public opinion were directed towards enforcing attention to them, it is reasonable to believe that in every succeeding generation fewer parents would produce children with feeble constitutions, and fewer adults would cause their own deaths prematurely by ignorant infringement of these laws.

Poverty, and the consequent want of the necessaries and enjoyments of life, is another vast source of human suffering. But who that contemplates the fruitfulness of the earth

and the productiveness of human labour and skill can doubt that, if a higher-minded and more considerate population could be reared, who should act according to the dictates of an enlightened understanding and a sound practical morality, under wise social arrangements, this source of suffering might also be dried up, or very greatly diminished?

Vicissitude and uncertainty of condition also afflict thousands who are placed above the reach of actual want of food and raiment. Yet how much of these evils may be traced to the dark mysteriousness in which trade is generally conducted! In consequence of that, each manufacturer is often in secret ruining both himself and his neighbour by over-production, without any of them being aware that he is the source of his own and his neighbour's calamities. And how much evil may be ascribed to the grasping and gambling spirit, which prompts so many persons to engage in wild speculations, which a sound education in political economy might prevent!

The last reason which I assign for believing in the capability of man for improvement is, that he can scarcely advance a step in knowledge and morality without inducing a palpable amelioration of his condition. If you will trace the history of our countrymen through their various states, of savages, barbarians—chivalrous professors of love, war, and plunder—and of civilised citizens of the world, you will find the aggregate enjoyment of the people increased with every extension of knowledge and virtue.

For all these reasons, let us hope that improvement, although not boundless, yet so extensive that its limits cannot be defined, lies within the reach of man; and let us proceed to consider some of the means by which it may be attained.

The first step towards realising this object is to produce a general conviction of its possibility, which I have endeavoured to accomplish. The next is to communicate to each individual a clear perception of the advantages which would accrue to *himself* from such improvements, and a firm conviction of the impossibility of individuals in general ever attaining to the full enjoyment and satisfaction of their highest and best powers, except by means of social institutions founded on the harmonious action of all their faculties.

In support of this last proposition, I solicit your attention

for a brief space to our helpless condition as individuals. In social and civilised life, not one of us could subsist in comfort for a day without the aid and society of our fellow-men.* This position will perhaps be disputed by few; but the idea is general that if we only acquire property enough we may completely realise the happy condition so delightfully sketched by Moore, when he invokes felicity to a friend in the following words:—

> "Peace be around thee wherever thou rov'st;
> May life be for thee one summer day;
> And all that thou wishest, and all that thou lov'st,
> Come smiling around thy sunny way."

Wealth cannot purchase such happiness as this.

Is any one convinced that human life is rendered unnecessarily laborious by our present habits of competition, and does he desire to limit his hours of labour, and long ardently to enjoy more ample opportunities for exercising his moral and intellectual faculties?—he soon discovers that while his neighbours in general continue to seek their chief happiness in the pursuit of wealth or the gratification of ambition, he can accomplish little towards realising his moral desires. He must keep his shop open as long as they do; he must labour in his manufactory up to their full standard of time; or if he be a member of a profession, he must devote as many hours to business as they; otherwise he will be distanced in the race, and will lose both his means of subsistence and his station in society.

So true is this representation that, in my own day, many of the men who without fortune have embarked in public life—that is, who have taken the lead in public affairs, and have devoted a large portion of their time to the business of the community—have ruined themselves and their families. Their competitors in trade, manufactures, or professional pursuits were dedicating their whole energies to their private duties, while *they* were *dividing* their attention between them and the public service; and they were, in consequence, ruined in their individual fortunes, and

* Alexander Selkirk lived in solitude for four years on the uninhabited island of Juan Fernandez in comfort, and even with enjoyment, after he had become accustomed to his situation; but he had a fine climate, a fertile soil, and unbounded range for action. A human being left without aid in a civilised community would be far more helpless and miserable.

sank into obscurity and want. Yet it is certain that the business of the State or of a particular town or city should receive a due portion of attention from the inhabitants.

This dependence of individuals on the condition of the social circle in which they live extends through all the ramifications of existence. Does any individual entertain higher notions of moral and religious duty than are current in his own rank and age?—he will find, when he attempts to carry them into practice, that he becomes an object of remark to all, and of dislike and hostility to many.

Does another perceive the dangers to health and comfort in narrow lanes, small sleeping apartments, and ill-ventilated rooms and churches, and desire to have them removed?—he can accomplish absolutely nothing until he has convinced a multitude of his fellow citizens of the reasonableness and advantage of his projected improvements, and induced them to co-operate in carrying them into effect.

But perhaps the strongest proof of the close connection between public welfare and private interest is afforded by the effects of any great political or commercial convulsion. In 1825-6 we saw extensive failures among bankers, merchants, and manufacturers; and how universal was the individual suffering throughout all classes! Labourers could find no employment, and the shopkeepers who depended on them had few customers, and of these, many were unable to pay. The great manufacturers who supplied these classes with clothing and articles for domestic use were idle, the house proprietor suffered for want of solvent tenants, and the landed proprietor found a dull and disadvantageous market for his produce.

Contrast this picture with the condition of the country when the great branches of manufacturing industry are prosperous, and how different the happiness of individuals! Thus it appears, that even under the present system of the pursuit of individual interest, the real welfare of each individual is much more closely connected with that of his neighbours than is generally recognised. This proves that a fundamental element of individual advantage is public prosperity.

According to my humble conviction, therefore, the very first lesson relative to our social duties which should be given to the young is to open their understandings to the great fact that the precept of Christianity which commands

us to love our neighbours as ourselves is actually written in our individual and social constitutions, and must be practically realised before individuals can become truly prosperous and happy.

That precept has been generally interpreted to mean that we should do specific acts of kindness to the men who live locally in our neighbourhood, or who are connected with us by ties of intimacy or kindred; but, although this is unquestionably one, and a very important, application of it, the principle of the precept goes much further. It enjoins us to arrange our social institutions and our whole practical conduct in such a manner as to render all simultaneously, and as nearly as may be equally, happy; and apparently our nature has been constituted to admit of this being done with unspeakable advantage to all whenever we shall thoroughly understand our constitution, its wants and capabilities. At present this principle is imperfectly understood, and certainly it is not generally acted on.

A few years ago, we used to hear the maxim often repeated that private persons had nothing to do with public affairs; that their business was to mind their shops, their manufactories, their professions, and their families, and to leave public matters to public men. The evil consequences of following this rule in past ages may be read in the wide aberrations of many of our laws and institutions, and of our social condition, from the standards of reason and general utility. If you will peruse the pages of history, you will find the caprices of a single Sovereign often leading to wars which spread devastation and misery among millions of people. These could not have been waged if the millions of persons on whom the calamities fell had considered the public interest to be inseparably connected with their own, and if they had had courage to exercise an enlightened control over the actions of their rulers.

If we trace narrowly the great causes why our rulers have been permitted to waste the public resources and incur the national debt, which now forms so great an impediment to public improvement, we shall find that too often the individuals of the nation were calculating the private gain which hostilities would yield to them. War created a demand for farm produce to maintain fleets and armies, for cloth to clothe them, and for iron to arm them, and so forth; and men shut their eyes to the fact that it

was destroying the national resources, and that they themselves would, in the end, be forced to pay for all.

One of the most certain marks of a truly enlightened mind is the power of comprehending the dependence of our individual welfare on public prosperity. I do not mean, of course, that each of us should become a political reformer, or a conservative, or a brawler about town politics and police regulations, as if these constituted our chief business, to the neglect of our private duties. This would augment, instead of diminishing, the evils of our social condition. What I wish to enforce is the conviction that, in the general case, our individual enjoyments are inseparably connected with those of the society in which we move; and that it is both our interest and our duty to study attentively the nature, objects, and practical results of our social institutions, and to devote to them all the time and attention that may be necessary to bring them into accordance with the dictates of our higher powers.

The prevalence of these views would lead to numerous and important advantages. We should learn to regard public measures in their real relationship to general utility, and not through the distorting medium of our private interests and partialities. We should proscribe class interests as public nuisances; and believe in the incalculable power which society possesses to improve its condition whenever it chooses to act in the right direction. We should feel much more disposed than we are at present to promote, with our moral influence, the ascendency of all measures calculated to lead to public good, relying on their benefiting ourselves in our social capacity.

If I be correct in the opinion that the happiness of each individual is inseparably connected with that of the society in which he lives, and that the law that we must love our neighbour as ourselves really means, in its extensive sense, that individual enjoyment can arise only from improved social habits and institutions, then I shall not be thought guilty of extravagance when I remark that in times past this view has rarely, to any practical end, been pressed on the attention of society. Within the last fifty or sixty years political economy has been discussed on philosophical principles; but the leading aim of the economists has been to demonstrate the most effectual means of increasing wealth.

The very title of the first valuable work on the subject in this country is "The *Wealth* of Nations," by Dr. Adam

Smith. The principles which he expounded, it is true, are, in many respects, coincident with those which I am now advocating. No one can value his labours, and those of his successors, such as Ricardo, M'Culloch, and their followers, more highly than I do. Yet it is unquestionable that the great aim of all these writers has been to clear away the rubbish that impeded the play of our selfish faculties, and to teach the advantage of repealing all laws that impede a man in following his own bent in search of its own happiness in its own way, restrained only by the obligation that he shall not *directly* injure or obstruct the prosperity of his neighbour.

In the infancy of civilisation, the exposition of the natural laws by which it is created and diffused is most valuable, and these writers are worthy of all consideration as being useful in their day. But society must *advance* in its course. It *has* augmented its wealth, while many persons doubt whether the increase of happiness has, in all ranks, now kept pace with that of its riches. What seems now to be wanted is the application of principles in harmony with our whole nature, physical, animal, moral, and intellectual, calculated to lead to the gratification of all our powers.

The gigantic efforts of Great Britain in war afford an example of the prodigious power, in the form of violence, which we are capable of wielding ; and if our forefathers had dedicated to the physical and mental improvement of the people the same ardour of mind, and the same amount of treasure, which they squandered in battles between the years 1700 and 1815, what a different result would at this day have crowned their labours ! If they had bestowed honours on the benefactors of the race as they have done on its destroyers, how different would have been the direction of ambition !

The next requisite for improving our social condition is the command of time for the discharge of our social duties. One day in the week is set apart for teaching and practising our religious duties ; but in that day little instruction is communicated by our public and authorised teachers touching the affairs of this world, and the laws by which the happiness of our social state may be best promoted. The other six days of the week are devoted to the advancement of our individual interests in the pursuit of wealth, or, as the Scripture designates it, to the collection of "the meat which perisheth."

In the existing arrangements of society, our social duties do not appear to be generally recognised as incumbent on us. There are few seminaries for making us acquainted with them, and no time is allowed for the practice of them. Those unofficial individuals who discharge public duties must either sacrifice to them the time which their competitors are devoting to their private interests, or must overtask their minds and bodies by labouring when Nature demands repose.

With all deference to existing opinions, I should humbly propose that a specific portion of time should be set apart for teaching in public assemblies, and for discharging practically our social duties, and that all private business should then be suspended. If half a day in the week were devoted to this purpose, some of the following consequences might be expected to ensue.

In the *first* place, the great importance of social institutions and habits to individual happiness would be brought home to all. It would be half a day dedicated to the consideration of the means by which we might practically love our neighbours as ourselves : a public recognition of the principle as one capable of being carried into effect would, in itself, bend many minds towards realising it.

Secondly, such an arrangement would enable, and also excite, the people at large to turn their attention seriously to moral and social considerations, in which their true interests are so deeply involved, instead of considering it meritorious and advantageous to neglect them ; and it would tend to remove a dense mass of ignorance and prejudice which offers a powerful obstacle to all improvement.

Thirdly, the dedication of a specific portion of time to our social duties would leave leisure for truly virtuous and enlightened men to transact public business, without exposing themselves to be ruined by their competitors in the race of private interest. Under the present system, the selfish are enriching themselves, while the patriotic are impoverishing their families by discharging their public duties.

Perhaps the notion will present itself to many persons that if the industrious classes were congregated to receive instruction in this manner, the result would be the formation of innumerable clubs and debating societies, in which vivacious but ignorant men would imbue the weaker

brethren with discontent, and lead them into mischievous errors. This would probably happen if a sudden adoption of the plan took place without previous preparation. At present, ignorance of sound social principles is so prevalent, that such unions might be abused; but a young and rising generation may be prepared, by training and education, for comprehending and performing their social duties, and then leisure for the practice of them would lead only to good.

After the people at large are enlightened, and are thoroughly imbued with the love of justice and of the happiness of their neighbours, another social duty will be to carry into practice, as far as possible and by every moral means, the equalisation of the enjoyment of all—not by pulling the fortunate and accomplished down, but by elevating the condition of the inferior orders. With this view, all privileges and artificial ranks which obstruct the general welfare should be abolished: not violently, but gradually; and, if possible, by inducing their possessors to give them up, as injurious to the public and not beneficial to themselves.

The next social duty which I mention relates to the maintenance of the poor. Much diversity of opinion prevails on the causes of poverty and the remedies for it; as also on the best means of managing the poor. Many political economists have taught that there should be no legal provision for the indigent, because the knowledge of such a resource induces the indolent and vicious to relax their own efforts in order to earn the means of subsistence, leads them to throw themselves unblushingly, and as a matter of right, on the public bounty, and thus operates as a direct stimulus to poverty.

Again, some political economists, of whom Dr. Chalmers is the chief, regard all compulsory assessments for the poor as injurious to society, and maintain that private benevolence, if fairly left to itself, is quite adequate to provide for them. Other men, equally wise and experienced in the world, are altogether disbelievers in this alleged power of the principle of benevolence, and argue that the only effect of relying on it would be to permit the avaricious to escape from all contribution, and to throw the burden of maintaining the poor entirely on the benevolent, who, in general, are overwhelmed with other demands on their bounty.

Scientific knowledge of human nature, and of the influence of external circumstances on happiness, cannot be general when such widely different doctrines regarding a question

so momentous are supported by men of equal profundity and learning.

The view of it which is presented by the new philosophy is the following:—

The causes of that degree of poverty which amounts to destitution are great defects in the body or in the mind of the individuals who fall into this condition, or in both. The lame, the deaf, and the blind may be poor through bodily defects, and should be comfortably supported by the more fortunate members of society. Their numbers are not great, in proportion to those of well-constituted men, and the expense of their maintenance would not be felt as a severe tax if they were the only burdens on the benevolence of the community. The idiotic belong to the same class.

All that society can accomplish in regard to such persons is to provide comfortably for those who exist, and to use means to limit their increase in future generations. This can be accomplished best by instructing the community at large in the organic laws, and presenting to them every intelligible motive to obey them.

An accomplished manager of the poor of a parish, according to the present system, is a man who resists to the very last extremity every application for charity; and who, when resistance is no longer possible, obtains the greatest quantity of food and raiment for the smallest amount of money. Economy in contracts is the grand object; and those managers are covered with glory who are able to reduce the assessment on the parish one-half per cent.

Without meaning at all to depreciate the advantages of economy, I remark that this mode of management reminds me of the manner in which an old relative of my own coped with the rushes which grew abundantly in one of his fields. He employed women, whom he hired at so many pence a day, to pull them up; and if the wages of the women fell from 10d. to 8d. or 6d. a day, he thought that he had managed the rushes to great advantage that year. But it so happened that the rushes, like the poor, constantly re-appeared, and the labour of pulling them up never came to an end.

At last this excellent person died, and his son succeeded to the farm. The son had received a scientific education, and had heard of the chemical qualities of soil, of the various metals and minerals which are usually found

incorporated with it, and of the effect of these and other circumstances on vegetation. He thus discovered that stagnant water is the parent of rushes; and when he succeeded to the farm he cut a deep drain through a high bank, obtained declivity sufficient to cause water to flow, and then constructed drains through the field in every direction. By this means he dried the soil; the rushes disappeared, and have never since been seen there; the labour of pulling them up is saved, and the money which it cost is devoted to further improvements.

So long as society shall neglect the causes of poverty, and shall omit to remove them, and so long as they shall confine their main efforts to making cheap contracts for supporting the poor, so long will they have a constant succession of indigent to maintain. Nay, there is a great tendency in their proceedings to foster the growth of the very poverty which so grievously distresses them. I have said that the children in the charity-workhouses have generally low temperaments and inferior brains; and that these are the great parents of poverty. To prevent these children from rearing an inferior race, also bordering on pauperism, and from becoming paupers themselves in the decline of life, it would be necessary to improve, by every possible means, their defective organisation. This can be done only by supplying them with nutritious diet, and by paying the utmost attention to their physical and mental training.

By the present system, they are fed on the poorest fare, and their training is very imperfect. They look dull, inert, heavy, and lymphatic, and are not fortified so much as they might be against the imperfections of their natural constitutions. In point of fact, in feeding pauper children with the most moderate quantity of the coarsest and cheapest food, means are actually taken to perpetuate the evil of pauperism; for bad feeding in childhood weakens the body and the mind, and consequently diminishes the power of the individuals to provide for themselves. Attention, therefore, ought to be devoted, not merely to the support of existing paupers, but also to the means of preventing another crop from springing up in the next generation. Our present system may be compared to that which the farmer would have pursued if he had watered the field after pulling up the rushes, in order to assist Nature in accomplishing a new growth.

LECTURE XII.

Pauperism and Crime.

Another cause of pauperism is the habit of indulging in intoxicating liquors. This practice undermines the health of the whole nervous system, through which it operates most injuriously on the mind. The intoxicating fluid, by its influence on the nerves of the stomach, stimulates the brain, and excites the organs of sensibility, emotion, and thought, for the time, into pleasing and vivacious action.

Hence the drunkard enjoys a momentary happiness; but when the stimulus is withdrawn, the tone of the system sinks as far below the healthy state as during intoxication it was raised above it. He then experiences an internal void—a painful prostration of strength and vivacity, and a strong craving for a renewed supply of alcohol to recruit his exhausted vigour. During intoxication, the brain, from over excitement, is incapable of healthy action, while in the intervals between different debauches it is so exhausted and enfeebled that it is equally unfit to execute its functions. The habitual drunkard thus sinks into the condition of an imbecile, and may become a burden on the industrious portion of the community for his maintenance.*

Various causes lead to these unfortunate habits. One is hereditary pre-disposition. If the parents, or one of them, have been habitually addicted to this vice, its consequences affect their physical constitution, and they

* The phenomena attending the different stages of intoxication appear to indicate that the brain is affected also directly in the following manner, although evidence is still wanting to render this view certain. Intoxicating liquors accelerate the action of the heart, and cause an increased flow of blood to the head. The first effect of this is to stimulate all the organs into greater activity, and to produce feelings of vivacity and pleasure. The blood circulates most freely in the largest mental organs, because they have the largest blood-vessels. As intoxication proceeds, the smaller organs—those of the intellectual powers—are first overcharged with blood, and their functions become impaired; next, the organs of the moral sentiments are gorged; and lastly, those of the propensities; so that the drunkard extinguishes first his humanity, then his animal nature, and at last becomes a mere breathing, unconscious mass.

transmit an abnormal condition of the organs to their children. This doctrine has been ridiculed, as if we taught that children are born drunk. They are no more born drunk than they are born in a passion; but they are engendered with conditions of brain that tend ultimately to produce in them a love of intoxicating fluids.

Again, a tendency to drunkenness appears to be caused by excessive labour with low diet. The nervous energy is exhausted through the medium of the muscles, and the stimulus of alcohol is felt to be extremely grateful in restoring sensations of life, vigour, and enjoyment. This cause may be removed by moderating the extent of labour, and by improving the quantity or the quality of the food. If alcohol were withheld, and a nourishing diet were supplied to such men, they would after a few weeks be surprised at the pleasurable feelings which they would experience from this better means of supplying the waste of their systems.

An additional cause of intoxication is found in ignorance. When an individual enjoys high health and a tolerably well-developed brain, he feels a craving for enjoyment, a desire to be happy, and to be surrounded by happy friends. If he be uneducated and ignorant, his faculties desire a scene in which they may vent their vivacity, and objects on which they may expend their energies; and he discovers that intoxicating liquors will give him a vivid experience for the time of the pleasures of which he is in quest. For the sake of this artificial stimulus, the bottle is then resorted to, instead of the natural excitements of the mind, calculated at once to render us happy and to improve our external condition.

A more extensive and scientific education is the most valuable remedy for these evils. We have seen mental cultivation banish drunkenness from the classes holding rank and respectability in society, and the same effect may be expected to follow from the extension of education downwards.

The last cause of pauperism is a great convulsion which occurs every few years in our manufacturing and commercial systems, and which, by deranging trade, deprives many industrious individuals of employment, casts them on charity for subsistence, breaks down their self-respect and their feelings of independence, and ultimately degrades them into helpless pauperism.

If, then, I am correct in the opinion that the chief causes of pauperism are—*first*, a low temperament and imperfect development of brain, attended with a corresponding mental imbecility, although not so great as to amount to idiocy; *secondly*, hereditary or acquired habits of intoxication, which impair the mind by lowering the tone of the whole nervous system; *thirdly*, want of mental cultivation; and *fourthly*, depression arising from commercial disasters—the question whether the poor should be provided for by society is easily solved. To leave them destitute would not remove any one of these causes, but would increase them. To allow our unhappy brethren, who thus appear to be as frequently the victims of evil influences over which they have little or no control as of their own misconduct, to perish, or to linger out a miserable and vicious existence, would be not only a direct infringement of the dictates of Benevolence and Conscientiousness, but an outrage on Veneration (seeing that God has commanded us to assist and reclaim them); moreover, it would tend also to the injury of our own interests.

The fact that the world is arranged by the Creator on the principle of dispensing happiness to the community in proportion to their obedience to the moral law is here again beautifully exemplified. By neglecting the poor, the number of individuals possessing deficient brains and temperaments is increased, the number of drunkards is increased, and the number of the ignorant is increased. As society carries these wretched beings habitually in its bosom; as they prowl about our houses, haunt our streets, and frequent our highways, and as we cannot get rid of them, it follows that we must suffer in our property and in our feelings until we do our duty towards them.

Nay, we must suffer in our health also; for their wretchedness is often the parent of epidemic diseases, which do not confine their ravages to them, but sweep away indiscriminately the good and the selfish, the indolent and the hard-hearted, who have allowed the exciting causes to grow up into magnitude beside them.

On the other hand, by applying rigorous measures, not only to maintain the poor, but also to remove the causes of pauperism, these evils may be mitigated, if not entirely removed. If a practical knowledge of the organic laws were once generally diffused through society, and a sound moral, religious, and intellectual education were added, I cannot

doubt that the causes of pauperism would be perceptibly diminished.

Mental science conveys a strong conviction to the mind that precepts and knowledge are not sufficient *by themselves* to ensure correct conduct. The higher faculties of the mind must be brought into a state of *sufficient vigour* to be able practically to resist, not only the internal solicitations of the animal propensities, but the temptations presented by the external world, before sound precepts can be realised in practice.

Now, a favourable state of the organs, on the condition of which mental strength or feebleness in this world depends, is an indispensable requisite towards the possession of this vigour; and as this fact has not hitherto been known—at least, has not been attended to—it seems to me probable that society does not know a tithe of its own resources for mitigating the evils which afflict it.

The temperance societies are extremely useful in this respect. The substitution of comfortable food for intoxicating beverages has a direct tendency to benefit the whole nervous system, and to increase the vigour of the higher powers of the mind. Therefore, society at large should bend its best energies, directed by sound knowledge, towards the accomplishment of this end.

Holding it, then, to be clearly both the duty and the interest of society to provide for the poor, the next question is, How should this be done: by legal assessment or by voluntary contributions? The willingness of any individual to bestow charity depends not exclusively on the quantity of wealth which he possesses, but likewise on the strength of the benevolent principles in relation to the selfish in his mind. Now, we discover by observation, that the benevolent and the selfish feelings differ very widely in different individuals; and experience supports the conclusion which we draw from this fact, that their dispositions to act charitably are as widely different.

Not only so, but as the leading principle of our present social system is the pursuit of self-interest, it may be stated as a general rule (allowance being always made for individual exceptions) that those in whom the selfish feelings, with intellect and prudence, predominate, will possess most wealth; and yet this very combination of faculties will render them least willing to bestow. Their wealth and their benevolence will generally be in the inverse ratio of each other.

On another point I am disposed to carry our social duties further than is generally done. I regard the money applied to the maintenance of the indigent as, at present, to a great extent wasted, in consequence of no efficient measures being adopted by society to check pauperism at its root.

If I am correct in ascribing it to a low temperament, imperfect mental development, habits of intoxication, ignorance, and commercial fluctuations, efficient means must be used to remove these causes before it can either cease or be effectually diminished; and as the removal of them would, in the end, be the best policy for both the public and the poor, I am humbly of opinion that the community, if they were alive to their own interests, as well as to their duty, would supply the pecuniary means for laying the axe to the root of the tree, and, by a rational education, and by the elevation of the physical and mental condition of the lower classes of society, would bring pauperism to a close, or, at all events, diminish its present gigantic and increasing dimensions.*

Here the regret always occurs that our senseless wars should have wasted so much capital that we must provide twenty-seven millions of pounds sterling annually to pay the interest of it :†, a sum which, but for these wars, might have been applied to the moral advancement of society, and have carried a thousand blessings in its train. If our moral sentiments were once rendered as active as our propensities have been, and I fear still are, we should devote our public assessments to beneficial social objects, render them liberal in proportion to the magnitude of the work to be accomplished, and pay them with a hearty good-will, because they would all return to ourselves in social blessings.

I forbear suggesting any particular plan by which the objects now detailed may be accomplished; because no plan can become practical until the public mind be instructed in the principles, and convinced of the truth, of the doctrines which I am now teaching: and whenever they shall be so convinced, they will devise plans for themselves with infinitely greater facility and success than we can

* It is gratifying to observe that the suggestion in the text has, to some extent, been recently carried into effect by the Poor-Law Commissioners of England. See their admirable report "On the Training of Pauper Children," 1844.

† The interest on the National Debt, funded and unfunded, was, in 1892, £25,200,000.

pretend to do who live only in the dawn of the brighter day.

The next social duty to which I advert relates to the treatment of criminals, or of those individuals who commit offences against the persons or property of the members of the community. The present practice is to leave every man to the freedom of his own will until he shall have committed an offence : in other words, until he shall have seriously injured his neighbour ; and then to employ, at the public expense, officers of justice to detect him, witnesses to prove his crime, a jury to convict him, judges to condemn him, jailers to imprison him, or executioners to put him to death, according as the law shall have decreed. It will be observed that in all this proceeding there is no inquiry into the causes which led to the crime, into the remedies for crime, or into the effects of the treatment on the offender or on society ; yet every one of these points should be clearly ascertained before we can judge correctly of our social duties in regard to the treatment of criminals.

As to the cause of crime, there is a strange inconsistency between our theological and our legal standards on the proclivity of the human mind to evil. The articles of our Church teach us that the human heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked ; while legally, every man is regarded as so completely a moral agent that he can command his will and his actions ; and hence, that when a clear law which his intellect can comprehend is laid down for his guidance, he is a just and proper subject for punishment if he infringe it.

The premises and the conclusion in this last view are consistent with each other; and if this were a correct description of human nature, there would be no gainsaying the propriety of the practice. We should still, however, find a difficulty in accounting for our want of success in putting an end to crime ; for if these principles of criminal legislation and punitive infliction be sound, it appears a strange anomaly that crime has everywhere, and in every age, abounded most where punishment—especially severe punishment—has been most extensively administered, and that it has abated in all countries where penal infliction has become mild and merciful.

There is, however, an error in this view of human nature. It appears incredible that in a well-governed country like this, where detection and punishment are almost certain to

follow crime, any man should infringe the law, if he were not urged by impulses which obtained the mastery, for the time, over conscience and reason. We need not waste time, however, in speculating on this subject, but may come at once to facts.

As mentioned in a former lecture, the faculties may be divided into three great classes: those of the Animal Propensities, the Moral Sentiments, and the Intellectual Faculties.

In some individuals the animal propensities bear the ascendency over the moral and the intellectual faculties. Such men feel the impulses of passion very strongly, and are internally urged by vigorous selfish desires, which vehemently crave for gratification; while, on the other hand, they possess only feeble glimpses of moral obligation, and a glimmering of intellectual perception.

The class of minds which forms the greatest contrast to this one is that in which the moral and the intellectual faculties decidedly predominate over the animal propensities. Individuals thus constituted have naturally strong feelings of moral and religious obligation and vigorous intellectual perceptions, while the solicitations of their animal passions are relatively moderate.

The third class is intermediate between these two. They have the propensities, the moral sentiments, and the intellectual faculties nearly in a state of equilibrium. They have strong passions, but they have also strong powers of moral and religious emotion and of intellectual perception.

Fortunately, the lowest class of minds is not numerous. The highest class appears to me to abound extensively; while the middle class is also numerous. The middle and the highest class are at least as twenty to one, in comparison with the lowest.

I am aware that many of my present audience may regard these not as facts, but as dangerous fancies and groundless speculations. To such persons I can only say that if they will take the proper means to discover whether these are truths in Nature or not, they will find it as impossible to doubt of their reality as of the existence of the sun at noon-day; and there is no rule of philosophy by which facts should be disregarded merely because they are unknown to those who have never taken the trouble to observe them.

I respectfully solicit you to consider that the brain is not

of human creation, but is the workmanship of God, and that it is a most pernicious error to regard its functions and its influence on the mental dispositions with indifference. I beg leave here to assume that the views now presented are founded in Nature, and to apply them in elucidation of our social duties in the treatment of criminals.

In the case of persons of the lowest class, we are presented with beings whose tendencies to crime are naturally very strong, and whose powers of moral guidance and restraint are very feeble. We permit such individuals to move at large in a state of society in which intoxicating liquors, calculated to excite and gratify their animal propensities, are abundant and easily obtained, and in which property, the great means of procuring pleasure, is everywhere exposed to their appropriation; we proclaim the law that if they invade this property, or if, in the ecstasies of their drunken excitement, they commit violence on each other, or on the other members of the community, they shall be imprisoned, banished, or hanged, according to the degree of their offence; and in that condition of things we leave them to the free action of their own faculties and the influence of external circumstances.

It appears a self-evident proposition that if such men are actuated by strong animal passions there must be an antagonist power, of some kind or other, to restrain and guide them, before they can be led to virtue or withheld from vice. Now, the well-constituted members of society, judging from their own minds, assume that these individuals possess moral feelings and intellectual capacities adequate to this object, if they choose to apply them. On the other hand, the conviction forced on me by observation of the lives and histories of great and habitual criminals is that they do *not* enjoy these controlling powers in an adequate degree to enable them successfully to resist the temptations presented by their passions and by their external circumstances.

The question now presents itself, What mode of treatment does this view of the natural dispositions of criminals suggest? Every one is capable of understanding that if the optic nerve be too feeble to allow of perfect vision, or if the auditory nerve be too small to permit complete hearing, the persons thus afflicted should not be placed in situations in which perfect vision and hearing are necessary to enable them to avoid doing evil. Nay, it will also be granted without much difficulty that deficiency in the sense of Tune

may be the cause why some individuals have no perception of melody. But most people immediately demur when we assure them that some human beings exist who, in consequence of deficiency in the moral faculties, are as blind to the dictates of benevolence and justice as the others are deaf to melody; and that it is equally cruel to prescribe to them, as the law does, the practice of moral duties, and then to punish them severely because they fail. Yet the conclusion that this treatment is cruel is inevitable, if the premises be sound.

What, then, should be done with this class of beings?—for I am speaking only of a class, small in comparison with the great mass of society. The established mode of treating them by inflicting punishment has not been successful. Those who object to the new views constantly forget that the old method has been an eminent failure—that is to say, that crime has gone on increasing in amount, in proportion as punishment has been abundantly administered; and they shut their eyes to the conclusion which experience has established, that, be the causes of crime what they may, punishment has not yet been successful in removing them, and that therefore it cannot, on any grounds of reason, be maintained to be of itself sufficient for this purpose.

The new philosophy dictates that the idea of punishment, considered as mere retribution, should be discarded. Punishment in this sense really means vengeance; and the desire for inflicting it arises from an erroneous conception of the structure and condition of the criminal mind, and from the activity of our own passions, which are excited by the injuries inflicted on us by the actions and outrages of this class of persons. Our duty is to withdraw external temptation, and to supply, by a physical restraint, that deficiency of moral control which is the great imperfection of their minds.

We should treat them as moral patients. They should be placed in penitentiaries, and prevented from abusing their faculties, yet be humanely treated, and permitted to enjoy comfort and as much liberty as they could sustain, without injuring themselves or their fellow-men. They should be taught morality, knowledge, and religion, so far as their faculties enable them to learn; and they should be trained to industry.

This mode of treatment would render their lives happier than they could ever be, were their persons left at large in

society; and it would make them also useful. I consider the restoration of this class of persons to the possession of a moral self-control as nearly hopeless: they resemble those who are blind and deaf from irremediable effects in the organs of sight and hearing. If, however, by long restraint and moral training and instruction they should ever become capable of self-guidance, they should be viewed as patients who have recovered, and be liberated, on the understanding that if they should relapse into immoral habits, they should be restored to their places in the asylum.*

It has been frequently urged that this doctrine abolishes responsibility; but I am at a loss to comprehend the exact import of this objection. The distinction between right and wrong does not depend on the freedom of the human will, but on the constitution of our faculties. Every action is morally right which gratifies all our faculties, enlightened and acting harmoniously; and every action is wrong which outrages or offends them. Hence, if we see a furious madman or a mischievous idiot (whom no one supposes to be free agents) burning a house or murdering a child, we are compelled, by our whole moral faculties, to condemn such actions as wrong, and to arrest the perpetrator of them in his wild career.

Now, the case of the class of offenders which we have been discussing is precisely analogous. Like the madman, they act under the influence of uncontrollable passions existing, in their case, in consequence of the *natural* predominance of certain faculties, and in his from ascendency of the passions. Society absolves idiots and the insane from punishment; and we only plead that this class of unfortunate beings should be as extensive in the eye of the law as it is in Nature; and that by erroneous legal definitions of insanity, and by legal fictions, the really insane should not be treated as criminals. The *actions* of the morally insane, whom we wish to include in it, are without hesitation condemned; and no one doubts that we should put a stop to their outrages, although we do not regard the individuals as guilty.

* I have conversed on the subject of the irreclaimable dispositions of this class of criminals with intelligent and humane superintendents of prisons in Great Britain and in the United States of America, and they have expressed a decided conviction that there are prisoners whom no punishment will recall to virtue, but who, when liberated, constantly re-commence their career of crime.

The important question, therefore, is, By what means may society be most effectually protected against their injurious assaults on property and life? The disciples of the old school answer that this may be best done by holding them responsible for their actions, and by punishing them; but in doing so, they turn a deaf ear to the lessons of experience, which proclaim only the failure of this treatment in times past. Without consideration for the real welfare either of society or of the offenders, they indulge their own animal resentment by delivering over the victims of cerebral disease to jailers and executioners, to be punished for committing actions which their defective mental constitution rendered it impossible for them to avoid. There is no wonder that crime does not diminish under such a form of treatment.

The disciples of the new philosophy, on the other hand, answer the question by appealing to experience; by looking at facts; by consulting reason; by regarding the advantage at once of the criminal and of society. They say that physical and moral restraint are the only effectual remedies for this great evil; that these should be unhesitatingly applied—not vindictively, but in affection and humanity; and that then the offences of this class of criminals will be diminished in number.

LECTURE XIII.

The Treatment of Criminals.

The second class of minds to which I direct your attention is that in which the animal propensities, the moral sentiments, and the intellectual faculties are all active, and nearly in equilibrium. In individuals thus constituted the propensities give rise to vivid manifestations of the animal feelings, but the moral sentiments and the intellect produce also strong moral emotions and intellectual perceptions. In practical conduct, such persons are, to a remarkable extent, the creatures of external circumstances.

If one of them, born of profligate parents, be trained to idleness, intoxication, and crime, his whole lower nature will thus from infancy be called into vivid action, while his moral sentiments will receive no proportionate cultivation. His intellectual faculties, denied all rational and useful instruction, will be employed only in serving and assisting the propensities; they will be sharpened to perpetrate crime and to elude punishment. Such an individual will be prepared to become an habitual criminal, and he will be the more dangerous to society on account of the considerable degree in which he possesses moral and intellectual faculties. These will give him an extent of intelligence and plausibility which will enable him only the more successfully to deceive, or probably to obtain access to places of trust, in which he may commit the more extensive peculations.

If, on the other hand, an individual thus constituted be placed from infancy in the bosom of a moral, intelligent, and religious family, who shall present few or no temptations to his propensities, but many powerful and agreeable excitements to his higher faculties; if he shall have passed the period of youth under this influence, and in early manhood shall have been ushered into society with all the advantages of a respectable position and a high character, and shall have been received and cherished by the virtuous as one of themselves: then his moral and intellectual faculties may assume and maintain the ascendency during life.

If, again, an individual of this class have been religiously educated, but in early youth have left home, and been much thrown upon the world—that is to say, left to associate with persons of indifferent characters and dispositions—he may gradually deteriorate. In the dawn of manhood and the blaze of his passions, his conduct may be not a little profligate and disreputable. But as he advances in life, the energy of the animal propensities may begin to decay; or they may be exhausted by excessive indulgence; or he may suffer afflictions in his health, in his family, or in his worldly circumstances. Under the influence of these combined causes and circumstances, his moral sentiments may recover their activity, his early religious impressions may resume their ascendency, and he may come forth a repentant sinner and a reformed man.

In religion, this process is generally called regeneration. According to my observation, the men who are converted, and reformed from habitual profligacy, and who continue, afterwards, permanently moral and religious characters, possess this combination. They become profligate at first, from the energetic action of their animal propensities; and when subsequently they become respectable Christians, they act under the control of their moral and intellectual powers.

I am aware that in making this statement I am treading on delicate ground; because many sincere and excellent persons believe that these results flow from the influence of the Holy Spirit, and that the Holy Spirit operates in regenerating sinners altogether independently of the laws of organisation: in short, that the influence is supernatural. I do not at all dispute the *power* of God to operate independently of the natural laws: the very idea of His being omnipotent implies power to do according to His pleasure, in all circumstances and times; but it appears to me that, the age of miracles being past, it does not now please God to operate on the human mind either independently of, or in contradiction to, the laws of organisation instituted by Himself.

This reduces the question, not to one respecting God's power—for we all grant this to be boundless—but to one of *fact*—whether it pleases Him actually to manifest His power over the human mind, *always* in harmony with, or sometimes independently of, and at other times in contradiction to, the laws of organisation; and this *fact*, like

any other, must be determined by experience and observation.

I humbly report the results of my own observations; and say that, although I have seen a number of men of renewed lives, I have never met with one possessing a mind of the lowest character who continued moral amidst the ordinary temptations of the world. Such men occasionally appear moral for a time; but they do not remain steadfast in the paths of virtue when temptation is presented.

On the contrary, I have uniformly seen regenerated men who maintained their position possess a mind in which the animal propensities, the moral sentiments and the intellect were *all* considerably developed; so that in these instances the influence of religion seemed to me to operate completely *in harmony* with the organic laws. That influence cast the balance in favour of the higher sentiments, gave them the permanent ascendency, and hence produced the regenerated character.

These observations can be met, not by argument, but by counter facts. If any one will show me cases in which men possessing the defective brains of idiots, or the diseased brains of insanity, have, by any religious influences, been converted into rational and pious Christians, he will completely overthrow my conclusions. Such facts would show unequivocally that it does please God, in some instances, to operate on the mind, even in our day, independently of, or in contradiction to, the laws of organisation. Nay, if examples shall be produced of men possessing the worst brains becoming apparently, by the influence of religion, excellent practical Christians amidst external temptations, I shall yield the point. But no such examples have yet been exhibited.

Perhaps some of you may be of opinion that this is a discussion which belongs more to theology than to moral philosophy. In reply, I remark that the question regarding what *is* the *scriptural doctrine* touching regeneration belongs to theology, and I avoid all discussion of it; but the question, does any religious influence act independently of, or in contradiction to, the laws of organisation, is one which belongs to philosophy. Indeed, it teaches a fundamental point in moral philosophy; because, if the laws of Nature, on which alone philosophy rests, are liable, in the case of mind, to be traversed by influences of any kind operating independently of, or in contradiction to them, *moral*

philosophy can have no foundation. There may be a theology comprising a code of moral duty, founded on Scripture; but assuredly there can be no philosophy of morals founded on Nature.

In like manner, there can be no natural religion: because all our scientific observations and conclusions will be constantly liable to be falsified, and rendered worse than useless, by a supernatural influence producing results entirely independent of, or in contradiction to, the causes which are presented in Nature for the guidance of our understandings. This question, therefore, is not only important, but, as I have said, fundamental in a course of moral philosophy; and I could not consistently avoid introducing it.

To return to the subject from which we have digressed, I observe that in the case of this class of minds in which the propensities, the moral sentiments, and the intellectual faculties are nearly in equilibrium, society enjoys a great power in producing good or evil. If, by neglecting education, by encouraging the use of intoxicating liquors, by permitting commercial convulsions attended with extreme destitution, society allows individuals possessing this combination of mental faculties to be thrown back, as it were, on their animal propensities, it may expect to rear a continual succession of criminals.

If, on the other hand, by a thorough and all-pervading training and education, moral, religious, and intellectual; by well-regulated social institutions providing steady employment, with adequate remuneration; and also by affording opportunities for innocent recreation, this class of men shall be led to seek their chief enjoyments from their moral and intellectual faculties, and to restrain their animal propensities, they may be effectually saved from vice.

It is from this class that the great body of criminals arises; and as their conduct is determined, to a great extent, by their external circumstances, the only means of preventing them from becoming criminals is to fortify their higher faculties by training and education, and to remove external temptation by introducing improvements, as far as possible, into our social habits and institutions.

I wish to press on your attention the dereliction of social duty which the better-constituted members of society commit while they neglect to use the light which Providence presents to their eyes. If official persons place men in whom the animal faculties predominate, or in whom the

balance between them and the moral powers only hangs in equilibrium, in external circumstances in which temptations are presented to the inferior faculties stronger than they are able to resist, a great portion of the guilt of their offences lies with those who thus expose them to trial; and although the criminal law does not recognise this as guilt, the natural law clearly does so.

It may appear hard that punishment should have been inflicted for so many generations, while men did not possess any adequate means of discriminating natural dispositions, so as to be able to avoid them. This difficulty presents itself in regard to all the natural laws; and the only answer that can be offered is that it has pleased Providence to constitute man a progressive being, and to subject him to a rigid discipline in his progress to knowledge. Our ancestors suffered and died under the ravages of the small-pox until they discovered vaccination.

The next question to be considered is, How should men, having minds of this middle class, be treated, *after they have yielded to temptation*, infringed the law, and been convicted of crime? The established method is, to confine them before trial in crowded prisons, in utter idleness, and in the society of criminals like themselves; and after trial and condemnation, to continue them in the same society, with the addition of labour; or to hang them.

In no aspect of European and Christian society are there more striking marks of a still lingering barbarism than in the treatment of criminals. In almost no other institutions of society are there more glaring indications of an utter want of the philosophy of mind than in the prisons of Great Britain.* But let us descend to particulars.

We have seen that men of the middle class of moral development (and most criminals belong to it) are led into crime in consequence of the ascendency, for the time, of their animal propensities; but that, nevertheless, they possess to a considerable extent also moral sentiments and intellect. In treating them as criminals we may have various objects in view.

* The text was written in 1835—36, and an improvement has since taken place in the management of British prisons. A Prison Act has been passed, appointing Boards for the direction of prisons in Scotland (1841). The improvements of prisons in both sections of the island steadily proceeds; but still the true philosophy of prison discipline is little understood (1846).

First, our object may be revenge, or the desire to inflict suffering on them because they have made society suffer. This is the feeling of savages, and of all rude and naturally cruel minds; and if we avow this as our principle of action, and carry it consistently into effect, we should employ instruments of torture, and put our criminals to a cruel and lingering death. I humbly think, however, that as we profess to be humane, we ought entirely to discard the principle of vengeance from our treatment as unchristian, unphilosophical, and inexpedient.

Secondly, our object may be, by inflicting suffering on criminals, to deter other men from offending. This is the general and popular notion of the great end of punishment, and when applied to men of the middle class of faculties, it is not without foundation. Wherever the moral and reflecting faculties possess considerable development, example does produce some effect: and the higher the moral and intellectual faculties rise in power, the more completely efficacious does it become. But the error is very great of supposing that all men are constituted with very nice moral sensibilities. While I consider it certain that the fear of punishment *does operate* beneficially on the waverers, I regard its influence as much more limited than is generally believed.

The conclusion at which I arrive on this point is, that the condition of convicted criminals should be such as should be felt to be a very serious abridgment of the enjoyments of moral and industrious men; but I do not consider it advisable that one pang of suffering should be added to their lot for the sake of deterring others, if that pang be not calculated to prove beneficial to themselves. Indeed, it is a questionable point in morals whether society is at all warranted in inflicting on one of its members suffering which can do him no good, solely with a view to benefit itself by deterring others at his expense from committing crime. It appears to me that this is unjust, and therefore inadmissible, and it is still less defensible, because it is unnecessary.

Thirdly, our object in criminal legislation may be at once to protect society by example and to reform the offenders themselves. This appears to me to be the only real and legitimate object of criminal law in a Christian country, and the question arises, How may it best be accomplished?

A condemned criminal is necessarily an individual who

has been convicted of abusing his animal propensities, and thereby of inflicting evil on society. He has proved by his conduct that his moral and intellectual powers do not possess sufficient energy, in all circumstances, to restrain his propensities. Restraint, therefore, must be supplied by external means; in other words, he must, both for his own sake and for that of society, be taken possession of and prevented from doing mischief; he must be confined.

Now, this first step of discipline itself affords a strong inducement to waverers to avoid crime; because, to the idle and dissolute, the lovers of ease and pleasure, confinement is a sore evil—one which they dread more than a severe, but shorter, infliction of pain. This measure is recommended, therefore, by three important considerations —that it serves to protect society, to reform the criminal, and to deter other men from offending.

The next question is, How should the criminal be treated under confinement? The moment we understand his mental constitution and condition, the answer becomes obvious. Our object is to abate the activity of his animal propensities, and to increase the energy of his moral and intellectual faculties. The first step in allaying the activity of the propensities is to withdraw every object and communication that tends to excite them.

The proper treatment is to separate them as much as possible from each other; and, while they are in one another's society, to prevent them, by the most vigilant superintendence, from communicating immoral ideas and impressions to each other's minds.

In the next place, they should be all regularly employed, because nothing tends more directly to subdue the inordinate activity of the animal propensities than labour. It occupies the mind, and physiologically it drains off, by the muscles, the nervous energy, which, in the case of criminals, is expended by their strong propensities. Many criminals are so deficient in intellect that they are not capable of engaging in ingenious employments; but my proposition is, that wherever they do enjoy intellectual talent, the more effectually it is drawn out, cultivated, and applied to useful purposes, the more will their powers of self-guidance and control be increased.*

* Many of these ideas have now been adopted in our treatment of criminals. Great improvements in the organisation and management

Supposing the quiescence of the animal propensities to be secured by restraint and by labour, the next object obviously is to impart vigour to the moral and intellectual faculties of criminals, so that they may be rendered capable of mingling with society at a later period without relapsing into crime. The moral and intellectual faculties can be cultivated only by exercising them on their natural objects and in their legitimate fields. This can be done only by greatly increasing the number of higher minds that hold communion with them; by rendering their labour the means of purchasing the stores which they consume; and by encouraging them to read, and to exercise all their best powers in every practicable manner.

By this treatment the offender would be restored to society with his inferior feelings tamed, his higher powers invigorated, his understanding enlightened, and his whole mind and body trained to industrious habits. If this should not afford society a more effectual protection against his future crimes, and be more in consonance with the dictates of Christianity than our present treatment, I stand condemned as a vain theorist; but if it would have these blessed effects, I humbly entreat of you to assist me in subduing that spirit of ignorance and dogmatism which represents these views as dangerous to religion and injurious to society.*

of prisons were begun by the Acts of 1835 and 1839. Prison inspectors were appointed, also a surveyor-general of prisons. In 1842 Pentonville Prison was built on the "solitary" system. In 1865 an Act made the system compulsory in the case of male prisoners. The same Act contained a code of rules for all prisons. In 1878 the control of all prisons was transferred from local authorities to the Government, and a body of Royal Commissioners on Prisons was appointed for each of the three kingdoms. While the administration has improved, the cost has greatly diminished—from £495,000 in 1876-77 to £320,000 in 1889-90. The number of prisoners has also diminished by 12·5 per cent. in fifteen years, while the population has increased by 25 per cent. in the same time. These facts are a remarkable proof of the wisdom and forethought of the author, and show how much he was in advance of his time.—ED., 1893.

* The prisons in the United States of America are conducted in a manner greatly superior to those of Great Britain and Ireland, but even they admit of improvement. I shall add some remarks on them to the next Lecture.

LECTURE XIV.

Punishment or Reformation?

I proceed to consider the duty of the highest class of minds in regard to criminal legislation and prison discipline. This class has received from Providence ample moral and intellectual powers, with as much of the lower elements of our nature as is necessary for their well-being in their present sphere of existence, but not so much as to hurry them into crime. Such individuals have great moral power committed to them by the Creator, and we may presume that He will hold them responsible for the use which they make of it.

Hitherto, this class, chiefly through want of knowledge, has fallen far short of their duty in the treatment of criminals. As revenge is disavowed by Christianity, and condemned by the moral law of Nature, we should exclude it entirely as a principle in our treatment of criminals; nevertheless, it may be detected mingling, more or less, with many of our criminal regulations.

Under the existing system of criminal legislation, every man is held responsible for his actions who, in the phraseology of lawyers, can distinguish between right and wrong; and this responsibility consists in being subjected to a certain extent of punishment—in other words, mental and physical suffering—proportioned to the magnitude of the offence which he has committed.

An individual may be born with so strong an instinct of acquisitiveness and such weak moral and intellectual powers, that, like a fox on a common, he may be actually impelled by his nature to appropriate objects suited to gratify his propensity, regardless of the preferable rights of others. He may be grossly ignorant; he may be undergoing the pangs of starvation; or he may be surrounded by the temptations presented by intoxicating liquors and a social atmosphere of ignorance and profligacy; still the law takes no account of such things.

It inquires only whether he possesses so much intellect as to know that the law has declared stealing, killing, fire-

raising, fraud, deception, and hundreds of other acts, to be *wrong*. If he is not purely idiotic or raving mad, he may be in any of the unfortunate conditions now mentioned, and yet know this fact. And this is enough for the law. It, then, by a fiction of its own, and often in opposition to the most glaring indications, assumes him to be a free and responsible being, and deals out its punishment, or, in other words, its *vengeance*, upon him for having disregarded its dictates.

If any class deserves punishment, I should be disposed to inflict it on the higher class—on the men to whom a bountiful Creator has given ample ability to reclaim their less fortunate brethren from vice and crime, but who, through ignorance, and the helplessness that accompanies it, leave this great duty undischarged. In point of fact, the natural law does punish them, and will continue to punish them, until they adopt the right method of proceeding.

If we reckon up the cost, in the destruction of life and property, in the maintenance of criminal officers, courts of justice, and executioners, and the pangs of sorrow, flowing not only from pecuniary loss, but from disgrace, sustained by the relatives of profligate offenders, we may regard the sum-total as the penalty which the virtuous pay for their neglect of the rational principles of criminal legislation.

If the sums thus expended were collected and applied, under the guidance of enlightened judgment, to the construction and proper appointment of penitentiaries—one or more for each large district of the country—and if offenders were committed to them for reformation, it is probable that the total loss to society would not be greater than that of the present system, while the advantages would unspeakably exceed those which now exist.*

In regard to the treatment of criminals when placed in such penitentiaries, I have already remarked that, in the sentences pronounced under the present system, the principle chiefly, although unintentionally, acted upon by the superior class of society appears to be revenge.

If a boy rob a till of a few pence, he is sentenced to eight

* Effect has been given to these ideas in the establishment of reformatories, industrial schools, and training ships for juvenile offenders, as well as in the great convict prisons at Portland, Dartmoor, and elsewhere, where the convicts are employed in public works.—ED., 1893.

days' imprisonment in jail: that is, to eight days' idleness, passed in the society of accomplished thieves and profligate blackguards; at the end of which space he is liberated. Here the quantity of punishment measured out seems to be regulated by the principle that the eight days' confinement causes a quantity of suffering equal to a fair retribution for robbing the till.

If a female steal clothes from a hedge, she is sentenced to sixty days' confinement in Bridewell, where she is forced to work in the society of ten or a dozen of profligates like herself during the day, and is locked up alone during the night. At the end of the sixty days, she is liberated and turned adrift on society. The intention of this treatment is to cause a quantum of suffering sufficient to deter the criminal from repeating the offence, and others from committing similar transgressions; but we shall inquire whether these effects follow.

If we renounce altogether the principle of vengeance as unsound, we shall still have other two principles remaining as guides to our steps: first, that of protecting society; and secondly, that of reforming the offender.

The principle of protecting society authorises us to do everything that is necessary to accomplish this end, under the single qualification that we shall adopt that method which, while most beneficial to society, is also least injurious to the criminal. If, as I have contended, the world be really constituted on the principle of the supremacy of the moral sentiments, we shall find that whatever measures serve best to protect the public interests will also be most beneficial for the offender, and *vice versâ*.

In the view of social protection, any individual who has been convicted of infringing the criminal law should be handed over, as a moral patient, to the managers of a well-regulated penitentiary, to be confined in it, not until he shall have endured a certain quantity of suffering, equal in magnitude to what is supposed to be a fair revenge for his offence, but until such a change shall have been effected in his mental condition as may afford society a reasonable guarantee that he will not commit fresh crimes when he is set at large.

It is obvious that this course of procedure would be humanity itself to the offender, while it would unspeakably benefit society. It would convert our prisons from houses of retribution and of corruption into schools of reform. It

would require, however, an entire change in the principles on which they are conducted.

Judging from the ultimate effect, we find that the individuals who for some petty offence are committed to Bridewell for the first time, for only fourteen days, are in reality more severely punished than those who, for some more grave infringement of the law, are sentenced at first to two years' imprisonment. Nay, the ultimate result to the petty delinquent would be far more beneficial if for his trifling offence he had been sentenced to two years' confinement instead of fourteen days.

The chief *forms* in which the law punishes are confinement in prisons (until very lately in idleness, and amidst vicious associates) and, in more aggravated cases, transportation to a penal colony.*

If the humane principles which I now advocate shall ever be adopted (and I feel confident that they will), the sentence of the criminal judge, on conviction of a crime, should simply declare that the individual had committed a certain offence, and that he was not fit to live at large in society. It should contain a warrant for his transmission to a penitentiary, to be there confined, instructed, and employed, until liberated in due course of law. The treatment in prison and the process of liberation would then become the objects of greatest importance.

There should be official inspectors of penitentiaries, invested with some of the powers of a court, sitting at regular intervals, and proceeding according to fixed rules. They should be authorised to receive applications for liberation at all their sessions, and to grant the prayer of them on being satisfied that such a thorough change had been effected in the mental condition of the prisoner that

* There are, of course, now no "penal colonies"; but that fact does not impair the force of the argument. Transportation ceased in 1867, and penal servitude at home took its place. The change has been followed by the best results, as the following facts show:—In 1837 there were in the colonial penal settlements, and in the hulks and prisons of England and Wales, 50,000 convicts. In 1869 the number had fallen to 11,660, and in 1891 to 4,978. In 1837 the number of persons transported was 4,068, and in 1842 it was 4,166. The number of persons sentenced to penal servitude was, in 1869, 2,219; in 1889, 1,039; and in 1890, 828; and this in spite of a very great increase in the population. The health of prisoners has at the same time improved remarkably, and the rate of mortality among them has been greatly lowered.—ED., 1893.

he might safely be permitted to resume his place in society.*

Until this conviction was produced, upon examination of his dispositions, of his attainments in knowledge, of his acquired skill in some useful employment, of his habits of industry, and, in short, of his general qualifications to provide for his own support, to restrain his animal propensities from committing abuses, and to act the part of a useful citizen, he should be retained as an inmate of the prison.

Perhaps some individuals whose dispositions appeared favourable to reformation might be liberated at an earlier period, on sufficient security, under bond, given by responsible relatives or friends, for the discharge of the same duties towards them in private which the officers of the penitentiary would discharge in public.

If any offender liberated on bond should ever re-appear as a criminal, the penalty should be inexorably enforced, and the culprit should never again be liberated, except upon a verdict finding that his reformation had been completed by a proper term of training in a penitentiary.

This plan, or one closely resembling it, has been tried in Germany with the best effects. At the village of Horn, near Hamburgh, there is a house of refuge for juvenile offenders of both sexes, named Das Rauhe Haus. It consists of several plain inexpensive buildings, situated in a field of a few acres, without walls, fences, bolts, bars, or gates. It is supported by subscription, and the annual cost for each individual in 1837, when I visited it, was £10 4s. sterling.

It then contained fifty-four inmates, of whom thirteen were girls. A portion of them were offenders who had been condemned by the courts of law for crimes, and had suffered the punishment allotted to them in the house of correction, and who afterwards, with the consent of their parents, had come voluntarily to the institution for the sake of reformation. Another portion of them consisted of young culprits apprehended for first offences, whose parents, rather than have them tried and dealt with according to law, subscribed a contract by which the youths were delivered over for a number of years to this establishment for amendment. A third portion consisted of children of evil dispositions, whose parents voluntarily

* This is a forecast of the system of police supervision.—ED., 1893.

applied to have them received into the institution for the reformation of their vicious habits. Among this last class I saw the son of a German nobleman, who had been sent to it as a last resource, and who was treated in every respect like the other inmates, and with marked success.

The inmates are retained, if necessary, till they attain the age of twenty-two. They are instructed in reading, writing, and religion, and are taught a trade. There is a master for every twelve, who never leaves them night or day. The plan of the treatment is that of parental affection mingled with strict and steady discipline, in which punishments are used for reformation, but never with injurious severity. The teachers are drawn chiefly from the lower classes of society; and the head manager, Candidat Wicher, an unbeneficed clergyman, himself belonging to this class, thus became thoroughly acquainted with the feelings, manners, and temptations of the pupils.

When I visited the establishment he possessed unlimited authority, and shed around him the highest and purest influences from his own beautifully moral and intellectual mind. He mentioned that only once had an attempt at crime been projected. A few of the worst boys laid a plan to burn the whole institution, and selected the time of his wife's expected confinement, when they supposed that his attention would be much engaged with her. One of them, however, revealed the design, and it was frustrated. The plan had been in operation for four years at the time of my visit, and I understand that it continues to flourish with unabated prosperity.

Another instance of the successful application of rational and humane principles is afforded by "La Colonie Agricole et Penitentiare de Mettray," about four and a half miles from Tours, in France. It is described in the *Journal de la Société de la Morale Chretienne* for September, 1844.

It was founded in 1839 for the reception of young delinquents, who, under a special provision to that effect, are acquitted of their offences (as our lunatics are) *comme ayant agi sans discernement* (*as having acted without discernment*), but are sentenced to specific periods of *correctional discipline* before their final discharge. It was founded, and is still to a considerable extent maintained, by voluntary contributions, one benevolent individual, Count Leon d'Ourches, having endowed it during his lifetime with 150,000 francs, and the King and Royal Family, the

Ministers of the Interior, of Justice, and of Instruction, with many public bodies and private individuals, having also liberally contributed.

The principles of management are the following :—

1. A *social* or *family* spirit (*esprit de famille*) is sedulously instilled into the pupils, as opposed to the selfish or merely gregarious spirit usually created in large assemblies of criminals.

2. For this purpose, the boys are divided into small sections, or families, with common interests and tasks.

3. In all other respects they are placed in circumstances as much as possible resembling those of free life ; and they are led to submit to the strict order, obedience, and other discipline imposed on them, by appeals to their judgment, interests, and feelings, rather than by direct coercion. Corporal punishment, in particular, is avoided in regard to them.

4. A carefully impressed religious education is given to them, with as much purely intellectual culture as may comport with their proposed future condition as labourers. Reading, writing, arithmetic, linear drawing, and music are considered to constitute the requisite branches.

Lastly : their employments consist chiefly of those connected with agricultural and country life ; a strong wish being entertained that they should settle to these on being discharged rather than return to dense societies.

"In the Mettray Institution," says the official report, "we use the cell to prepare for our other influences, to enable our pupils to recover from the turbulence of excited feeling, and sometimes also to lay a foundation of instruction, when little aptitude for it is exhibited amidst a crowd. It is in a cell, too, that religious impressions are most easily and certainly conveyed, and that first habits of industry may be formed.

"From the second year of our establishment, we think that we may say that vice had become unpopular, and the bad were under the influence of the good. The cause of our success has been the application of two fruitful ideas—the substitution of a *domestic* or *family* spirit in our pupils, instead of one proceeding from more gregarious association, and *the seeking from moral influences the restraints which other systems look for in walls, bolts, chains, and severe punishments.*"

The result of this treatment is stated thus :—"The insti-

tution has received in all four hundred and eleven children, of whom one hundred and two have been discharged. Of these latter, four have been re-convicted (June, 1844); one has been apprehended, and awaits a new trial; six are considered only of middling conduct; but seventy-nine are irreproachable. Of the remaining twelve nothing is known."

If such a system were adopted in this country, a sound and serviceable philosophy of mind would be of importance to guide the footsteps of judges, managers, inspectors, liberating officers, and criminals themselves. Without such a philosophy, the treatment would be empirical, the results unsatisfactory, and the public disappointment great.

If, keeping in view the principles which I have explained, you read attentively the various systems of prison discipline which have been tried, you will discover in all of them some lurking defect in one essential particular or another, and perceive that their success has been great or small in proportion as they have approached to or receded from these principles.

The advocates of the treadmill proceeded on the theory that the irksomeness of the labour would terrify the offenders so much that, if they had once undergone it, they would refrain from crime during their whole lives, to avoid encountering it again. This notion, however, was without sufficient foundation. The labour, although painful at the time, did not in the least remove the *causes* of crime; and after the pain had ceased, these causes continued to operate, offences were repeated, and treadmills have now fallen considerably into disrepute.

Captain Maconochie* states confidently, from much experience, that the mixture of a free and a convict population while the latter is still in a state of bondage is fatal to both. The administration of justice is impaired by its dependence on colonial interests and prejudices, and becomes inconsistent; while its importance is lost sight of amidst a variety of other questions, interests, and details. The expense, also, is greatly increased by the heavy police—judicial, military, and executive—which is indispensable to keep down the confusion, abuse, and crime thus created. "Penal settlements, therefore, should be separated from free colonies altogether, and not even be subject to them,

*Author of an account of "The Management of the Penal Colonies" (1845). He was Superintendent of Norfolk Island.—ED., 1893.

but be kept in direct correspondence with the Government at home."

I have personally visited the State prisons at Boston ; at Blackwell's Island and Auburn, in the State of New York ; the Eastern Penitentiary and the Moyamensing Prison of Philadelphia ; and the State Prison at Weathersfield, Connecticut. I cheerfully testify to their great superiority over the vast majority of British prisons ; but I am still humbly of opinion that the discipline, even in them, proceeds on an imperfect knowledge of the nature of the individuals who are confined and punished in them.

In the prisons of Auburn and Sing-Sing, in the State of New York, and at Weathersfield, in the State of Connecticut, the system which has been adopted is one combining solitary confinement at night, hard labour by day, the strict observance of silence, and attention to moral and religious improvement.

At sunrise the convicts proceed in regular order to the several workshops, where they remain under vigilant superintendence until the hour of breakfast, when they repair to the common hall. When at their meals, the prisoners are seated at tables in single rows, with their backs towards the centre, so that there can be no interchange of signs. From one end of the work-rooms to the other upwards of five hundred convicts may be seen without a single individual being observed to turn his head towards a visitor. Not a whisper is heard throughout the apartments.

At the close of the day labour is suspended, and the prisoners return in military order to their solitary cells ; there they have the opportunity of reading the Scriptures and of reflecting in silence on their past lives. The chaplain occasionally visits the cells, instructing the ignorant, and administering the reproofs and consolations of religion.

In the Eastern Penitentiary of Pennsylvania the convict is locked up solitarily in a cell during the whole period of his sentence. He is permitted to labour, and is instructed in moral and religious duties ; but he is allowed to hold no converse with society nor with the other inmates of the prison.

The following remarks on these prisons are offered for your consideration :—

There is only one way of strengthening the faculties, and that is by exercising them ; and all the American prisons which I have seen are lamentably deficient in arrangements

for exercising the moral and intellectual powers of their inmates. During the hours of labour no advance can be made beyond learning a trade. This is a valuable addition to a convict's means of reformation; but it is not all-sufficient. After the hours of labour, he is locked up in solitude; and I doubt much whether he can read, for want of light; but, assuming that he can, reading is a very imperfect means of strengthening the moral powers. They must be exercised, trained, and habituated to action.

My humble opinion is that in prisons there should be a teacher of high moral and intellectual power for every eight or ten convicts; that after the close of labour these instructors should commence a system of vigorous culture of the superior faculties of the prisoners, excite their moral and religious feelings, and instruct their understandings.

In no country has the idea been carried into effect that in order to produce moral fruits it is necessary to put into action moral influences, great and powerful in proportion to the *barrenness* of the soil from which they are expected to spring; and yet this is a self-evident truth.

A difference of opinion exists among intelligent persons whether the system of solitary confinement and solitary labour, pursued in the Eastern Penitentiary of Pennsylvania, or the system followed in Auburn, of social labour in silence, enforced by inspectors, and solitary confinement after working hours, is more conducive to the ends of criminal legislation. The principles now stated lead to the conclusion that living in entire solitude weakens the whole nervous system. It withdraws external excitement from the animal propensities, but it operates in the same manner on the moral and intellectual faculties. Social life is to these powers what an open field is to the muscles: it is their theatre of action; and without action there can be no vigour. Solitude, even when combined with labour and the use of books, and an occasional visit from a religious instructor, leaves the moral faculties still in a passive state, and without the means of vigorous active exertion.

The Auburn system of social labour is better, in my opinion, than that of Pennsylvania, in so far as it allows of a little more stimulus to the social faculties, and does not weaken the nervous system to so great an extent, but it has no superiority in regard to providing efficient means for invigorating and training the moral and intellectual faculties.

The Pennsylvania system preserves the convict from contamination by evil communications with his fellow-prisoners, and prevents the other convicts from knowing the fact of his being in prison. It does not, however, hinder his associates who are at large from becoming aware of his conviction and imprisonment. The reports of the trial in the public newspapers inform the convict's companions of these; and I was told that they keep a note of them, and watch for him on the day of his release, if they should happen themselves to be then at large, and welcome him back to profligacy and crime.

The principles of criminal legislation now advocated necessarily imply the abolition of the punishment of death.

LECTURE XV.

Minor Social Duties.

Having discussed the social duties which we owe to the poor and to criminals, I proceed to notice several duties of a minor and more private nature, but which still are strictly social and very important. I refer to the duties of guardianship and surety.

As human life is liable to be cut short at any stage of its progress, there are always existing a considerable number of children who have been deprived, by death, of one or both of their parents; and an obligation devolves on some one or more of the members of society to discharge the duties of guardians towards them. When the children are left totally destitute, the parish is bound to maintain them; and that duty has already been considered under the head of the treatment of the poor.

It is, therefore, only children who stand in need of personal guidance, or who inherit property that required to be protected, whose case we are now to consider. We may be called on to discharge these duties either by the ties of nature, as being the next of kin, or by being nominated guardians or trustees in a deed of settlement executed by a parent who has committed his property and family to our care.

Many persons do not regard these as moral duties, but merely as discretionary calls, which every one may discharge or decline without blame, according to his own inclination; and there are individuals who recount some half-dozen of instances in which trustees and guardians, after having undergone much labour and anxiety, have been rewarded with loss, obloquy, and ingratitude; and who, on the exculpatory strength of these cases, wrap themselves up in impenetrable selfishness, and during their whole lives decline to undertake such duties for any human being.

It is impossible to deny that instances of flagrant ingratitude to guardians have occurred on the part of wards, but these are exceptions to a general rule; and if the practice of declinature were to become general, young orphans would be left as aliens in society. the prey of every

designing knave, or would be cast on the cold affections of public officers appointed by the State to manage their affairs.

While there are examples of misconduct and ingratitude on the part of wards, there are also, unfortunately, numerous instances of malversation on the part of guardians; and those who are chargeable with this offence are too apt, when called to account, to complain of hardship and want of just feeling on the part of their wards, as a screen to their own delinquencies. I have known some instances, indeed, but very few, in which children whose affairs had been managed with integrity, and whose education had been superintended with kindness and discretion, have proved ungrateful; but I have known several flagrant examples of cruel mismanagement by guardians.

In one instance, both the father and the mother of two female children died when the elder of the children was only about three years of age. The father was survived by a brother, and also by a friend, both of whom he named as guardians. He left about £3,000 in property. The brother was just starting in business, and had the world before him. He put £1,500 of the trust money into his own pocket, without giving any security to the children; and during the whole of their minority he used it as his own, and neither paid them interest nor repaid the capital.

His co-trustee, who was no relation in blood, was as striking an example of generosity as this individual was of selfishness. He lent out the other £1,500, took the children into his house, educated them along with his own family, applied the interest of the half of their fortune he had rescued faithfully for their benefit, and finally accounted to them honestly for every shilling.

When the children became of age, they prosecuted their disinterested uncle for the portion of their funds which he had mistaken for his own; and after considerable litigation they succeeded in recovering principal, interest, and compound interest, which the Court awarded against him, in consequence of the flagrancy of the case; but they were loudly taxed by him and his family with ingratitude and want of affection for calling into a court of law so near and dear a relative!

As a contrast to this case, I am acquainted with an instance in which a body of trustees named in a deed of settlement by a mere acquaintance, a person who had no claim on their services through relationship, managed, for

many years, the funds of a young family, superintended the education of the children, and accounted faithfully for every farthing that came into their possession, but who, at the close of their trust, owing to their having employed a law-agent who did not attend to his duty, and owing to the children having turned out immoral, were sued personally for £1,000 each, and were involved in a very troublesome and expensive litigation.

I mention these facts to convey to the younger part of my audience, who may not have had experience in such matters, an idea at once of the trouble and risk which often accompany the duty of guardianship. At the same time, I have no hesitation in saying that I consider every man bound to undertake that duty, with all its discomforts and dangers, where the dictates of the higher sentiments urge him to do so.

There are instances, however, in which men, from their vanity or from more selfish motives, do not appeal, in their deeds of settlement, to their own respectable relatives and friends for assistance, but name men of eminent rank as the guardians of their children, under the double expectation of adding a posthumous lustre to their own names, and of securing a distinguished patronage to their family. This practice is disowned by conscience and by just feelings of independence, and trustees called on in such circumstances to act are clearly entitled to decline.

Suppose, then, that a case presents itself in which one of us feels himself justly required to accept the office of a trustee or guardian under a deed of settlement: what is it his duty to do? Certain rules of law are laid down for the guidance of persons acting in these capacities, with which he should, at the very first, make himself acquainted. They are framed for the direction of average men, and on the whole prescribe a line of duty which tends essentially to protect the ward, but which also, when observed, affords an equal protection to the guardian.

It has often appeared to me, from seeing the loss and suffering to which individuals are exposed from ignorance of the fundamental rules of law on this subject, that instruction in them, and in other principles of law applicable to duties which the ordinary members of society are called on to discharge, should form a branch of general education.

After having become acquainted with our duties as trustees or guardians, we should bend our minds sedulously to the upright discharge of them. We should lay down a

positive resolution not to convert our wards, or their property and affairs, into sources of gain to ourselves, and not to suffer any of our co-trustees to do such an act. However tempting it may be to employ their capital in our own business, and however confident we may feel that we shall in the end honestly account to them for every shilling of their property—still, I say, we ought not to yield to the temptation.

The moment we do so, we commit their fortunes to all the hazards of our own; and this is a breach of trust. We place ourselves in circumstances in which, by the failure of our own schemes, we may become the instruments of robbing and ruining helpless and destitute children, committed, as the most sacred charges, to our honesty and honour. If this grand cause of malversation be avoided, there is scarcely another that may not be easily resisted.

After abstaining ourselves from misapplying the funds of our wards, our next duty is to watch over our co-trustees or co-guardians, in order to prevent them from falling into a similar temptation. Men of sensitive, delicate, and upright minds, who are not in the least prone to commit this offence themselves, often feel extraordinary hesitation in checking a less scrupulous co-trustee in his malpractices. They view the act as so dishonourable that they shrink from taxing another with it, and they try to shut their eyes as long as possible to mismanagement, solely from aversion to give pain by bringing it to a close. This is a weakness that is not founded in reason, but on a most erroneous view both of duty and of human nature.

I can testify, from experience and observation, that a man who is thoroughly honest never objects to have his transactions examined with the utmost strictness. He is conscious of virtue, and is pleased that his virtue should be discovered, which can never be done so effectually as by a close scrutiny of his conduct. We shall, therefore, never offend a really good and trustworthy man by inquiring habitually how he is discharging his duty. On the contrary, he will invite us to do so, and will esteem us the more, the more attentively we watch over the affairs of our pupils.

> "That steward whose account is clear
> Demands his honour may appear;
> His actions never shun the light,
> He is, and would be proved, upright."
>
> *Gay's Fables*, Part II., Fab. 6.

On the other hand, if Conscientiousness be so defective in any individual that he is tempted to misapply the funds committed to his care, he stands the more in need of being closely watched, and of having his virtue supported by checks and by counsel; and in such circumstances no false delicacy should be allowed to seal our lips and tie up our hands. We cannot give just offence by the discharge of our duty in stopping peculation. If our co-guardian be upright, he will thank us for our scrupulosity; whereas, if he be dishonest, his feeling of offence will resemble that of a rogue towards the officer who detects him and brings him to justice, which is unworthy of consideration.

But even in this case we shall give much less offence than we imagine. It is a fact—of which I am convinced by extensive observation—that men in whom Conscientiousness is deficient, and who are thereby more prone to yield to the temptation of infringing justice, have very little of that sensibility to the disgrace of dishonesty which better constituted minds feel acutely; and hence we may speak to them very plainly about their departures from duty without their feeling debased. But whether they be offended or not, it is the duty of their co-trustees to prevent them from doing wrong.

If the funds of our pupils be properly preserved and profitably invested, there will generally be little risk of serious failure in the remaining duties of trustees and guardians. These consist generally in seeing that the children are properly maintained, educated, and set out in life. Every trustee will be more able to discharge these duties well in proportion to the range and value of his own information.

The next social duty to which I advert is that of suretyship—or *cautionary*, as it is called in Scotland. A surety may either engage to pay a certain sum of money if the principal obligant fail, or become bound for his good behaviour and proper discharge of duty in any office to which he has been appointed. Great losses and much misery often arise from suretyship, and in consequence, many persons lay down the rule never to become surety for any human being; while others, of a more generous and confiding nature, are ready to bind themselves for almost any one who gives them a solemn assurance that they will never be called on to pay.

I shall attempt to expound the philosophy of the subject, and we shall then be better able to judge of our duty.

Surety is a lame substitute for a knowledge of human character. There are men whose prudence and integrity are proof against every temptation; and if we were certain that any particular individual whom we designed to trust, or to employ in our affairs, was one of these, we should desire no other security for his solvency or his good conduct than that afforded by his own noble nature. But we know that there are also plausible persons who are only ostensibly honest; and we are never certain that an individual whom we are disposed to trust or employ may not, in an unlucky hour, be found to belong to this class.

We therefore require that someone who knows his qualities should certify his possession of prudence and integrity, in the only way that can convince us of the entire sincerity of the recommendation: namely, by engaging to pay the debt in case of default, or to indemnify us if, through negligence or dishonesty, we shall suffer loss.

We come now to inquire into the practical rule which we should follow in regard to undertaking suretyship. In the present state of society, the exacting of security is in many instances indispensable; and I cannot, therefore, see any ground on which those who decline in all circumstances to undertake it can be defended. It appears to me to be a necessary duty, which presents itself to many individuals; and although, when imprudently discharged, it may be hazardous, we are not on that account entitled entirely to shrink from it. There are several precautions, however, which we are not only entitled, but are called on, to adopt for our own protection.

In the *first* place, no man should ever bind himself to pay money to an extent which, if exacted, would render him bankrupt: for this would be to injure his creditors by his suretyship; nay, he should not bind himself gratuitously to pay any sum for another which, if lost, would seriously injure his own family.

In short, no man is called on to undertake gratuitous and benevolent obligations beyond the extent which he can discharge without severe and permanent suffering to himself; and in subscribing such obligations, he should invariably calculate on being called on to fulfil them by payment. In general, men even of ordinary prudence find by experience that they are compelled to pay at least one-half of all the cautionary obligations which they undertake, and the imprudent even more. Unless, therefore,

they are disposed to go to ruin in the career of social kindness, they should limit their obligations in proportion to their means.

Secondly—We should consider the object sought to be attained by the applicant. If he be a young man who desires to obtain employment, or to commence business on a moderate scale on his own account, or if a friend in a temporary, unexpected, and blameless emergency need our aid, good may, in these instances, result from the act. But if the suretyship is wanted merely to enable a person who is doing well to do, as he imagines, a great deal better, to enable him to extend his business, or to get into a more lucrative situation, we may often pause, and reasonably consider whether we are about to serve our friend, or to injure both him and ourselves.

According to my observation, the men who have succeeded best in the pursuits of this world, and have longest and most steadily enjoyed prosperity and character, are those who, from moderate beginnings, have advanced slowly and steadily along the stream of fortune, aided chiefly by their own mental resources: men who have never hastened to be rich, but who, from the first, have seen that time, economy, and prudence are the grand elements of ultimate success. These men ask only the means of a fair commencement, and afterwards give no trouble, either to the public or to their friends. Success flows upon them as the natural result of their own course of action, and they never attempt to force it prematurely.

There are other individuals, full of sanguine hope, inordinate ambition, or boundless love of gain, who never discover the advantages of their present possessions, but are constantly aiming at an imaginary prosperity just at arm's length beyond their reach, and who solicit their friends to aid them that they may seize the prize. They urge their acquaintances to become sureties for them to raise money in order to extend their business.

I recommend to those to whom this appeal is made to moderate the pace of these sanguine speculators, instead of helping to accelerate it: to advise them to practise economy and patience, and to wait till they acquire capital of their own to increase their trade. The danger of undertaking obligations for such men arises from their oversanguine, ambitious, and grasping dispositions, which are rendered only more ardent by encouragement. The chances

are many that they will ruin themselves, and will bring serious loss on their sureties.

I have seen deplorable examples of families absolutely ruined by one of their number possessing this character. By brilliant representations of approaching fortune, he succeeded in obtaining possession of the moderate patrimonies of his brothers and sisters, the funds provided for his mother's annuity—in short, the whole capital left by his father, as the fruit of a long and laborious life—and in a few years he dissipated every sixpence of it in enterprises and speculations of the most extravagant description.

As a general rule, therefore, I would dissuade you from undertaking suretyship merely to increase the quantity or to accelerate the march of prosperity, if your friend, by the aid of time, prudence, and economy, have it in his power ultimately to command success by his own resources.

In becoming bound for the good conduct of an individual in a new employment, you should satisfy yourselves that the situation into which you are about to introduce him is suited to his natural dispositions and capacities, and is not calculated to bring the weaker elements of his character into play, and to be the means of ruining him, as well as of injuring yourselves. Suppose, for example, that a young man has any latent seeds of intemperance in his constitution, or that he is fond of a wandering and unsettled life, and that, by becoming surety for his faithful accounting, you should obtain employment for him as a mercantile travelling agent, you might manifestly expose him to temptations which might completely upset his virtue. I have known individuals who, in more favourable circumstances, had acquired and maintained excellent characters, who were ruined by this change.

Again, if an individual be either extremely good-natured—so much so that he cannot resist solicitation—or if he be ambitious and fond of display and power, or very speculative; and if you aid him in obtaining an agency for a bank, by which means he will obtain an immediate command of large sums of money, you may bring him to ruin when you intended to do him a great service; for his integrity will thereby be exposed to assaults in all these directions. It has been remarked that more men prove unsuccessful as bank-agents than almost in any other office of trust; and the reason appears to me to be that the free command of money presents greater temptations to the

weak points of character than almost any other external circumstance.*

For this reason, it is only men of the highest natural moral qualities who should be appointed to such situations: individuals whose integrity and love of justice and duty are paramount over all their other feelings; and then, with average intellectual endowments, their conduct will be irreproachable.†

Another social duty which men are occasionally called on to discharge is that of acting privately as *arbitrators* between disputing parties, or publicly as *jurymen*. According to the present practice, no special preparation for these duties is supposed to be necessary. A young man may have obtained any kind of education, or no education; he may possess any degree of intelligence and talent; and he may be upright in his dispositions, or very much the reverse; yet none of these things are of the least consideration in regard to his qualification to serve as a juror. As soon as he is found inhabiting a house, or possessing a shop or a farm of a certain rent, his name is placed on the list of jurors; he is summoned in his turn to sit on the bench of justice, and there he disposes, by his vote, of the lives and fortunes of his fellow-men.

The defence maintained for this system is, that as twelve individuals are selected in civil cases, and fifteen in criminal, the verdict will embody the average intelligence and morality of the whole; and that, as the roll of jurors includes all the higher and middle ranks, their decisions, if not absolutely perfect, will at least be the best that can be obtained. This apology is, to some extent, well-founded; and the superior intelligence of a few frequently counteracts a vast amount of ignorance and dulness in a jury. Still, the extent of this ignorance and inaptitude is a great evil; and as it is susceptible of removal, it should not be permitted to exist.

All of you who have served as jurors must be aware of the great disadvantages under which individuals labour

* This evil has been greatly diminished by the strict system of inspection of branches now adopted.—ED., 1893.

† Several joint-stock companies have recently been formed to guarantee the intromissions and good conduct of persons employed in situations of trust, and the moderate premiums which they demand speak highly for the general integrity of the industrious classes of Great Britain.

in that situation from want of original education, as well as from want of habits of mental application.

I knew an instance in which a jury, in a civil cause which embraced a long series of mercantile transactions, including purchases, sales, bills, excise entries, permits, and other technical formalities, was composed of four Edinburgh traders and of eight men balloted from the county of Edinburgh, where it borders on Lanarkshire and Peeblesshire—men who occupied small farms, who held the plough and drove their own carts: persons of undoubted respectability and intelligence in their own sphere, but who knew nothing of mercantile affairs: whose education and habits rendered them totally incapable of taking notes of evidence, and, of course, of forming any judgment for themselves.

When the jury retired at ten o'clock at night, after a trial of twelve hours, one of the merchants was chosen foreman, and he asked the opinion of his brethren in succession. Eight of them echoed the charge of the presiding judge, but the other three announced a contrary opinion. The jurors from the country, seeing that the merchants were all on one side, and they on the other, acknowledged that the details of the case had extended far beyond their capacity of comprehension: that they really could form no judgment on the question, and therefore they concluded that it was safest to follow the judge.

The minority, who understood the case thoroughly, differed from the judge; they took great pains to explain, from their own notes, the leading circumstances to the majority, and succeeded in bringing them over to their opinion; and the result was a verdict of a totally opposite description to that at first proposed. I obtained this information the day after the trial from one of those who had stood in the minority. The verdict was right, and no attempt was made to disturb it by the party who lost his cause.

The majority were not to blame; they had been called on to discharge a public duty for which they were totally unprepared, and they did their best to accomplish the ends of justice. But what I humbly submit to your consideration is, that as the ordinary members of the community are called on to exercise the very important office of jurors, and may become the instruments of taking away the life or the property of their fellow-men, their education should be so conducted as to qualify them, to a reasonable extent, for

discharging so grave a duty. If we were accustomed to look on our social duties as equally important with our private interest, instruction calculated to qualify us to comprehend questions of private right and public criminality would undoubtedly form a branch of our early instruction.

It might be useful to confer certificates or civil degrees on young men, founded on an examination into their educational attainments, and to render these indispensable by law to their being placed on the roll of jurors, or even of voters, and also to their exercising any public office of trust, honour, or emolument. The effects of such a regulation would probably be that it would be considered disgraceful to want this qualification : that parents would strain every nerve to obtain it for their children : and that all who required to be the architects of their own fortunes would pursue such studies as would enable them to acquire it.

Analogous to the duty of a juror is that of acting as arbitrator between individuals who have differences with each other which they cannot amicably adjust. This being altogether a voluntary duty, it may be supposed that only those who are well known to be qualified for it will be called on to discharge it ; but the reverse is too often the case. Individuals who are themselves ignorant of the nature of an arbitrator's duties are no judges of what qualifies another person to discharge them, and they often make most preposterous selections.

It is indeed a very common opinion that the referee is the advocate of the party who nominates him, and that his duty consists in getting as many advantages for his friend as possible. Hence, in anticipation of disagreement, power is generally given to the two referees, in case of difference in opinion, to choose a third person, whose award shall be final ; and not unfrequently this *oversman*, as he is called in Scotland, halves the differences between the two discordant arbitrators, and assumes that this must be absolute justice.

It is a favourite maxim with persons not conversant with law that all disputes are best settled by a reference to "honest men judging according to equity." I have never been blind to the imperfections of law and of legal decisions ; but I must be permitted to say that I have seen the worst of them far surpassed in absurdity and error by the decisions of honest men judging according to equity.

If any of you have ever acted as an arbitrator, he must have found that the first difficulty that presented itself to his understanding was the wide difference between the contending parties regarding matters of fact. The law solves this difficulty by requiring evidence, and by establishing rules for determining what evidence shall be sufficient. Honest men, in general, hold themselves to be quite capable of discovering, by the inherent sagacity of their own minds, which statement is true and which false, without any evidence whatever, or, at least, by the aid of a very lame probation.

The next difficulty which an arbitrator experiences is to discover a principle in reason by which to regulate his judgment, so that impartial men may be capable of perceiving why he decides as he does, and that the parties themselves may be convinced that justice has been done to them. In courts of law, certain rules, which have been derived from a comprehensive survey of human affairs and much experience, are taken as the guides of the understanding in such circumstances.

These are called rules or principles of law. They do not always possess the characteristics of wisdom which I have here described, nor are they always successfully applied; but the objects aimed at, both in framing and in applying them, are unquestionably truth and justice. Yet honest men, judging according to equity, too frequently treat all such rules with contempt, assume their own feelings to be better guides, and conceive that they have dispensed absolute justice, when they have followed the dictates of their own understandings, unenlightened, inexperienced, and sometimes swayed by many prejudices.

I know a case in which the arbitrator found himself much puzzled, and resorted to this method of solving the difficulty: He called the two parties, Mr. A and Mr. B, to meet him in a tavern, and placed them in separate rooms. He went first to Mr. A, and told him that he had seriously read all the papers, had considered the case, and had come to the conclusion that he, Mr. A, was entirely in the wrong, and that he meant to decide against him, but had called him and Mr. B to meet him, to try, if it were possible, to negotiate a compromise between them, to save himself from the disagreeable necessity of pronouncing such a decision. He concluded by asking Mr. A what was the largest sum he would voluntarily offer to avoid the impending decision.

Mr. A, after expressing his surprise and disappointment, and arguing his case anew, which argument was heard patiently and pronounced to be unsatisfactory, at last named a sum. The arbitrator proceeded to the room in which Mr. B was waiting, and told him that he had studied the case, &c., and was extremely sorry that he regarded *him* as completely in the wrong, and meant to decide against him; but as he had a regard for him, he begged to know the smallest sum which he was willing to accept if Mr. A could be induced to offer it as an amicable compromise, to save him the pain of pronouncing such a judgment. Mr. B argued, and was listened to; his arguments were repelled, and he was again solicited to name a sum, under pain of having a decision immediately announced which would deprive him of all. He at last named a sum.

There was a wide difference between the sums named; but the referee was not to be defeated. He went backward and forward between them, constantly threatening each in turn with his adverse decision, till he forced the one up and beat the other down, so that they at last met; and then, keeping them still apart, he caused each of them to subscribe a binding letter of compromise. This accomplished, he introduced them to each other, and boasted of the *equity* of his mode of settling the dispute.

This decision was more disinterested than one of a similar kind mentioned by Cicero. An arbiter, Quintus Fabius Labeo, being appointed by the Senate of Rome to settle a boundary between the people of Nola and those of Naples, counselled each to avoid greediness, and rather to restrict than unjustly to extend their claims. They both acted on this advice, and a space of unclaimed ground was left in the middle. He gave to each the boundary which they had claimed, and the middle space to the Roman people!

LECTURE XVI.

Government.

Various opinions have been entertained by philosophers regarding the origin of government. Some have viewed it as an extension of the parental authority instituted by Nature; others, as founded on a compact, by which the subjects surrendered part of their natural liberty to their rulers, and obtained in return protection, and the administration of just laws for the public benefit. Some have assigned to it a Divine origin, and have held that kings and rulers of every rank are the delegates of Heaven, and have a title to exercise dominion altogether independently of the will of their subjects. None of these views appear to me to reach the truth.

In the human mind we find social instincts, the activity of which leads men to congregate in society. We observe that they differ in natural force of character, intellectual talent, and bodily strength, whence some are powerful and some weak. We discover also faculties of Veneration, giving the tendency to look up with respect to superior power, to bow before it, and to obey it. There are also faculties of Self-Esteem, prompting men to assume authority, to wield it, and to exact obedience.

Government seems to me to spring from the spontaneous activity of these faculties, combined with intellect, without any special design or agreement on the part either of governors or of subjects. In rude ages, individuals possessing active temperaments, and a large amount of Self-Esteem and Love of Approbation, would naturally assume superiority and command. Men with less mental energy and considerable Veneration would as instinctively obey; and hence government would begin.

In proportion as the moral and the intellectual faculties develop themselves in a tribe or a nation, there is a tendency to define and set limits to the power of the rulers, and to ascertain and enlarge the boundaries of the liberties of the subjects. External circumstances also modify the character of the government. When they are surrounded by powerful and ambitious neighbours, the subjects of a particular State

forego many individual advantages for the sake of the higher security which they derive from placing the whole power of the nation in the hands of a single individual.

They prefer a despotism, because it enables the executive government to concentrate and propel the whole physical force of the kingdom against an invading enemy. In other circumstances, where local situations, such as those of England or of the United States of North America, expose the national independence to few dangers, the subjects, in proportion to their moral and intellectual advancement, naturally limit the power of their sovereigns or rulers.

I regard the form of government of any particular country to have arisen from the following causes, or some combination of them—

First—The mental development of the people.

Secondly—The temperament of the people.

Thirdly—The soil and climate of the country.

Fourthly—The character and condition of the nations with whom they are geographically in contact. And,

Lastly—The extent of moral and intellectual cultivation which the people have undergone.

Rationally viewed, government is the just exercise, by one or a few individuals, of the power and authority of the nation, delegated to them for the general good; and the only moral foundation of it is the general consent of the people. There may be conquest, and masters and slaves; but this form of government is the result of force triumphing over right; and one duty incumbent on the people in such a state of things is to overthrow the victor's dominion as speedily as possible.

It is an error to suppose that Nature requires us, when we enter into the social state, to abandon or to limit our rights as individuals. Man is by nature a social being, and ample gratification of all his faculties, within the limits of morality and health, is compatible with his existence in that condition.

"Man has a right," says Mr. Hurlbut,* "to the gratification, indulgence, and exercise of every innate power and faculty of his mind. The exercise of a faculty is its only use. The *manner* of its exercise is one thing *that* involves a question of morals. The *right* to its exercise is another thing, in which no question is involved but the existence

* Essays on "Human Rights, and their Political Guaranties," by E. P. Hurlbut, Counsellor at Law in the City of New York, 1845.

of the innate faculty, and the objects presented by Nature for its gratification."

Rulers and subjects are all equally men, and are equally placed under the Divine laws; and as these proclaim the obligation on each of us to do to others as we would have them to do unto us, and to love our neighbours as ourselves, the notion of *right* in any one man, or class of men, to rule for their own pleasure or advantage over their neighbours, against their inclination and inconsistently with their welfare, is utterly excluded.

The only government which the moral and intellectual faculties can recognise, as founded in Nature, is that which flows from the subjects, and is exercised directly for their benefit. The doctrine that kings, princes, and nobles have rights of property in the homage, services, and devotion of other men, which they are entitled to exact for their own benefit and gratification, whether agreeable to the will of the subjects or not, flows from egotism unregulated by reason and justice. It is an example of the selfish system carried to infatuation, in which princely rights become an overwhelming idea, and obliterate from the mind the perceptions of all moral and intellectual distinctions inconsistent with themselves.

The Bourbons pretended to have Divine right of this kind to govern France; and when Louis XVIII. was restored by the victorious arms of the sovereigns of Europe, he, out of his mere grace, issued a charter, conferring a certain extent of freedom on the French nation. After the revolution of July, 1830, when Charles X. was driven from the throne, the French abjured the principle, and, to prevent its recurrence, insisted that Louis Philippe should be styled the king, not of France, but of *the French:* that is, chosen by the French people to rule over them.

The idea that government is instituted and maintained exclusively for the welfare of the people does not, however, imply that each individual is authorised to resist it whenever he conceives that it is injurious to his particular interests, or is disagreeable to his taste. The social law of our nature, out of which government springs, binds us together for good, and also for evil. If we attempt to advance alone, even to good, we shall find ourselves situated like a soldier on a march who should move faster or slower than his column. He would be instantly jostled out of the ranks, and be compelled to walk by himself. The same result

occurs in regard to individual attempts to arrest or improve a government.

The first step, in a rational and moral course of action, is to convince our fellow-men of the existence of the evils which we wish to have removed, and to engage their co-operation in the work; and until this be done, to continue to obey. As soon as the evil is generally perceived, and a desire for its removal pervades the public mind, the amendment becomes easy of accomplishment.

There is the soundest wisdom in the arrangement of Providence by which political improvement is slow and gradual; because, in the very nature of things, pure moral institutions cannot flourish and produce their legitimate fruits unless the people for whom they are intended possess corresponding moral and intellectual qualities. This fact will become abundantly evident when we trace the progress of government more in detail.

The first requisite towards the formation of a government by a nation is that it be *independent* of foreign powers. If it do not possess independence, the people must of necessity submit to the will of their foreign master, who generally rules them according to narrow views of his own advantage, without the least regard to *their* feelings or welfare.

Great confusion prevails in the minds of many persons regarding the words *liberty* and *independence*, when applied to nations. A nation is *independent* when it does not owe submission to any foreign power. Thus, France and Spain, under the Bourbon dynasties, before the French Revolution, were both independent; they owned no superior. But they were not free; the people did not enjoy liberty: that is to say, their internal government was despotic; the personal liberty, the lives, and the fortunes of the subjects were placed at the uncontrolled disposal of the sovereign.

England has been independent almost since the Romans left the country; for although it was conquered by the Normans in the year 1066, the conquerors fixed their residence in the vanquished territory, made it their home, and in a few generations were amalgamated with the native population. But the English people were not properly free till after the revolution in 1688. The Scottish and Irish nations now form, along with England, one empire which is independent, and all the people of which are free. That is: the nation owns no superior on earth, and every individual

is protected by the laws in his person, his property, and privileges not only against the aggressions of his neighbours, but against the government itself. The only obligation incumbent on the subject towards the State is to obey the laws; and when he has done so the rulers have no power over him whatever for evil.

The history of the world shows that some nations live habitually under subjection to foreign Powers: that other nations are independent, but not free; while a few—a very few indeed—enjoy at once the blessings of independence and of liberty. It may be advantageous to investigate the causes of these different phenomena.

The social duties which we owe to our rulers are extremely important; yet we cannot comprehend them aright without understanding thoroughly the subject of government itself, and the relations of the different kinds of it to the human faculties. On this account the brief exposition which I propose to give of this subject is not foreign to the grand question of our moral duty.

The chief requisite to independence is that the people shall possess so much intelligence and love of their country as to be capable of acting in concert, and of sacrificing, when necessary, their individual interests to the public welfare. You can easily understand that, however energetic the individuals of a nation may be, if they should be so deficient in intelligence as to be incapable of joining in a general plan of defence, they must necessarily fall before a body of invaders who obey a skilful leader, and act in combination.

When a nation is assailed by external violence, the great body of the people must be prepared also to sacrifice their individual interests at the shrine of their country before independence can be maintained. The connection between national independence and individual welfare is so palpable, and so speedily felt, that a small portion of moral sentiment suffices to render men capable of this devotion. It is only when indolence and avarice have become the predominant feelings of the people, combined with a want of vigour in Self-Esteem and Combativeness, that they prefer their individual comforts and property, even under the galling yoke of a foreign foe, to national independence.

The last and best condition of a nation is when it is not only independent, but also free: that is, when it owns no foreign master, and when each inhabitant acknowledges no

master at home, except the laws, and the magistrates who are the interpreters and administrators of the laws.

Before a people can attain to this form of government, they must possess not only the qualities requisite for independence, but far higher moral and intellectual gifts than mere independence demands. The love of justice must have become so prevalent, that no limited number of individuals can muster followers sufficient to place themselves in the condition of masters over the rest. The community in general must be enlightened to such a degree that they will perceive the inevitable tendency of individuals to abuse power when they possess it without control; and they must have so much of devotion to the general interests as to feel disposed, by a general movement, to oppose and put an end to all attempts at acquiring such dominion; otherwise the nation cannot enjoy liberty. They must also, as individuals, be, in general, moderate, virtuous, and just in their own ambition; ready to yield to others all the political enjoyments and advantages which they claim for themselves.

History confirms these principles. The original European settlers of North America were English families, who had left their country under religious or political persecution; and their numbers were recruited by industrious persons who emigrated to that land with a view to improving their condition by the exercise of their industry and talents. When they threw off the yoke of Britain, they were a moral and an intelligent people; they instituted the American republic, the freest government on earth, which has flourished in vigour to the present day.

The continent of South America was peopled at first by ruffian warriors and avaricious adventurers, who waded through oceans of blood to dominion over the natives, and who practised cruelty, oppression, and spoliation, but not industry, as their means of acquiring wealth. Their numbers were maintained by a succession of men animated by the same motives, and possessing essentially the same characteristics, sent out by the corrupted government of old Spain, to a harvest of spoil. They were not the amiable, the religious, and the laborious sons of the Spanish soil, driven away by oppression, hating injustice, and flying to a new country for refuge from tyranny, as was the case in North America.

In the beginning of the present century the troubles of

Spain tempted these South American colonists to disclaim her authority; and they waged, for their independence, a long and bloody war, in which they were at last successful. In imitation of the North Americans, they then formed themselves into republics, and instituted government by laws.

But mark the result. The cruel, base, self-seeking, dishonest, vain, and ambitious propensities which had distinguished them as Spanish colonists did not instantly leave them when they proclaimed themselves to be free citizens of independent republics. On the contrary, those feelings which had characterised them from the first, continued to operate with fearful energy. As private individuals, the new republicans devoted themselves to evading payment of all government taxes; the duties exacted on imported commodities were pocketed by the functionaries entrusted with their collection, or were converted into the means of oppressing rival politicians and traders. Their public couriers were robbed. In their Senates, they formed themselves into cabals for the promotion of projects of local advantage or of individual ambition; and when not successful, they obstructed all measures for the general advantage, or appealed to arms to obtain their objects.

The consequence has been that, owing solely to ignorance, selfishness, and to the absence of general morality and the love of justice in the people, these States, with the richest soils and the finest climates in the world, with independence, and with the most improved forms of domestic government, have, since they acquired their liberty, exhibited almost one unvaried scene of revolution, bloodshed, and contention. This is the penalty which Providence ordains them to pay for their parents' transgressions, and for the immoral dispositions which they inherited from them.

As a contrast to these events, the history of the Swiss and of the Dutch may be alluded to. Both of these peoples have considerable development of the moral and the intellectual organs. The Swiss were early distinguished by the simplicity of their manners, and by their moral devotion and determination; while Holland was peopled from various countries by individuals flying, like the British Americans, from civil or religious persecution. The Swiss had been free from time immemorial, although their *independence* dates from 1308.

The Austrians invaded Switzerland in great force, and the people were called on to sacrifice life and property in defence of their liberties. "Never did any people," observes Russell, "fight with greater spirit for their liberty than the Swiss. They purchased it by above fifty battles against the Austrians, and they well deserved the prize for which they fought; for never were the beneficial effects of liberty more remarkable than in Switzerland."

The celebrated battle of Morgarten, in which, for the first time, the Swiss defeated the whole force of Austria, affords a striking example of the manner in which self-devotion contributes to the establishment of independence. "Leopold assembled 20,000 men, to trample, as he said, the audacious rustics under his feet; but the Swiss beheld the gathering storm without dismay. To meet it, and to dispute it, 1,400 men, the flower of their youth, grasped their arms, and assembled at the town of Schweitz. Veneration and all the higher sentiments were manifested when they proclaimed a solemn fast, passed the day in religious exercises and chanting hymns, and, kneeling down in the open air, implored 'the God of heaven and earth to listen to their lowly prayers, and humble the pride of their enemies.'

"They took post on the heights of Morgarten, and awaited the approach of the enemy. If ever there were circumstances in which they might have relaxed their rigid virtue, it was at the time when their liberties and their very existence were at stake; but even at this moment they disdained to recruit their ranks from those whose lives had been sullied by the violation of the laws. The petition of fifty outlaws, that they might be permitted to share the dangers of the day with their countrymen was, therefore, unhesitatingly rejected.

"The victory was complete. Besides those who fell in the battle, not less than fifteen hundred, most of whom were nobles or knights, were slain in the rout; and Leopold himself with difficulty escaped under the guidance of a peasant to Winterthur, where he arrived in the evening, gloomy, exhausted, and dismayed. A solemn fast was decreed to be held in commemoration of the day 'in which the God of hosts had visited His people, and given them the victory over their enemies'; and the names and heroic deeds of those champions who had fallen in defence of their country were ordered to be annually recited to the people."

The history of the Dutch is somewhat similar, although not so full of noble generosity. They resisted by force of arms, and at the expense of the greatest sufferings and sacrifices, the tyranny of Spain, for the sake of liberty of conscience; and at last established at once their independence and their freedom; and both they and the Swiss continue to enjoy these advantages to the present day. How unlike was the individual character of the British Americans, the Swiss, and the Dutch, to that of the Spanish Americans; and how different the uses which they have made of their independence, when obtained!

The last illustration with which I shall trouble you in proof that freedom cannot exist without intelligence and morality in the people is afforded by Sicily. "It is well known," says Mr. Lyon, "that, during the course of the late war, the island of Sicily was taken possession of by Great Britain; and, with a magnanimity peculiarly her own, she resolved to bestow on her new ally that form of government, and those laws, under which she herself had attained to such a pitch of prosperity and glory. Whether the zeal thus manifested to the Sicilians was a zeal according to knowledge will immediately appear: but there can be no doubt that the gift was generously, freely, and honestly bestowed.

"The Sicilian government was, therefore, formed exactly after the model of the British. The legislative, executive, and judicial powers were separated: vesting the first in a parliament composed of lords and commons; the second in the king and his ministers; the last in independent judges. Due limits were set to the prerogative, by not permitting the sovereign to take cognisance of bills in progress, or to interfere in any way with the freedom of debate or the purity of election. The peerage was rendered respectable by making titles unalienable and strictly hereditary, and by forbidding the elevation to the peerage of such as were not already in possession of a fief to which a title had belonged, and whose annual income was not 6,000 ounces of silver" (of the value of 12s. 6d. sterling to the ounce); or £3,950 a year.

Such is the outline of the constitution given to Sicily by the British; and the result of this experiment is contained in the following quotation from "Travels in Sicily, Greece, and Albania," by the Rev. Mr. Hughes:—

"No words," says he, "can describe the scenes which

daily occurred upon the introduction of the representative system in Sicily. The House of Parliament, neither moderated by discretion nor conducted with dignity, bore the resemblance of a receptacle for lunatics, instead of a council-room for legislators; and the disgraceful scenes, so often enacted at the hustings in England, were here transferred to the *very floor of the Senate.* As soon as the president had proposed the subject for debate, and restored some degree of order from the confusion of tongues which followed, a system of crimination and recrimination invariably commenced by several speakers, accompanied with such furious gesticulations and hideous distortions of countenance, such bitter taunts and personal invectives, that blows generally ensued. This was the signal for universal uproar."

After adverting to the utter profligacy of all ranks of the people, Mr. Hughes observes, that "no one will wonder that difficulties environed those who endeavoured to resuscitate the embers of a patriotism already extinct, and break the fetters of a nation who rather chose to hug them; that civil liberty was received with an hypocrisy more injurious to its cause than open enmity, and that, returning without any efforts of the people, it returned without vigour, and excited neither talent nor enthusiasm; that those amongst the higher classes who received it at all, received it like a toy, which they played with for a time, and then broke to pieces; and that the populace, having penetration sufficient to discover the weakness of their rulers, were clamorous for the English authorities to dissolve the whole constitution, and take the power into their own hands."

From these examples and illustrations, I trust that you are now able to distinguish between the *independence* and the *freedom* of a nation, and are prepared to agree with me in opinion that there can be no real freedom without prevalent intelligence and morality among the body of the people. These can be introduced only by education and training; but the general diffusion of property, by giving a direct interest to numerous individuals in the maintenance of justice, greatly promotes the progress of morality. Hence, public enlightenment, morality, and wealth constitute the grand basis of freedom.

LECTURE XVII.

Different Forms of Government.

The next topic to which I advert is the different forms of government. As long as any nation continues destitute of education, and is not devoted to industrious pursuits calculated to exercise the moral and intellectual faculties, it consists of hordes of human beings in whom the animal propensities predominate, and who, in consequence, are ready to embark under any bold and energetic leader, in any enterprise that promises gratification to individual interests and passions, however immoral, or however detrimental to the community. History is one great record of the truth of this remark. The only mode of preserving public tranquillity, and any semblance of law in such a state of society, is for one man or a small number of individuals, superior to the rest in vigour, sagacity, and decision, to seize on the reins of government, and to rule despotically.

Men in this condition are animals possessing the human form and human intelligence, but not yet the human morality which alone causes individuals to love justice and become a law unto themselves. If the best and wisest of men were requested to devise a government for a nation of selfish and ferocious beings, possessed of intellect sufficient to foresee consequences, but not inspired with the love of justice, he would at once say that it must be one of great energy: vigorous to repress and prompt to punish, otherwise, there would be no tranquillity. A despotism, therefore, naturally springs up in a very rude and barbarous country, and is the form of government best adapted to its circumstances.

The despot rules in the full spirit of the selfish system. He punishes through caprice as often as from justice; and he rewards through favouritism more frequently than from perception of real merit; but in doing so, he acts on the principles generally prevalent in his community. If he be enlightened, just, and beneficent, he may do great service to his people by instructing and civilising them; but as a general rule he will be found acting, like themselves, on the purely selfish principle, obstructing their moral and

intellectual improvement whenever he discovers that their enlightenment will prove fatal to his own authority.

When a nation has become partially civilised and instructed in the arts of industry, wealth is created; and a class arises whose moral and intellectual faculties, developed by education, and stimulated by the love of property, prompt them to observe the dictates of morality towards their fellow-men, and to enjoy the advantages of just government themselves: a class which would not join a leader to trample the nation at large under foot, but would rather, by their wealth and intelligence, assist the people to expel a tyrant, and to establish the supremacy of equitable laws. But the superior men who constitute this class find themselves associated with a mass of uneducated and penniless individuals, who compose the great body of the people.

The kind of government adapted to a nation composed of such elements is obviously one which shall combine the force and energy of the despot necessary to repress and punish all attempts at individual supremacy and domination, and at the same time to enforce order and justice, with a due regard to the general welfare. A mixed form of government, like the British, in which great executive power is committed to the monarch, but in which the enlightened classes, through their representatives in Parliament, enact the laws, and also control the executive, by granting or withholding the public supplies, is the natural result of this state of society.

The great benefit, I have said, of freedom is, that it tends to promote the general welfare; whereas all other forms of government, whether despotic, under one supreme prince, or oligarchical, under a limited number of nobles, tend to the sacrifice of the interests of the many to the advantage of the few. In all ages and countries this has been the case, and in our own mixed form of government the evil also exists.

In a former Lecture I endeavoured to point out that an hereditary nobility, protected by law in the possession of political power and exclusive privileges, without regard to individual qualities and attainments, is an infringement of the natural laws, and produces evil to the community, not only by the abuses of power which it commits, but by the misdirection which it gives to the sentiment of ambition in the public mind. I now remark that the existence of a noble or privileged class is one of the characteristic features of a mixed form of government like that of Great Britain,

and is the natural result of a portion of the people having far outstripped the mass in wealth, intelligence, and refinement; and it may be expected to endure as long as the great inequality in these particulars, on which it is founded, exists.

The mixed form of government itself obviously arises when a numerous class has considerably preceded the mass of the people in intelligence and moral attainments; and it exhibits the spectacle of that class becoming the sole depositaries of political power. The upper portion, or nobles, exercise the function of legislators directly in their own persons, and the inferior portion do so by means of representatives.

It is the genius of this form of government to confer privileges on classes; and hence, the highest members of the ruling body easily induced the king to bestow on them the character of nobility and the right of hereditary legislation; but as the great principle of doing to another as we would wish another to do to us leads, in its general application, to the removal of all distinctions not founded on real superiority, the existence of this class becomes, in course of time, an obstacle to general improvement.

There is one principle, however, taught with equal clearness by Christianity and by the doctrine of the supremacy of the moral sentiments—that the only beneficial manner of producing a moral equality is by improving and raising up the lower, and not by pulling down the higher classes, possessed of superior attainments. As long, therefore, as the class of nobles are superior in intellect, moral qualities, and education to the great body of the people, their superiority is real; and they would maintain this superiority although they possessed neither titles nor exclusive privileges.

In a former Lecture, I pointed out that hereditary rank and superiority are in opposition to Nature unless the organic laws are obeyed, and that then statutes are not needed to transmit property and honour to posterity. Those who transmit high moral, intellectual, and physical qualities to their offspring confer on them the stamp of Nature's nobility: and they need no other.

When the Creator bestowed on us Veneration, prompting us to reverence high qualities and attainments, and Love of Approbation, desiring distinction for ourselves, He must have intended that these faculties, in selecting their objects,

should be guided by reason, morality, and religion; yet the creation of artificial, and especially of hereditary, rank, which enables its possessor, independently of his mental qualities, to assume superiority over, and to take precedence of, other men, even when these are more virtuous, more learned, more useful, and more highly accomplished than himself, is in direct opposition to this maxim, and must, therefore, manifestly be an abuse.

The grand argument by which this view is defended is that, by presenting objects of *established* respect and consideration to the people, we accustom them to the practice of deference and obedience, and thereby promote the tranquillity of the State. It is argued also that, by instituting a class of nobles, a branch of society is formed which will cultivate, as their especial province, taste, refinement, and all the elegancies of life, and will improve the inferior members of the social body by their example.

It is further maintained that such a class is natural, and has existed in almost all countries, and must, therefore, be advantageous. In a certain state of society these reasons have some weight; but my position is that when the general body of the people becomes enlightened, these advantages disappear, and an hereditary nobility becomes a positive evil.

I beg leave, however, to state that I do not propose to abolish hereditary and artificial rank by violence, and against the will of its possessors. The grand principle which I have advocated in these Lectures, that all real improvement must proceed from the supremacy of the moral and intellectual faculties, forbids such a project. My aim is to render nobles ashamed of hereditary titles, decorations, and privileges, which testify nothing in favour of their merit; and I regard this as undoubtedly practicable in the course of a few generations, merely by enlightening their superior faculties.

If you trace the forms in which Self-Esteem and Love of Approbation seek gratification in different stages of social improvement, and observe how these approach nearer and nearer to reason, in proportion as society becomes enlightened, you will not consider this idea chimerical.

The tattooed skin and the nose transfixed with ornamental bones are profoundly respected and greatly prized by the savage. These are the external signs of his consequence—the outward symbols by which his Self-Esteem and Love of Approbation demand, and receive, the homage of inferior men.

But a very limited advance in civilisation destroys the illusion. It is seen that these are mere physical ornaments, which bespeak nothing but the vanity of the wearers; they are, therefore, ridiculed and laid aside.

Ascending to a more refined, yet still barbarous, age, you find that the marks of distinction formerly prized in our own country were a full-bottomed wig and a cocked hat, ruffles at the wrists, a laced waistcoat, and buckles on the shoes. A century ago, when a man thus attired appeared in any assembly of the common people, place was given to his rank, and respect was paid to his dignity, as if he had been of a superior nature.

But when, in the progress of enlightenment, it was discovered that these outward testimonials of greatness were merely the workmanship of barbers and tailors, men who enjoyed any real mental superiority, who were distinguished by refinement of manners, and the other qualities of a true gentleman, became ashamed of them, and preferred to wear a plain, yet elegant, attire, and to trust to their own manners and the discrimination of the public, for being recognised as of superior rank, and being treated accordingly; and they have been completely successful. A gentleman in the trappings of the year 1700 appearing in our streets now would be regarded as insane, or as facetiously disporting himself in order to win a wager.

The progress of reason which has swept away tattooed skins, bone ornaments in the nose, full-bottomed wigs, and laced waistcoats, will one day extinguish orders of knighthood, coronets, and all the other artificial means by which men at present attempt to support their claims to respect and consideration, apart from their personal qualities and virtues. They will be recognised by the wearers, as well as by the public, as devices useful *only to the unworthy.* An advanced education and civilisation will render men acute observers of the real elements of greatness, and profound admirers of them, but equally intolerant of tinsel impositions.

The greatest danger to which the British nobility are at present exposed is that which arises from their own imperfect education. While the middle classes have been reforming their schools, colleges, and universities, and have been rendering them vehicles, to a greater or a less extent, of useful knowledge, based on science and the laws of Nature; and while the working classes have been pursuing the same

course of instructive and elevating study in works of cheap literature, the high aristocracy have been clinging to Greek, Latin, History, and Mathematics, as the staple of their instruction, and have been fairly left behind. In the extensive and important discussions of social interests which lately agitated the country,* the ignorance of the titled aristocracy concerning the natural laws which regulate manufactures, agriculture, capital, and commerce, and which, as legislators in a commercial country, they were bound to understand, became the subject of universal remark; while the magnitude of their antiquated prejudices, and their general incapacity for comprehensive, profound, and logical reasoning, struck their own educated friends and admirers with dismay.

Self-Esteem and Love of Approbation exist, and have powerful influence. The feelings with which they inspire the mind will never be extinguished; only their *direction* can be changed. When we contemplate the history of the world, and perceive what laborious, painful, and dangerous enterprises men have undertaken and accomplished, and what privations and sufferings they have submitted to, in order to obtain the gratification of these two faculties, we may form some estimate of the impulse which would be given to physical, moral, and intellectual improvement if we were withdrawn from the worship of hollow idols, and were directed to nobler objects.

Men will always desire to stand high in rank, to be respected, and to be treated with consideration by their fellow-men; but their notions of what constitutes nobility and high rank will be elevated as their minds become enlightened. As formerly remarked, under the system of Nature, a family would esteem itself noble when it was able to show in its genealogy a long line of healthy, handsome, refined, moral, intelligent, and useful men and women, with few profligates and few imbeciles; and an individual would present before an intelligent public high intellectual attainments, pure morals, and refined manners, as the foundations of his claim to social consideration.

If you conceive nobles and individuals of high rank and remote ancestry animated by such motives, and setting such examples before their inferiors, what a powerful impulse would be given to improvement, compared with that which flows from the present state of opinion, when men, over-

* The subject was Free Trade and Abolition of the Corn-Laws, March, 1846.

looking the real elements of greatness, worship the external symbols of vanity, and elevate mediocrity, if sufficiently rich, to the station which should be held only by the most able, the most virtuous, and the most accomplished!

We are now prepared to answer the arguments by which hereditary rank and artificial nobility are defended, as advantageous in the present state of Britain. The first is that their existence presents objects of respect to the common people, and accustoms them to the practice of deference and obedience.

I reply that the common people respected the decorations of rank—the wig, the ruffles, and the waistcoats of the last century—only while they were deplorably ignorant; and, in like manner, they will regard with deference and awe, ancient titles apart from merit, only while they continue in the same condition. The moment they become sufficiently enlightened and independent in their moral and intellectual judgments to arrive at sound conclusions, they will cease to admire hereditary rank without high qualities.

The second defence of hereditary nobility is that, by instituting it, you establish a separate class dedicated to refinement, taste, and elegance, who by their example will improve the inferior orders. The answer is, that all these qualities are essential elements in Nature's nobility, and that after a certain stage of social enlightenment has been reached, they will be assiduously cultivated for their own sake, and for the distinction which they will confer; and that, therefore, patents of nobility, to preserve individuals who lack these high attainments in their minds, in possession of the outward advantages generally attending them, are *not* necessary for social welfare.

The third argument in favour of hereditary and artificial rank is that the admiration of it is natural, and has existed in all ages and countries, and that it must, therefore, be beneficial. I have already explained that the faculties of Veneration, Self-Esteem, and Love of Approbation are all natural, and that one of their tendencies is to respect and esteem ancient descent and superior qualities. The only difference between the admirers of things as they are and myself consists in this—that they present artificial objects to which these faculties may be directed—which objects, when examined by reason, are found to be unworthy of enlightened regard; whereas I propose to have them directed only according to reason, to objects pleasing at once to the

understanding, to the moral sentiments, and to these faculties themselves ; and beneficial to society.

I have dwelt on this subject longer than some of you may consider to have been necessary ; but the same principles have a wide application. They lead us to the conclusion that hereditary entails ought also to be abolished. In England, an entail is limited to the lives of the heirs in existence at the time when it is executed ; but in Scotland it may extend to perpetuity, if heirs exist so long. In this country an entail is a deed in law executed by the proprietor of an estate, by which he calls a certain series of heirs, without limitation, to enjoyment of the rents, or produce, or possession of the land, but without allowing to any one of them a right of property in itself. None of them can sell the estate, or burden it with debt beyond his own lifetime, or give it to a different order of heirs from that pointed out in the deed of entail.

If, for example, the property be destined to heirs-male, the present possessor may have a daughter, who is the apple of his eye and the treasure of his heart, and may have no male relation nearer than a tenth cousin, who may be a profligate of the most disgraceful description ; but the law is blind —the daughter cannot inherit one acre of the vast domain, and the remote and unworthy male heir will take it all.

This, however, is comparatively the least of the evils attending entails. Their existence maintains in an artificial rank, and in possession of great wealth and influence, individuals who, by their natural qualities, ought to stand at the bottom of the scale, and who, like the hereditary nobility, operate as idols on the minds of the aspiring and rising members of the middle and lower ranks, leading them to an insensate worship of aristocracy.

Many persons may imagine that this is a small social evil, affecting only the individuals who give way to it, and who, they suppose, are not numerous. But it appears to me to be of greater magnitude, and to lead to more extensive consequences. It supports, with the sanction of the law, the erroneous principle of preserving social greatness and influence to individuals, independently of their natural qualities : which tends directly to encourage all classes to overlook or to undervalue natural excellence, and to strive only to attain wealth, and to preserve it in their families by the aid of legal technicalities, against the law of God and the welfare of their fellow-men.

This averting of the general mind from the real principles of social improvement, and giving it a false direction, appears to be the worst evil attending all artificial systems for preserving family distinctions. The class which is thus supported has many powerful motives for improvement withdrawn from it: it leans upon crutches, and rarely exercises its native strength; and, as a natural consequence, it looks with an indifferent, if not a hostile, eye on all its inferiors who are labouring to attain that excellence which itself despises.

The same arguments which I have now employed against artificial ranks and entails apply to all exclusive privileges and distinctions conferred by law on individuals or classes, independently of their merits. The social institutions of every country in Europe have been tarnished more or less by such abuses. In France, before the Revolution, every class of the people except the lowest had its exclusive privileges, and every town and department had its selfish rights of monopoly or exemption, which were maintained with all the blind avidity usually displayed by unenlightened selfishness. The Revolution swept these away, and made all France and all Frenchmen equal in their rights and privileges, to the great advantage of the whole nation. In our own country, the spirit of reform is busy extinguishing similar marks of barbarism, but they are still clung to with great affection by the true adherents of the individual interest system.

The real object of this course of Lectures has been to show that men must obey the laws of God before they can be happy—that one of these laws is that we should love our neighbour as ourselves, or, in other words, that individual enjoyment is inseparably connected with, and dependent on, social welfare; that to promote the general welfare, it is necessary to render all the members of the community alive to its improvement, and to withdraw from them all artificial means of propping up their individual fortunes and rank, independently of virtue; that hereditary titles, entails, and other exclusive privileges of classes and individuals are the fortifications in which the selfish principle entrenches itself in order to resist and obstruct general improvement, and that, on *this account*, they should be undermined and destroyed.

I have endeavoured to show that the classes that now imagine themselves to be benefited by them would actually

profit by their abolition, by being directed into the true paths of happiness and virtue ; and I propose, by enlightening their understandings, and elevating the standards of public approbation, to induce a voluntary surrender of these distinctions, and not a forcible abrogation of them. Ages may elapse before these results shall be accomplished, but so did many centuries intervene between the painted skins and the laced coat ; and so did generations pass away between the embroidered waistcoats and our own age ; yet our day has come, and so will a brighter day arrive, although *we* may be long removed from the scene before it dawns.

Since the foregoing remarks were written I have lived for twenty months in the United States of North America, where no hereditary nobility, no privileged classes, and no entails exist. It is impossible not to perceive that in their absence the higher faculties of the mind have a freer field of action.

At the same time, truth compels me to remark that, as they were abolished in the United States by a sudden exercise of power, and as a system of equality was introduced as the result of a successful revolution, and did not arise spontaneously from the cultivation of the public mind and the development of the moral and intellectual faculties of the people, the democracy of the United States does not present all that enlightenment of the understanding, that high-minded love of the beneficial and the just, that refinement of manners and that well-regulated self-control which constitute the most valuable fruits of political freedom.

In the United States, the selfish faculties appear to me to be as active and as blind as in Great Britain. The political institutions of the country are in advance of the mental cultivation of the mass of the people; and the most cheering consideration for the philanthropist, in the prospect of the future, is the fact that these institutions having given supreme power to the people, of which there is no possibility of depriving them, it is equally the interest and the duty of men of all ranks and conditions to concur in elevating them in the scale of moral, religious, and intellectual improvement, so as in time to render them worthy of their high calling among nations. Much remains to be accomplished.

The great characteristic of the mixed form of government

is its tendency to promote the interests of the classes who wield political power to the injury of the others. Ever since Great Britain apparently attained freedom, there has been an evident system of legislating for the advantage and gratification of the dominant class. The laws of primogeniture, of entails, and of the non-liability of heritable property to legacy-duty; the game-laws, the corn-laws, and the heavy duties imposed on foreign timber, are all instances in which the aristocracy have legislated for themselves at the expense of the people.

In proportion, again, as the mercantile classes acquired political power they followed the same example: they induced Parliament to pass Acts for encouraging the shipping interests, the fisheries, the linen manufacture, and a great variety of other interests, by paying out of the public purse direct bounties to those engaged in them, or by laying protecting duties, to be paid by the public, on the rival produce of foreign nations.*

The next form of government presented to our consideration is the *democratic*, or that in which political power is deposited exclusively in the people, and by them delegated to magistrates chosen, for a longer or a shorter period, by themselves.

If the world be really governed by God on the principle of the supremacy of the moral and intellectual faculties, our social miseries must arise from individuals and classes pursuing their separate interests, regardless of those of the rest of the community; and in this view, the sooner all ranks enjoy political power, the sooner will legislation assume a truly moral character, and benefit the entire nation.

But, keeping in view the other principle which I have endeavoured to expound—that men are incapable of steadily pursuing moral and just objects until their moral and intellectual faculties have been well trained and enlightened—you will perceive that no nation can become fit for a republican form of government until all classes of the people have been adequately and nearly equally instructed.

The ancient republics of Greece and Rome formed no exceptions to this rule. They were confined to a very small territory, and the citizens of each republic were for many

* These selfish, erroneous, and prejudicial principles of legislation are disavowed by Mr. Cobden and all the enlightened leaders of the manufacturing and mercantile classes.—1846.

ages within reach of personal communication with each other, so that there existed some degree of equality of intelligence among them. Whenever their boundaries became extensive, their free government ceased, and was superseded by despotism.

But these ancient republics never were moral institutions. Their freedom, so far as it existed, resulted from the equal balance of selfishness and power in the different classes of the community; or from the rivalry of their different orators and leaders, who destroyed each other as they respectively attempted to usurp an undue share of authority. The people in their assemblies, and the senators in their senates, were often guilty of the most unjust and unprincipled tyranny over individuals; and altogether, the boasted liberties of Greece and Rome appear only as the concessions of equally-matched combatants: always withdrawn when equality in the power of aggression and resistance ceased to exist.

The reason of this is obvious. In those States there was no true religion, no moral training, no printing-presses, and no science of Nature. The great mass of the people were ignorant. Their monuments and records which have reached us are the works of a few distinguished men who arose among them, and who certainly displayed high genius in the fine arts, in literature and eloquence; but these were the educated and the talented few. From the very necessity of their circumstances, the mass of the people must have been profoundly ignorant, the slaves of the animal propensities; and their domestic habits, as well as their public conduct, show that this was the case.

In the middle ages a number of small republics sprang up in Italy, and we are dazzled by representations of their wealth, magnificence, and freedom. One observation applies to them all. They exhibited the dominion of an oligarchy over the people, and the ruling classes practised the most disgraceful tyranny wherever they were not restrained by fear of each other. Most of them ultimately fell before the power of the larger monarchies, and are now extinct.

Switzerland presents a brighter prospect. As it was the first country in Europe that acquired freedom, so has it longest preserved the blessing. The moral and intellectual qualities of the people fitted them for free governments, and the Swiss nation constituted itself into a congeries of republics, acting in federation, but each independent in its

internal administration. In the course of time, power fell into the hands of an aristocratic class there, as in Italy; but the native qualities of the Swiss mind seem to have warded off the consequences which in other countries generally ensued.

"The members of the Sovereign Council of Bern," we are told,* "were elected for life, and every ten years there was an election to supply the vacancies that had occurred during that period. The councillors themselves were the electors; and as old families became extinct, and as it was a rule that there should not be less than eighty families having members in the great council, vacancies were supplied from new families of burghers."

Still, the number of families in whose hands the government was vested was comparatively small; and several unsuccessful attempts were made, in the course of the eighteenth century, to alter this state of things, and to reinstate the assemblies of the body of the burghers. The discontent, however, was far from general, and it did not extend to the country population. The administration was conducted in an orderly, unostentatious, and economical manner; the taxes were few and light.

"It would be difficult," says the historian Müller, "to find in the history of the world a commonwealth which, for so long a period, has been so wisely administered as that of Bern. In other aristocracies the subjects were kept in darkness, poverty, and barbarism; factions were encouraged amongst them, while justice winked at crime or took bribes; and this was the case in the dependencies of Venice. But the people of Bern stood, with regard to their patricians, rather in the relation of clients towards their patrons than in that of subjects towards their sovereigns."

In 1815, an aristocratical constitution was given to Bern, under the sanction of the allied Powers who dethroned Napoleon; but in 1830, the canton of Bern, and several others, again changed their government, and became democratic republics. "The new constitution has now (1835) been in force for more than three years; notwithstanding some heart-burnings and party ebullitions, things appear to be settling into a regular system, and no act of violence or open bloodshed has accompanied the change."

This account of Bern appears remarkable when compared

* *Penny Cyclopædia*, article "Bern," Vol. IV., p. 304.

with the history of other republics, the ruling factions of which, when allowed the privilege of self-election, life-tenures of office, and freedom from responsibility, invariably became selfish and unprincipled tyrants, converting the laws into engines of oppression, and the revenues of the State into sources of private gain. I can account for the superiority of the Swiss only by the larger endowment of their moral and reflecting faculties, which seems to have been a characteristic feature in the people from a very remote period, and which still continues.

The conclusion which I draw in regard to the republican form of government is, that no people is fit for it in whom the moral and intellectual faculties are not largely developed, and in whom also they are not generally and extensively cultivated. The reason is clear. The propensities being all selfish, any talented leader who will address himself strongly to the interests and prejudices of an ignorant people will carry their suffrages to any scheme which he may propose, and he will speedily render *himself* a dictator, and *them* slaves. If there be a numerous dominant class equally talented and enlightened, the individuals among them will keep each other in check; but they will rule as an oligarchy, in the spirit of a class, and trample the people under their feet.

Thus it appears that, by the ordination of Providence, the people have no alternative but to acquire virtue and knowledge; to embrace large, liberal, and enlightened views; and to pursue moral and beneficial objects—or to suffer oppression. This is another of the proofs that the moral government of the world is based on the principle of the supremacy of the moral sentiments and the intellect; for, turn where we will, we find suffering linked with selfishness, and enjoyment with benevolence and justice, in public as well as in private affairs.

The United States of North America present the best example of a democracy which has hitherto appeared in the history of the world. Power is there lodged with the entire people; and their magistrates, from the lowest to the highest, are truly the delegates of the national authority. Yet, in the older States of the Union life and property are as secure as in any country in the world, and liberty is more complete.

The founders of American society were moral, religious, and industrious men, flying from injustice and oppression;

and were, therefore, probably men of the keenest moral and religious feelings to be found in the old world at the time when they emigrated to America. Their ranks continued to be recruited from the industrious and enterprising sons of Europe; and hence, when they threw off the yoke of Great Britain, the *matériel* of the States consisted chiefly of minds of the best quality. Since they acquired their independence they have continued to advance in education, morality, and intelligence.

In Great Britain and France you will find a greater number of *highly* educated men; but beside them you will perceive countless multitudes of human beings enveloped in the profoundest ignorance. In America you will meet with few men of such eminent culture and attainments as England and France can boast of; but you will look in vain for the masses of uneducated stolidity which are the disgrace of Europe. The American people are *nearly all* to some extent educated. The co-existence of the greatest freedom, therefore, with the highest general intelligence, in America, is in harmony with the doctrines which I am now endeavouring to expound.

After enjoying the advantages of personal observation, I find that I have over-estimated the attainments of the mass of the people in the United States. The *machinery* for education which they have instituted, and which they support by taxation or by voluntary contribution, is great and valuable, and rather exceeds than falls short of my pre-conceived opinions; but the *quality and quantity* of the education dispensed by it are far inferior to what I had imagined. The *things taught*, and the *modes of teaching*, in the public or common schools which educate the people are greatly inferior to what are found in the improved schools of Great Britain.

In regard to the scientific principles of morals, political economy, and government, especially as regards the first and the second, the people of the United States appear to me to be greatly in the dark. At the same time, there are many enlightened philanthropists among them who see and deplore this ignorance, and who are labouring assiduously and, I have no doubt, successfully, to remove it. The impulse towards a *higher* education is, at this time, strong and energetic; and as the Americans are a *practical* people, I anticipate a great and rapid improvement.

The great cause of the extravagance and apparent un-

steadiness of democracy in the United States appears to me to be referable to the extreme youth and consequent excitability and want of experience of the majority of their voters. The population doubles itself by natural increase every twenty-five years, and hence the proportion of the young to the aged is much greater than in European countries. The franchise is enjoyed at the age of twenty-one, and the majority of their voters are under thirty-five, so that the country is governed to a great extent by the passion, rashness, and inexperience, instead of by the wisdom and virtue of its people.

The history of the world has shown nations degenerating and losing the independence and freedom which they once possessed; and it is prophesied that America will lose her freedom and become a kingdom in the course of years; or that her States will fall asunder and destroy one another. It is supposed also that the civilised nations of Europe will become corrupt, and, through excessive refinement, will sink into effeminacy, and proceed from effeminacy to ignorance, from ignorance to barbarism, and thence to dissolution.

The principle in philosophy that similar causes, in similar circumstances, produce similar effects, admits of no exception; and if modern Europe and the United States of America were in the same condition in which the monarchies and republics of the ancient world existed, I should at once subscribe to the conclusion. But in the ancient governments, the mass of the people, owing to the want of printing, never were educated or civilised; and even the attainments of the ruling classes were extremely limited. They had literature and the fine arts, but they had no sound morality, no pure religion, little science, and very few of the useful arts which have resulted from science.

The national greatness of those ages, therefore, was not the growth of the common mind, but arose from the genius of a few individuals, aided by accidental circumstances. It was like the dominion of France in our own day, when the military talents of Napoleon extended her sway from Naples to Moscow, and from Lisbon to Vienna. But, resting on no superiority in the French people over the people of the conquered nations, it was dissolved in a day, even under the eye of the commanding genius that had raised it.

When we apply the history of the past as an index to

the events of the future, the condition of *like circumstances* is wanting; for Europe and the United States are in the progress (however slow) of presenting, for the first time in the world, the spectacle of an universally educated people; and on this account I do not subscribe to the probability of civilisation perishing or of modern nations becoming effeminate and corrupt. The discovery of the natural laws, and of those of organisation in particular, will guard them against this evil. It is true that only a few States in Europe have yet organised the means of universally educating the people; but Prussia, France, Holland, and Switzerland have done so, and Great Britain is becoming anxious to follow their example.* The others must pursue the same course, for their own security and welfare. A barbarous people cannot exist in safety beside enlightened nations.

For the same reasons, I do not anticipate the dissolution of the union of the States of North America, or that they will lose their freedom. They are advancing in knowledge and morality, and whenever the conviction becomes general that the interests of the whole States are in harmony, which they undoubtedly are, the miserable attempts to foster the industry of one at the expense of another will be given up, and they may live in amity and flourish long, the boast of the world, so far as natural causes of dissolution are concerned.

This expectation is founded on the hope that they will give a *real* education to their people: an education which shall render them conversant with the great principles of morals and political economy; so that they may know that there is a power above themselves: that of Nature and Nature's God, whose laws they must obey before they can be prosperous and happy. I assume also that means will be found to expunge the blot and pestilence of slavery from their free institutions.† It is a canker which will consume the vitals of the Union, if it be not in time eradicated. These expectations may appear to some to be bold and chimerical; but truth's triumphs have no limits; and justice, when once recognised as a rule of action, which it emphatically is in the institutions of the United States, cannot be arrested midway in its career.

The greatest dangers to the institutions of the United

* Great Britain has now done so under the Education Act, 1870, in England, and the Act of 1872 for Scotland.—ED., 1893.

† This also has been accomplished.—ED., 1893.

States are now impending over them. The people are young, prosperous, rapidly increasing, and still very imperfectly instructed. The natural consequence is that they are rash, impetuous, boastful, and ambitious, and ready to rush into contests with other nations about real or imaginary interests. Their institutions are calculated to prevent or to remove causes of quarrel among themselves, but they provide no adequate barriers to their encroachments on other nations.

The extension of their territory may render their bonds of union too feeble to hold them together, and ambition may ruin a fabric which, under the guidance of morality and reason, might endure for ever. Their only chance of salvation lies in the success of their efforts to train and instruct a rising generation in virtue and knowledge.

From the principles now laid down, it follows that the tendency of all governments in modern times is to become more democratic in proportion as the people become more intelligent and moral. Since 1831 our own government has been much more under the influence of the people than at any previous period of our history. Those who feel alarm at the march of democracy read history without the lights of philosophy. They have their minds filled with the barbarous democracies of Greece and Rome and with the events of the French Revolution, and they tremble at the anticipated rule of an ignorant rabble in Great Britain.

On the other hand, the only democracy which I anticipate to be capable of gaining the ascendency here will be that of civilised and enlightened, moral, and refined men; and if the principles which I have expounded be correct, that the higher sentiments and the intellect are intended by Nature to govern, it will be morally impossible that while an enlightened and an ignorant class co-exist, as in Great Britain, the ignorant can rule.

The British aristocracy, by neglecting their own education, may become relatively ignorant in comparison with the middle classes, and their influence may then decay; but should this happen, it would still be an example of the intelligence of the country bearing the chief sway. In France the dominion of the ferocious democrats was short-lived: superior class gradually recovered authority, and the Reign of Terror never was restored.

In the ancient democracies there was no enlightened class comparable with that of Britain. I regard, therefore,

the fears of those who apprehend that the still ignorant and rude masses of our country will gain political power, and introduce anarchy, as equally unfounded with the terror that the rivers will one day flow upwards, and spread the waters of the ocean over the valleys and the mountains. The laws of the moral are as stable as those of the physical world. Both may be shaken for a time by storms or convulsions, but the great elements of order remain for ever untouched, and after the clearing of the atmosphere they are seen in all their original symmetry and beauty.

The result which I anticipate is that education, religion, and the knowledge of the natural laws will in time extend over all classes of the community till the conviction shall become general that the Creator has rendered all our interests and enjoyments compatible; and that then all classes will voluntarily abandon exclusive privileges, unjust pretensions to superiority, and the love of selfish dominion; and will establish a social condition in which homage will be paid only to virtue, knowledge, and utility, and in which a pure Christian equality, in so far as human nature is capable of realising it, embodying the principle of doing to others as we would wish others to do unto us, will universally prevail.

These days may be very distant; but causes leading to their approach appear to me to exist, and to be already in operation; and I hope that, in giving expression to these anticipations, I am stating the deductions of a sound philosophy, and not uttering the mere aspirations of a warm imagination.

At all events, this theory, which places independence, freedom, public prosperity, and individual happiness on the basis of religion, morality, and intelligence is ennobling in itself, and cannot possibly do harm. Indeed, it can scarcely disappoint us; because, however far mankind may stop short of the results which I have anticipated, and for the realisation of which I allow centuries of time, it is certain that every step which they shall advance in this career will lead them nearer to happiness, while by *no other path* can they attain to permanent prosperity and power.

LECTURE XVIII.

Man as a Religious Being.

Having discussed the foundation of moral philosophy, the duties of man as an individual and as a social being, and also the causes of the independence and freedom of nations, with the relations of the different forms of government to the moral and intellectual conditions of the people, I proceed to consider man's duty to God, so far as this can be discovered by the light of Nature.

Lord Brougham, in his "Discourse of Natural Theology," maintains, with great truth, that natural theology is a branch of natural philosophy. His argument is the following: It is a truth of physics that vision is performed by the eye refracting light, and by making it converge to a focus upon the retina. The eye is an optical instrument, which, by the peculiar combination of its lenses, and the different materials they are composed of, produces vision. Design and adaptation are clearly manifested in its construction.

These are truths in natural philosophy; but a single step converts them into evidences in natural theology. The eye must have been formed by a Being possessing knowledge of the properties of light, and of the matter of which the eye is composed: That Being is no inhabitant of earth; He is superior to man: He is his Maker: He is God.

Thus, the first branch of natural theology, or that which treats of the existence and power of the Deity, rests on the same basis with physical science; in fact, it is a direct induction from the truths of science.

The second branch of natural theology treats of the duties of man towards God, and of the probable designs of the Deity in regard to His creatures. The facts of mental philosophy stand in the same relation to this branch in which the facts of physical science stand in relation to the first branch. By contemplating each mental faculty, the objects to which it is related by its constitution, its sphere of action, its uses and abuses, we may draw conclusions regarding the Divine intentions in creating our faculties, and touching the *duty* which we owe to God in the employment of them. It is obvious that, as God has given us

understanding able to discriminate the uses and abuses of our faculties and moral sentiments, leading us to prefer their *use:* we owe it to Him as a duty to fulfil His intention thus obviously expressed in our creation by using our powers right, and by not abusing them.

The second branch of natural theology, like the first, rests upon the same foundation with all the other inductive sciences; the only difference being that the one belongs chiefly to the inductive science of *physics*, and the other to the inductive science of *mind*.* This distinction, however, is not perfectly accurate; because the evidence of the existence and attributes of God, and also of man's duty towards Him, may be found in both of these branches of science.

It has been objected that revelation supersedes the necessity of studying natural theology. Dr. Thomas Brown, in his Lectures on Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, has furnished a brief, but powerful, answer to this objection. "On this subject," says he,† "that comprehends the sublimest of all the truths which man is permitted to attain, the benefit of *revelation* may be considered to render every inquiry superfluous that does not flow from it. But to those who are blessed with a clearer illumination, it cannot be uninteresting to trace the fainter lights which, in the darkness of so many gloomy ages, amid the oppression of tyranny in various forms, and of superstition more afflicting than tyranny itself, could preserve, still dimly visible to man, that *virtue* which he was to love, and that *Creator* whom he was to adore. Nor can it be without profit, even to their better faith, to find all *Nature* thus *concurring* as to its most important truths with revelation itself; and every thing, living and inanimate, announcing that *high and holy One*, of whose *perfections* they have been privileged with a more splendid manifestation."

Dugald Stewart, in his "Outlines of Moral Philosophy," also treats at considerable length of natural religion. "The study of philosophy," says he,‡ "in all its various branches, both natural and moral, affords at every step a new illustration that the design which we trace in creation indicates wisdom, and that it operates in conformity to one uniform

* *See* "Lord Brougham's Discourses," 3rd edition, p. 58. His argument is not clear.

† Vol. IV., p. 401.

‡ Page 271.

plan, insomuch that the truths of natural religion gain an accession of evidence from every addition that is made to the stock of human knowledge."

I consider the study of natural theology important as leading to a sound interpretation of Scripture itself. Great differences exist in the interpretations of its declarations by different sects; and as all truth must be harmonious, it appears to me that whenever the constitution of man and the attributes of the Deity shall be ascertained, so far as this is possible, by strictly logical inductions from facts correctly observed in Nature, all interpretations of Scripture touching these points must be brought into harmony with Nature; otherwise, they will justly be regarded as erroneous. Every well-established doctrine in moral philosophy and in natural theology, founded on the constitution of Nature, will be a plumb-line by which to adjust interpretations of Scripture.

The Scriptural doctrine of the corruption of human nature, for example, is one on which a vast variety of opinions is entertained by Christians. When Scripture is interpreted in such a manner as to contradict the sound conclusions of reason on subjects which lie within the legitimate province of reason, such interpretations must be powerless, or positively mischievous. The Christian world, at present (1846), appears to be in a state of transition. In Germany, a large portion of the people, under the guidance of Johannes Ronge, have thrown off Roman Catholicism, have also rejected the dogmas of the Protestant Churches established at the Reformation, and have adopted Rationalistic interpretations of Scripture.

As a contrast to this movement, a number of the scholars of Oxford, under the influence of Dr. Pusey, have gone over to the Church of Rome; while the middle classes in Scotland have abandoned their ancient Presbyterian Church, have reared a new one on the same foundation, and embraced with fresh fervour the doctrines and opinions of the sixteenth century, rejected by the Germans.

The Rev. Baden Powell, Savilian Professor of Geometry in the University of Oxford, in his Work on "The Connexion of Natural and Divine Truth," says: "Physical science is the necessary foundation of natural theology: certain of the truths it discloses are warnings against mistaking the purport of Scripture; and the right use of the caution thus inculcated applies widely in the interpretation

of revelation. Inductive philosophy is subservient both to natural and revealed religion. The investigation of God's works is an essential introduction to the right reception of His Word."

In like manner, there should be no philosophy that is not religious: that is to say, that should not be viewed as a chapter of the Creator's great book of revelation, addressed to the human understanding in the constitution of the universe.

I proceed, therefore, to consider the subject of natural theology without fearing that, if properly conducted, it will endanger any other class of truths.

The first point which I propose to investigate relates to the foundation of natural religion. I beg of you to observe that religion emanates from sentiments or from emotions, and that it does not consist of a collection of mere intellectual conceptions or ideas. The foundations of it lie in the faculties of Veneration, Wonder, and Hope.

A brief explanation will enable you to understand this view. War springs originally, not from the human intellect, but from the propensities of Combativeness and Destructiveness, which give an instinctive tendency to oppose, to contend, and to destroy. There are legitimate spheres within which these propensities may act beneficially; but when they are too energetic they carry captive the other powers, enlist them in their service, and then lead to extensive destruction and to the horrors of war. Combativeness and Destructiveness, operating in savage man with very little intellect, produce war in which ambush and cunning, clubs, and bows and arrows, are used as the means of assault.

The same propensities, acting in the nations of modern Europe, have led to the employment of scientific principles in the construction of works of attack and of defence, and to the use of cannon, and other ingenious and complicated instruments of destruction. Still, Combativeness and Destructiveness are the original sources in the human mind from which war itself, in all its forms and with all its weapons, flows. If these instincts were not possessed, men would feel no impulse to fight any more than they feel an impulse to fly.

Further, you can readily infer that war will be practised by any nation very much in the proportion which Combativeness and Destructiveness bear in them to the other

faculties. If these propensities preponderate over the moral sentiments, the people will be constantly craving for war, and seeking occasions for quarrels. If they be very feeble, public attention will be directed to other and more peaceful pursuits, and contentions will, as far as possible, be avoided. If we wish to tame a warlike people to the arts of peace, we must try to stimulate their higher faculties, and to remove all objects calculated to excite their pugnacious propensities.

Similar observations apply to religion. The foundations of religion lie in Veneration, which instinctively feels emotions of reverence and respect; in Wonder, which longs after the new, the astonishing, and the supernatural, and which, combined with Veneration, leads us to adore an unseen power; and in Hope, which instinctively looks forward in expectation to future enjoyment. These inspire man with a ceaseless desire to offer homage to a superior Being, to adore Him, and to seek His protection.

We are informed that, in some tribes of savages, no traces of religion have been discovered; but you will find that in them the faculties which I have named are extremely weak. They are in the same condition in regard to the religious feelings that other tribes, in whom Tune and Time are deficient, stand in regard to melody; these have no music, in consequence of the extreme feebleness of the related faculties in their minds.

On the other hand, wherever the religious sentiments are strong in a people, that nation or tribe will be found to be proportionally devoted to religion. If their intellectual faculties be feeble—if they have no science and no true revelation to direct them—they may be engulfed in superstition; but superstition is only the religious sentiments gone astray. They may be found worshipping stocks and stones, reptiles, and idols of the most revolting description; but still, this shows not only that the tendency to worship exists in them, but that it may be manifested in great vigour when the intellect is feeble or very imperfectly informed. It proves also that these sentiments are in themselves blind or mere general impulses, which will inevitably err, unless directed by an illumination superior to their own.

The religious sentiments may act in combination with the propensities or with the moral sentiments. In combination with the lower feelings, they produce a cold, cruel,

and selfish faith, in which the votary's chief object is to secure the favour of Heaven for himself, while he allots endless and nearly universal misery to the rest of mankind. In combination with Benevolence and Conscientiousness, they lead to a faith in which justice and mercy, truth and humility, prevail.

While religion rests on the sentiments of Veneration, Wonder, and Hope, as its foundations, the enlightenment of the intellect serves to direct these sentiments to their proper objects, but it does not produce them, and therefore does not produce religion. It is thus impossible that religion itself can be eradicated from the human mind.

The forms and ceremonies by which the religious sentiments manifest themselves may be expected to vary in different ages and in different countries, according to the degree of development of the religious, moral, and intellectual faculties, and to the state of the intellectual cultivation of the people; but these emotions themselves evidently glow with a never-dying flame, and man will cease to adore only when he ceases to exist.

It is absurd, therefore, to mistake Churches, articles of faith, and Acts of Parliament for the foundations of religion, and to imagine that, when these are changed, *religion* will perish. The day was when religion was universally believed to rest, for its existence, solely on the decrees of Roman Catholic councils and popish bulls, and when the priests assured the world that the moment their Church and authority were subverted, religion would be for ever destroyed.

But we have lived to see religion flourishing vigorously in nations which disown that authority and that Church. If the Churches and articles of faith now prevalent shall be changed—of which there is much probability—the adherents of them will, after the fashion of the priests of Rome, proclaim that the doom of religion has been sealed; but all men who are capable of looking at the true foundation of religious worship, firmly and deeply laid in the human faculties, will be unmoved by such alarms. They will expect religion to shine forth in ever-brightening loveliness and splendour in proportion to the enlightenment of the public mind; and they will fear neither infernal nor terrestrial foes.

It would greatly assist the progress of improvement if a firm conviction could be carried home to the public mind

that religion has its foundations in the nature of man, because many excellent persons might thereby be delivered from the blind terrors in which they constantly live, lest it should be destroyed; and the acrimony of contending sects also, every one of which identifies its own triumph with that of religion itself, might probably be moderated.

The next question that presents itself is, Whether there be any moral or religious duties prescribed to man by natural theology? In answering this question, moralists in general proceed to prove the existence and attributes of God, and to infer from them the duties which we owe to Him as our Creator, Preserver, and Governor. They regard Him as the Mighty God, and us as His lowly subjects, bound to fear, tremble, love, and obey Him.

I entirely concur in this view when applied *to doing the will of God;* but it appears to me that it has often led to misconceptions and abuse. Religious duty has, somehow or other, come to be too generally regarded (in the spirit, at least, in which it is practised, if not in words) as a homage rendered to the Divine Being for His own gratification, the neglect of which He will punish, and the performance of which He will reward. Many persons have a notion of the Divine Being somewhat resembling that of an earthly sovereign whom they may win and gratify by praises and flattery, and from whose favour they may expect to receive something agreeable and advantageous in return.

All this is superstition and error, and it partakes too much of the character of selfishness. I am aware that no rational Christian puts his religious faith and worship into the form of such propositions; but I fear that the spirit of them can be too often detected in much of the religion of the world.

It appears to me that the religious service of the Deity possesses, under the lights of Nature, a totally different character.

The *existence* of a Supreme Ruler of the world is, no doubt, the first position to be established in natural religion; but the proofs of it are so abundant, so overpowering to the understanding, and so captivating to the sentiments, that I regard this as the simplest, the easiest, and the least likely to be disputed, of all the branches of the subject. If reflecting intellect be possessed, we can scarcely move a step in the investigation of Nature

without receiving irresistible proofs of Divine agency and wisdom.

I opened the first book embracing natural science that came to my hand when composing this lecture. It happened to be a number of the *Penny Cyclopœdia*, which had just been sent in by the bookseller; and I turned up the first page that presented itself (p. 151). It chanced to be one on bees, and I read as follows:—

"In many instances, it is only by the bees travelling from flower to flower that the pollen, or farina, is carried from the male to the female flowers, without which they would not fructify. One species of bee would not be sufficient to fructify all the various sorts of flowers were the bees of that species ever so numerous, for it requires species of different sizes and different constructions."

M. Sprengel found that, "not only are insects indispensable in fructifying different species of iris, but that some of them, as I. Xiphium, require the agency of the larger humble bees, which alone are strong enough to force their way between the stile-flags; and hence, as these insects are not so common as many others, this iris is often barren, or bears imperfect seeds."

This simple announcement proves to my understanding, incontestably, the existence and presence of a Deity in creation; because we see here an important end, clearly involving design, accomplished by agents altogether unconscious of the service in which they are engaged. The bee, performing, all unconsciously to itself, the work of fructification of the flowers—and the provision of bees of different weights for stile-flags of different strengths—bespeak, in language irresistible, the mind and workmanship of an intelligent contriver.

And who is this contriver? It is not man. There is only one answer possible—it is the Deity; and one object of His selecting such a method for operating may perhaps have been, to speak home to the understandings of men concerning His own presence, power, and wisdom. Nature is absolutely overflowing with similar examples.

But there is another species of proof of the existence of a God—that which is addressed to the poetic sentiments of man. "The external world," says Mr. Sedgwick, "proves to us the being of a God in two ways: by addressing the imagination, as well as by informing the reason. It speaks to our imaginative and poetic feelings, and they are as

much a part of ourselves as our limbs and our organs of sense.

"Music has no charms for the deaf, nor has painting for the blind; and all the touching sentiments and splendid imagery borrowed by the poet from the world without would lose their magic power, and might as well be presented to a cold statue as to a man, were there no preordained harmony between his mind and the material beings around him. It is certain that the glories of the external world are so fitted to our imaginative powers as to give them a perception of the Godhead and a glimpse of His attributes; and this adaptation is a proof of the existence of God, of the same kind (but of greater or less power, according to the constitution of our individual minds) with that which we derive from the adaptation of our senses to the constitution of the material world."*

Assuming, then, the existence of a Deity as demonstrable by means of the work of creation, the next question is, What can we discover of His character by the exercise of our natural faculties?

In answering this question, I observe, in the first place, that we cannot possibly discover anything from creation concerning His person or personal history—if I may use such expressions—because there is no manifestation of these in the external world. If, for example, we were to present a thread of raw silk to an intelligent man, and ask him to discover from its physical appearances alone the individual characteristics of the maker of the thread, he would tell us that it is impossible to do so, because the object presented to him does not contain one element from which his understanding can legitimately infer a single fact in answer to such a question.

In like manner, when we survey earth, air, and ocean, our own minds and bodies, and every page of creation that is open to us, although we perceive thousands of indications of the mental qualities of the Creator, we receive not one ray of light concerning His form of being, His personal history, residence, or individual nature. All conjectures on this subject, therefore, are the offspring either of fancy or of superstition.

But we receive from creation overwhelming proofs of His

* "Discourse on the Studies of the University of Cambridge," pp. 20, 21.

mental attributes. In the stupendous mechanism of the heavens, in which our sun and the whole planetary system are but as one wheel—and that so small that, although annihilated, its absence would scarcely be perceptible to an eye embracing the universe—we perceive indications of power which absolutely overwhelm our imaginations. In the arrangements of physical and animal creation, we discover proofs of wisdom without limits; and in the endowment of our own minds, and the adaptation of the external world to them, we discover evidence of unbounded goodness, intelligence, and justice.

The inference which I draw from these manifestations of the Divine character is this: that God veils from us His individual or personal nature, to avert from our minds every conception that He stands in need of us, or of our homage or services, *for His own sake*, so that we may have neither temptation nor apology for adopting a system of worship such as we should address to a being whom we desired to flatter or please by our attentions; and that He reveals to us His moral and intellectual attributes, to intimate to us that the worship which will meet with His approbation is that which will best carry into execution His will in that department of creation which is placed under the dominion of man as a rational and responsible being.

Now, what *is* this form of service? All creation proclaims the answer. It is acting in the spirit of the Deity, as manifested in His works. If so, natural religion must be *progressive* in its principles and duties, in correspondence with our increasing knowledge of the will of the Divine Being, expressed in His works; and it really is so.

Theologians often reproach the religion of Nature with darkness and uncertainty. They might as legitimately make the same charge against the *science and philosophy* of Nature. Up to a very recent period, indeed, the science of Nature was barren; but the reason was, not that in itself it contained no wisdom, nor any elements adapted to the profitable use of man, but that man's ignorance was so great that he had not discovered how to study that science in its right spirit. As soon as Bacon put man into the road to study it wisely, natural philosophy became munificently productive; and at this hour its stores continue to yield more and more abundant benefits to man, in proportion as they are opened up.

The same history will hereafter be given of natural religion. While men were ignorant of every principle of science, it was most natural in them to ascribe every isolated effect to an isolated power, and to imagine as many deities as there were agencies in the world which they could not reconcile. They saw the river waters rolling in mighty torrents to the ocean, and they imagined a river god as the cause.

They perceived the earth yielding spontaneously fruits, and flowers, and herbage of the richest kinds; they felt the bounty of the gifts, and, ignorant of their cause, they ascribed them to a goddess, Ceres. They saw the seasons change, and the sun, moon, and planets present different appearances; and, deeply impressed with the manifestations of power which these orbs displayed, but ignorant of the cause, they imagined them to be deities themselves. All this was the natural effect of the human faculties operating in profound ignorance of physical causation.

But since science demonstrated that the planets revolve, and rivers flow, in virtue of one law of gravitation, we no longer ascribe each action to a separate deity, but attribute both to one; and our notions of that one are prodigiously enhanced by the perception of a single power extending over such mighty intervals of space, and operating in all according to one uniform law.

In proportion, therefore, as we advance in the knowledge of creation, we discover proofs of uniformity, combination, mutual relationship, and adaptation, that compel the understanding to ascend to one cause, and to concentrate in that cause the most transcendent qualities. It is thus that our conceptions of the attributes of the Divine Being, drawn from Nature, go on increasing in truth, in magnificence, and in beauty, in proportion as we proceed in the acquisition of knowledge; and as our rapid progress in it is of recent origin, we may well believe that natural religion could not earlier have presented much instruction regarding the Deity to the understanding or the moral sentiments of man.

But the reproach is made against natural theology, that it is barren also in regard to man's duties. Here the same answer occurs. Natural theology teaches that it is man's duty to perform aright the part which God has allotted to him in creation; but how could he discover what that part was until he became acquainted with himself and with creation? Natural theology was barren in regard to duties,

only because the knowledge of Nature, which alone gives it form and substance, had itself scarcely an existence in the human mind.

Man had not learned to read the record, and was therefore ignorant of the precepts which it contained. He was exactly in the same condition, in regard to natural religion, in which most of us would be if we had never received any but a Gaelic Bible. The whole doctrines and precepts of Christianity might be faithfully recorded, and most explicitly set down in it; but if we could not interpret the characters, of what service would the book be to us? It would be absurd, however, to object against the Bible itself, on this account, that it is barren of instruction.

In like manner, whenever we shall have interpreted aright the constitution of the human mind and body, the laws of the physical world, and our relations to it and to God, which constitute the record of our duties, inscribed by the Creator in the Book of Nature, we shall find natural theology most copious in its precepts, most express in its injunctions, and most peremptory in its demands of obedience.

I appeal to those of you who have read the "Constitution of Man," and have been satisfied with the general truth of the principles unfolded, whether you do not perceive these to be duties prescribed in the constitution of Nature, by the Creator, to parents, with a command as clear and explicit, and with a sanction as certain, as if He had opened the heavens, and amidst thunders and the shaking of the universe, delivered to them the same precepts written on monuments of brass?

In truth, they are more so; because the authenticity of the tablets of brass, like those of stone, might be disputed and denied by sceptics, who have not themselves seen them delivered; while the precepts written in our nature, adapted to the constitution of our faculties, and enforced by the whole order of creation, stand revealed in a record which never decays nor becomes obsolete, and the authenticity of which no sceptic can successfully deny.

If the precepts therein contained be neglected by ignorance, or set at defiance by obstinacy, they never are so with impunity; because God, in His providence, sweeps resistlessly along in the course which He has revealed, laying in the grave the children in whose persons His organic laws have been deeply infringed, rendering unhappy those in whom

they have been materially neglected, and rewarding with enjoyment only those in whose minds and bodies they have been obeyed.

Every organ of the body and every faculty of the mind is a text from which the most valuable lessons in natural religion might be drawn: lessons thoroughly adapted to the human understanding, true, practical, and beneficial. Natural theology at once impresses on us the sanctions of the Divinity, and enforces them, by showing that He punishes men for their neglect, and rewards them for their observance, in the ordinary administration of His providence.

If I am sound in the view which I have laboured to establish, that this world really constitutes a great theatre of causation, adapted to the animal, moral, and intellectual nature of man, so arranged as to admit of his becoming prosperous and happy in proportion as he becomes thoroughly intelligent and moral—and by no other means: what a fertile field of precept for the practice of virtue is thus opened up to us!

How eloquent, how forcible, how varied, and how instructive, may not the teachers of God's law and God's will then become, when they shall have the whole book of creation opened to them for texts; when every line shall be clear, interesting, and instructive; and when they shall be able to demonstrate, in the consequences which attend the fulfilment or neglect of their precepts, that they are teaching no vain or fanciful theories, but the true wisdom of God!

Conceive for one moment how much of useful, interesting, nay, captivating instruction might be delivered to a general audience by merely expounding the functions, uses, and abuses of the various organs of the body necessary to health, and of the faculties of the mind, holding up the constitution of each as a Divine intimation to man, and the consequences of using or abusing each as solemn precepts from the Divinity, addressed to his understanding and his moral and religious feelings!

If these views be well founded, how unproductive of real advantage must the preaching and teaching of Christianity necessarily be while the duties prescribed by Nature are ignorantly neglected! Nothing appears to be more preposterous than for human beings to pray, evening and morning, to their Maker—"Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done in *earth*, as it is in heaven"; and all the while to

close their eyes against perception of the means appointed by God for realising His kingdom and doing His will on earth! So far are the duties prescribed by natural theology from being either barren or adverse to Christianity, it appears to me that practical Christianity has remained, to a great extent, unproductive, misunderstood, and comparatively feeble, in consequence of the dictates of natural theology having been unknown and neglected.

The clerical teachers of mankind in all civilised countries are placed at present in a position which few of them understand. The theology which constitutes the distinctive creed of each sect is scholastic and dogmatical, resting on words and interpretations of words based on no natural foundation, and unconnected with any natural science. The discoveries which have been made since these creeds were framed in Astronomy, Geology, and Physiology have brought facts concerning physical nature and the nature of man to light which were never dreamt of by the authors of these formulas of belief, and which yet bear directly on their merits.

A knowledge of these sciences is becoming widely diffused among the people, and the effects are already discernible in the United States of America, France, and Germany, where religious discussion is freely maintained. There the ancient formulas are every day falling more and more into disrepute, while no satisfactory substitute for them has yet been introduced. This cannot be achieved until the record of Nature be honestly and fearlessly contrasted with that of Scripture, and until justice be done to both. When will the clergy open their eyes to this fact?

LECTURE XIX.

The Religious Duties of Man.

I concluded the last Lecture by observing that natural theology is in reality extremely prolific in precepts, and imperative in enforcing obedience, whenever we know how to read the record. In elucidation of this remark, I shall now compare the Ten Commandments with the dictates of natural theology, and you shall judge for yourselves whether the same law is not promulgated in both. In order to see the precept, however, in natural theology, be it remembered that you must be able to read the record in which it is written : that is to say, you must understand the constitution of the external world, and that of your own nature, to such an extent as to be capable of perceiving what God intimates that a rational being, capable of comprehending both, should do, and abstain from doing, in consequence of that constitution.

If you are ignorant of this natural record, then the duties which it contains will appear to you to be mere fancies or gratuitous assumptions ; and the observations which I am about to make will probably seem unfounded, if not irreverent. But with every indulgence for the ignorance of natural institutions in which the imperfections of our education have left most of our minds, I beg to be forgiven for not bowing before the decisions of that ignorance, but to be permitted to appeal to the judgment of men possessing the most extended knowledge. If there be individuals here who have seriously studied natural science, and also the structure and functions of the human body and the nature and functions of the mind, they have learned to read the record of natural theology, and have prepared their minds by knowledge to interpret it aright, and to them I address the following observations.

The Ten Commandments are given forth in the Book of Exodus, which narrates that they were delivered by God Himself to Moses, written on tables of stone. If we find that every one of them is written clearly and indelibly also in the human constitution, and is enjoined by natural

religion, this must strengthen the authority of Scripture, by showing that Nature harmonises with its dictates.

The first commandment is—"Thou shalt have no other gods before Me."

This forbids an abuse of Veneration; and all Nature, when rightly understood, proclaims one God, and enforces the same commandment. The nations who are lost in superstition and given up to idolatry are profoundly ignorant of natural science. In proportion as we become acquainted with Nature, the harmony of design and the unity of power displayed in the most distant portions of the universe proclaim more and more forcibly the unity of the Designing Mind; and hence the authority of this commandment becomes stronger and stronger as science and natural religion advance in their conquests.

The second—"Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them," &c.

This is a repetition or amplification of the same precept.

Third—"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."

This is still directed against an abuse of Veneration. As soon as the intellect is enlightened by natural religion in regard to the real attributes of the Deity, reverence and obedience to Him, as prescribed by these commandments, are irresistibly felt to be right, and to be conformable to the dictates of the natural law, while all irreverence and profanity are as clearly indicated to be wrong.

Fourth—"Remember the Sabbath day, to keep it holy," &c.—"In it thou shalt not do any work," &c.

This enjoins giving rest to the muscular frame on the seventh day, that the brain may be able to manifest the moral and intellectual faculties with more complete success. It ordains also that on that day the moral and intellectual faculties shall be exclusively devoted to the study and contemplation of God and His works, and to the doing of His will.

Every line of our bodily and mental constitution coincides with this precept. The mind depends for its powers of acting on the state of the brain; and if constant muscular labour be endured the brain will be inert, and all our moral, religious, and intellectual faculties will become obtuse and dull. On the other hand, if we indulge in ceaseless mental exertion, we shall exhaust and weary out our brains by over-activity, and become at length incapable

of beneficial application to moral and religious duties. Thus the obligation to rest in due season is written as clearly in our constitution as in the Fourth Commandment.

Indeed, our natural constitution commands not only an extent of repose from labour equal to that prescribed by the Commandment, but greatly more. It imposes on us the duty of resting from labour several hours every day in our lives, and of dedicating them to the study and practice of the will of God. The observance, however, which it prescribes of the seventh day is somewhat different from that taught by human interpreters of the Fourth Commandment.

Our Scottish divines, in general, forbid walking or riding, or any other form of exercise and recreation, on Sundays, as a contravention of the Fourth Commandment. In our constitution, on the other hand, God proclaims that while incessant labour, through its influence on the mental organs, blunts our moral, intellectual, and religious faculties, abstinence from all bodily exertion, and the practice of incessant mental application for one entire day, even on religion, are also injurious to the welfare of both body and mind; and that on the seventh day there is no exception to the laws which regulate our functions on other days. These require that air, exercise, and mental relaxation should alternate with moral, religious, and intellectual studies.

Accordingly, natural theology teaches us to transfer a portion of the Sunday's rest and holiness to every one of the other days of the week, and to permit on the Sundays as much of air, exercise, and recreation as will preserve the mental organs in the best condition for performing their moral, religious, and intellectual duties.

In the New Testament no express injunction is laid on Christians to observe the first day of the week in the same manner that the Jews were commanded in the Old Testament to observe the last day of the week, or the Sabbath. In point of fact, there is no explicit prescription in the New Testament of any particular mode of observing the first day of the week. While, therefore, all Christian nations have agreed in considering themselves not bound by the Fourth Commandment to observe the seventh day, or the Jewish Sabbath, they have differed in regard to the mode of observing the first day of the week; and, as the Scripture prescribes no definite rule, each nation has adopted such forms of observance as appeared to itself to be most accordant with the general spirit of Christianity.

Thus, in Catholic countries amusements are permitted on Sundays after Divine service ; in Scotland, amusements and labour, except works of necessity and mercy, are prohibited. In Scotland, also, Sunday commences at twelve o'clock on Saturday night, and ends at twelve o'clock on Sunday night. In Massachusetts, on the other hand, different views are entertained. While Chap. 50, Sects. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd of the Revised Statutes, prohibits all persons from doing any work and from travelling on "the Lord's day," Sect. 4th declares that day, for the purposes of these sections, "to include the time between the midnight preceding and *the sun-setting of the said day.*"

According to the Scottish law, therefore, Sunday consists of twenty-four hours at all seasons of the year ; while according to the "Revised Statutes of Massachusetts" it consists only of sixteen and a half hours on the 22nd of December, and stretches out as the days lengthen, but never exceeds nineteen and a half hours at any period.

Again, in the Revised Statutes of this commonwealth, it is declared, by Sect. 5th, "that no person shall be present at any game, sport, play, or public diversion, except concerts of sacred music, upon the evening next preceding or following the Lord's day," under the penalty of paying a fine of five dollars. In Edinburgh, the best plays and public entertainments are brought forth on the "evening next preceding the Lord's day," or Saturday evening—and are then most numerously attended ; so that in Boston a Christian is fined in five dollars for doing on that evening what a Christian in Edinburgh is permitted to do without any penalty whatever. This shows how far each of these States assumes the power to itself of determining what may and what may not be done on the first day of the week.

On the continent of Europe, both Roman Catholics and Protestants devote a considerable portion of Sunday to recreation. This may be carried, in some instances, too far ; but unless the Scriptures abrogate the law written by God in our constitution, we in Scotland have erred in the opposite extreme.

The difference between the expounder of the Bible and him who unfolds the natural laws is this : the former, when he departs from the natural laws, can enforce his interpretations of Scripture only by an arm of flesh. If men refuse to forego air, exercise, and recreation on the seventh day, the priest may refuse them Church privileges, or call in the

police to fine and imprison them ; but he can do no more. He cannot change the nature of the mind and body ; nor will the Creator punish the people for not acting as their teacher desires them, in opposition to the natural laws.

The interpreter of the Book of Nature, on the other hand, may wield no arm of flesh ; but he is enabled to point to the power of God enforcing the Divine laws, and to demonstrate that punishment is inseparably connected with infringement, and reward with obedience. The expounder of Scripture, who, without inquiring what God has commanded in His natural laws, goes to Parliament, and prays for authority to enforce his own interpretation of the Fourth Commandment on his country, is met by opposition, ridicule, and aversion ;*—he is astonished at what he regards as the perverse and irreligious character of legislators, and ascribes their conduct to the corruption of human nature. It is the arm of the Deity that opposes him. His scheme, in so far as it prohibits wholesome recreation, is in opposition to the Divine laws written in the nature of man. Nature speaks with a thousand tongues ; and his object is baffled by a might which he neither sees nor comprehends.

This appears to me to be the real cause of the bad success in Parliament of the Sabbath-observance Bills. They clearly conform to Nature in so far as they seek to prohibit compulsory labour on that day ; but they certainly depart from the laws written by God in our constitution when they tend to discourage and prohibit that extent of recreation on Sundays which a corporeal frame like ours demands, and without which the mind cannot put forth its full vigour in morals, in religion, or in science.

When, on the other hand, the expounder of Scripture interprets it according to God's law as revealed in Nature, he is backed and supported by the whole weight of the Divine power and authority in creation, and his precepts become irresistible. He needs no Act of Parliament and no police to enforce his edicts. The Lord of heaven and earth, who proclaimed the law, carries it into execution.

The Fifth Commandment is—"Honour thy father and thy mother," &c.

This enjoins an exercise of Veneration towards parents.

* At the time the text was written Sir Andrew Agnew was beseeching Parliament to pass a Bill for the better observance of the Sabbath.

Natural theology enforces this precept in the most direct and efficacious manner. There is a faculty of Veneration prompting us to respect virtue, wisdom, and experience, and our parents are among its natural objects. There is, however, one modification of it which natural theology points outs, not expressed, although implied, in the Fifth Commandment:—Parents must render themselves legitimate objects of veneration by manifesting superior moral, intellectual, and religious qualities and attainments before they are authorised to expect the sentiment to be directed towards them by their offspring. Both Scripture and reason require them to do so, and they have no warrant from either to exact reverence while they neglect their own duties.

The Sixth Commandment is—"Thou shalt not kill."

This forbids an abuse of Destructiveness. In natural theology we find that the dictates of Benevolence, Veneration, and Conscientiousness all conspire with the Commandment in forbidding violence; and, moreover, Combativeness and Destructiveness lend their aid in enforcing the precept, because they prompt society to retaliate and slay the killer.

The Seventh Commandment is—"Thou shalt not commit adultery."

This forbids an abuse of Amativeness. In natural theology the whole moral sentiments conjoin in the same prohibition; and they and the intellect carry the restrictions and directions greatly further. They prohibit marriages at ages too early and too late; marriages of persons related in blood; of persons who possess imperfect or immoral developments of mind; of individuals while labouring under any great constitutional malady. In short, natural theology interdicts many abuses of Amativeness not mentioned either in the Old or in the New Testament, and it shows its authority in the natural laws for its requirements.

The disregard with which the dictates of natural theology in this department are treated is to be traced to profound ignorance that God has issued the prohibitions. We are not yet accustomed to regard Nature as a revelation of God's will, or to direct our conduct by it; but this is either our fault or our misfortune, and it is wrong.

The Eighth Commandment is—"Thou shalt not steal."

This forbids an abuse of Acquisitiveness. In natural theology, Conscientiousness and the other moral sentiments concur in the denunciation of theft, and the intellect points out to the culprit that the individuals who are the subjects

of his depredations will visit him with a treatment which must prove painful to himself.

The Ninth Commandment is—"Thou shalt not bear false witness."

This forbids the action of the other faculties without the control of Conscientiousness; all the moral sentiments proclaim the same prohibition.

The Tenth Commandment is—"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," &c.

This forbids an abuse of Acquisitiveness combined with Self-Esteem in the form of self-love, seeking gratification at the expense of others. Conscientiousness and Benevolence are directly opposed to such abuses, and condemn them.

Thus the precepts contained in the Ten Commandments are enforced in natural theology by the dictates of the whole moral sentiments, and also by the arrangements of the physical and moral worlds, which bring evil on those who contravene them.

Trying these Commandments, then, by the standards of natural theology, we see no reason to question their inherently Divine character; for we find them all written in the natural record of the Divine will.

I may observe, however, that they are not complete as rules of duty. Firstly—they do not forbid, in express terms, abuses of Philoprogenitiveness, Self-esteem, Love of Approbation, Benevolence, and many other faculties; and secondly, they do not expressly enjoin the *direct exercise* of any faculty except that of Veneration. There is no commandment prescribing as a duty the exercise of Benevolence, Conscientiousness, and Intellect, or enforcing legitimate uses of Philoprogenitiveness, Adhesiveness, Cautiousness, &c.

The New Testament far excels the Mosaic law in supplying these deficiencies. First, Christ forbids the abuses of *all* our faculties; secondly, He enjoins the active and legitimate *exercise* of all of them; and, thirdly, He clearly proclaims the supremacy of the moral sentiments, or teaches the duty of loving our neighbours as ourselves; and natural theology coincides with, and enforces His commands.

It has been stated as an insuperable objection to these views that they entirely exclude the practice of prayer, praise, and devotion. If God govern by general and immutable laws, what, it is asked, is the object or advantage of offering Him any homage or service whatever?

I answer this question in the words of Dr. Isaac Barrow: "We do not pray to instruct or advise God; not to tell Him news or inform Him of our wants (He knows them, as our Saviour telleth us, before we ask); nor do we pray by dint of argument to persuade God, and bring Him to our bent; nor that by fair speech we may cajole Him or move His affections towards us by pathetical oration: not for any such purpose are we obliged to pray. But for that it becometh and behoveth us to do, because it is a proper instrument of bettering, ennobling, and perfecting our souls; because it breedeth most holy affections, and pure satisfactions, and worthy resolutions; because it fitteth us for the enjoyment of happiness, and leadeth us thither; for such ends devotion is prescribed."*

I here add the following sentiments expressed in "Theological Lectures at Westminster Abbey," by John Heylin, D.D., Prebendary of Westminster, and Rector of St. Mary-le-Strand.†

Discoursing "concerning prayer," Vol. I., p. 94, he says: "'*Your Father knoweth what things ye have need of before ye ask Him.*' These words are highly instructive, and may serve to give us a solid and practical knowledge of the true nature of prayer. The proper end of prayer is not to inform God of our wants, nor to persuade Him to relieve them. Omniscient as He is, He cannot be informed. Merciful as He is, He need not be persuaded. The only thing wanting is a fit disposition on our part to receive His graces. And the proper use of prayer is to produce such a disposition in us as to render us proper subjects for sanctifying grace to work in—or, in other words, to remove the obstacles which we ourselves put to His goodness."

The same views were taught by the philosophers of the last century. "The Being that made the world," says Lord Kames, "governs it by laws that are inflexible, because they are the best; and to imagine that He can be moved by prayers, oblations, or sacrifices to vary His plan of government is an impious thought, degrading the Deity to a level with ourselves."‡

* "First Sermon on the Duty of Prayer."

† 1749—Tonson and Draper in the Strand, 46.

‡ "Sketches," B. III., Sk. 3. ch. iii. § I. St. Augustin states views substantially similar in his 130th Epistle "To Proba," quoted in "The Church of the Fathers," 1840, p. 260.

The objection that natural theology excludes devotion and praise is equally unfounded. It, no doubt, excludes the exercise of both for the purpose of gratifying the Creator, by expressing to Him our approbation of His works and government. But if our moral and religious sentiments be deeply penetrated with a sense of our own absolute dependence on His power, and with admiration of His greatness and goodness; if our intellects be imbued with clear perceptions of His wisdom; if our whole faculties flow towards His laws and institutions with the most earnest desire to know and to obey them; and if we have been created social beings, so that our souls expand in vigour, augment in vivacity, and rise into higher sublimity, by acting in concert in the presence of each other: it appears to me that every form of worship and devotion which shall give expression to these states of mind is not only permitted, but is also enjoined, by natural religion.

It teaches us, however, humbly to regard ourselves as enjoying a vast privilege and as reaping an unspeakable enjoyment in being thus permitted to lift up our minds to God; and it extinguishes the thought as impious and unwarrantable that, by our devotions, we can render God happier or better; or pay back His boundless gifts to us.

Natural theology also discountenances every conception of our pleasing God by professions of respect which we do not feel, or of propitiating His favour by praises of His laws, while we neglect and infringe them. It also teaches that the whole of human kind are equally the children of God; because it demonstrates that He has formed after one pattern all the nations of the earth, that He governs all by the same laws, offers them the same means of happiness, and visits them with the same punishments when they transgress His statutes.

Finally, it attaches no value to opinions, faith, or belief, apart from actions; because it shows that it is only by practically doing that which God has prescribed in the record of His will that we can reap enjoyment or avoid evil. In short, it renders the *practice* of our duty a test of the *sincerity*, and the results of that practice a criterion of the *soundness* of our belief. This appears to me to be also the essential character of Christianity.

LECTURE XX.

OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED.

In concluding these Lectures, I beg your attention to a denouncement of the whole course of study in which we have been engaged, which appeared in the prospectus of *The Christian Herald*.* "All sorts of literary machinery, newspapers, lectures, treatises, magazines, pamphlets, school-books, libraries of knowledge, for use or for entertainment, are most diligently and assiduously set in motion, if not for purposes directly hostile to the Gospel, at least on the theory that men may be made good and happy without the Gospel; nay, though the Gospel were forgotten as an old wives' fable. It were well if they who know the wretched infatuation of such views were alive to the importance of at least attempting to set similar machinery in motion for the production of a religious impression."

The prospectus continues—"It is impossible, even if it were desirable, to check the current of cheap popular literature; but it may be possible, through faith and prayer, to turn it more nearly into a right channel."

The impossibility of *checking* is here assigned as the paramount reason for attempting to direct the current; whence we may infer that these respectable divines would have stopped it if they could. Let us inquire, therefore, with becoming deference, but with the freedom of men who have the privilege of thinking for themselves, into the grounds of these opinions and charges.

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the views of faith and doctrine entertained by our condemning censors are all sound; and let us suppose an angel to be sent from heaven to teach a celestial choral symphony to men, in order to prepare them, on entering the realms of bliss, to join in the strains of their new abode. This might be conceived without imagining the angel to create new faculties, his object being only to elevate, quicken, and improve those that exist in human nature. This would be an

* *The Christian Herald* was a cheap weekly periodical, conducted by members of the Church of Scotland, and devoted exclusively to religion. The prospectus was issued in January, 1836.

illustration of the relation in which supernatural truths would stand to the moral and intellectual faculties of man. The truths of Scripture would not create new powers and faculties in us; they would only purify, exalt, and guide those that we already possess.

I observe, further, that in this case those individuals who possessed the strongest and the best cultivated faculties of Tune and Time would be in the best condition to profit by the angelic teacher's instructions; and I ask whether those individuals who enjoy the most vigorous and best exercised moral and intellectual faculties will not, by parity of reasoning, be best prepared to profit by the lessons of Scripture?

How would it strike you, then, if the angelic teacher were to reproach the human professors of music whom he found on earth instructing their pupils in the best music which they knew, and teaching them the practice of the art, with the offence of treating the Divine symphony as an old wives' fable?

They might most reasonably answer, "O angel of light, we and our pupils are humble men, and we do not enjoy the gifts of inspiration. We cannot cause the solemn organ to roll forth its pealing strains until we have studied its stops, and accustomed our mortal fingers to press its keys. We cannot make the dorian flute breathe its soft melodies until we have learnt its powers, and practised the delicate movements without which it yields only discordant sounds. We mean no disrespect to your heavenly air; but we mortal men cannot produce music at all until the mental faculties and the bodily organs, on which musical skill depends, have been trained to the art, and we are now instructing ourselves in our own humble way. We are exercising our mental faculties and our physical powers to bring them into a condition to hear, feel, comprehend, and execute the exalted duty which you assign to us.

"Do not, then, reprimand us for acting according to our nature; help and encourage us, and you will discover that those of us who have most assiduously studied and practised our earthly music will most readily and successfully acquire your heavenly strains."

The angel might blush at this reproof. But the simile is applicable to the divines who now denounce us, the teachers of natural science, as guilty of impiety. The truths of Scripture are addressed to the identical faculties with

which we study human science. They are the same intellectual powers which judge of the evidence and import of Scripture, and of the truths of Chemistry, Geology, and Physiology; and they are the same moral and religious sentiments which glow with the love of the God of the New Testament and with that of the God of natural religion.

Nay, not only are the faculties the same, but their objects are the same. There are not two Gods, but one God; and there are not two lines of duty, but one law of obedience prescribed in both of the records. Christianity is not diffused miraculously in our day; and unless the sentiments and the intellectual powers to which it is addressed be previously cultivated by exercise and illuminated by knowledge, its communications fall on stony ground, and take no root.

In May, 1835, Mr. Duff, the Indian missionary, told the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland that, in consequence of the minds of the Hindus being entirely deficient in this previous exercise and training, the Gospel appeared to them actually like an old wives' fable. He preached it in its purity and its might; yet it fell dead on their ears, and was lost. What remedy did he propose? To do the very thing for which we are now vituperated by our reverend pastors: he begged the Assembly to provide funds to enable him to teach the rudiments of physical science and the elements of useful knowledge to the Hindus, to prepare them for comprehending the Gospel.

And he was right. The elements of science are the truths of God adapted by Him to the constitution of the human faculties, just as the atmosphere is adapted by Him to the human lungs, and the lungs to it. As the lungs are invigorated by respiring atmospheric air, so are the intellectual and moral faculties rendered alert and energetic, and prepared at once to discriminate and to appreciate truth by the study of natural science.

On the other hand, until the Hindus be so cultivated and quickened, they will be the ready dupes of superstition, and will not be prepared to reap the full benefit even of Christianity. Reflect on the state of Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and you will learn the consequences of profound ignorance of natural science on the religious condition of the people. Gross superstition holds the place of rational devotion, and senseless ceremonies are the substitutes for practical morality.

Our own population are more enlightened than the people of these countries, but they still continue too ignorant of natural science, and particularly of the philosophy of mind. As neither they nor their clerical teachers appear to give due effect to the truth which I am now expounding—that Christianity requires cultivated faculties before it can produce its full beneficial effects—I beg leave to illustrate this proposition a little more in detail.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, divines and the people at large, both in England and in Scotland, were in full possession of the Scriptures. The Reformation was completed, and printing was in active operation ; yet, in these centuries, clergymen sitting as judges condemned old women to the flames as witches. What was the cause of this barbarity ? At that time there was neither physical nor mental science ; the phenomena of Nature were supposed to be under the influence of magicians, of evil spirits, and of the devil ; and these unhappy women, the victims of ignorance, cruelty, and superstition, were believed to be in league with the powers of darkness.

It was the dawn of physical science that opened up the creation to the human intellect, and revealed it as the vast domain of God ; whereas, before that dawn, ignorant divines, with the Bible in their hands, had mistaken it for the realm of the devil. It was science that delivered the clergy and their flocks from the practice of cruelties from which the unaided Bible had not sufficed to protect them. It is no disparagement to the Bible to say this, because it was never intended to supersede the study of God's will as revealed in the records of creation ; and, in falling into superstition, the clergy and people were suffering the penalty of having omitted to discharge that duty to God and to themselves.

Again : when Rome was threatened with cholera, in the year 1835, the Pope and cardinals carried a black image of the Virgin in solemn procession through the streets ; while *our* public authorities, in similar circumstances, cleaned the whole city from filth, purified the alleys and confined courts by fumigation, provided wholesome food and clothing for the poor, and organised hospitals for the reception of the sick.

What was the cause of this difference of conduct ? Will our clergy represent the cause of this proceeding of the Italians to have been solely their want of the Bible ? This

may have been one cause; but it is notorious that both in our own country and in Protestant Germany, although the laity enjoyed the Scriptures, they continued superstitious, fierce, and cruel, until human science dawned on their minds, and co-operated with the Bible in developing the spirit of Christianity.

The Roman clergy and people were ignorant of physiology and the laws of the animal economy, and their dull minds perceived no connection between the disease and the condition of their bodies. Edinburgh, on the contrary, was the seat of an enlightened school of medicine, and her leading men discerned the connection between impure air, filth, low diet, deficient clothing, and disease of every kind. They therefore, although as ignorant as the Pope himself of the special causes of the cholera, knew how to act in conformity with the general principles of health.

How have we come to entertain views so much more rational than those of our Roman brethren? Not exclusively by studying the Scriptures, because the Pope and cardinals who prescribed that procession certainly possessed the Scriptures, although they may have withheld them from their flocks; but by the study of the anatomy and physiology of the body, and the laws of the animal economy in general. It will be admitted that the citizens of Edinburgh acted the more purely Christian part in this emergency. Yet their superior knowledge of physical science was one great cause of their superior Christian practice.

Why, then, should our clerical guides charge us with contempt of the Bible because we teach the people the very knowledge which serves to render them willing, able, and intelligent co-operators with the plans of Providence in the natural world, which guards their minds from becoming the slaves of superstition, and which, by cultivating their moral and intellectual faculties, renders them apt learners of the precepts of Christianity?

What, however, does Mental Physiology teach? It teaches the functions, uses, and abuses of each of our faculties; it shows us that the moral and intellectual powers are given to guide our inferior feelings; and it informs us that we must observe the organic laws in order to preserve our brains in health, otherwise our mental powers will be impeded and deranged in their action. It leads us, in short, to study *ourselves* and our relations to

the external world, and to practise the duties thence discoverable, as acts of obedience to the will of God.

The result is, that instead of being lost in a mist of vague notions of what constitutes sin, and what righteousness, our disciples are enabled to distinguish good from evil in the uses and abuses of their faculties. Instead of wandering amidst dark superstitions, and mistaking the natural impulses of the propensities for suggestions of the devil, and those of the moral and religious sentiments for direct influences from heaven, they recognise the true sources of both, and use the natural, and, therefore, the most successful, means to subdue the former, and to sustain, regulate, and direct the latter. They are taught to avoid the inconsistency of praying to God for health or other benefits, while they blindly neglect every law of physiology on which health, or the realisation of their other desires, depends.

We urge the imperative necessity of first obeying God's laws of health, established in our constitution, and His other natural laws related to the objects prayed for; and then, and then only, of venturing to ask Him for His blessing and His benefits. Instead of seeing in the external world only a vast confusion of occurrences, in which sometimes the good triumph, and sometimes the wicked—in which the imagination is bewildered, and the moral affections are disappointed in not recognising God—they are taught to study the different objects and beings in Nature; to trace their relations and laws; to mark their uniformity of action, their beneficial applications, as well as their noxious influences; and to regulate their own conduct accordingly.

Their eyes are thus opened to the magnificent spectacle of a world full of the wisdom and goodness of God, specially adapted by Him to man's moral and intellectual powers, pervaded in every department by an intelligible and efficient government, and the whole tending regularly and systematically to favour virtue and to punish vice. They recognise the duties of temperance and activity—of moral, intellectual, and religious cultivation—of affection to kindred—of the love of mankind, and of God—and, above all, of obedience to God's will—to be engraven on their bodily and mental constitutions, and to be enforced by the external creation.

Is it, then, treating the Gospel as an old wives' fable to

teach the people such knowledge as this? Is it "a wretched infatuation," on our part, thus to prepare the mind by a pure, invigorating, and elevating cultivation to receive, profit by, and practise the precepts of that very Gospel itself? And what are these divines themselves doing?

Again, Mental Physiology shows that moral and religious sentiments, enlightened by intellect, have been designed to guide the inferior faculties of man. By the study of Political Economy you will discover that the whole relations of the different members of the State, and also of different nations, towards each other, uniformly produce good when they are framed in accordance with the dictates of these superior faculties, and evil and suffering when they deviate from them. That is to say, when the laws of any particular people approach to the closest conformity with the dictates of benevolence and justice, they become most beneficial to the whole public body, and when they depart from them, they become most injurious. When a nation in its treaties and relations with foreign States acts on the principles of benevolence and justice, and limits its own exactions by these principles, it reaps the greatest possible advantages, while it suffers evil in proportion as it attempts to gain by selfishness, rapine, force, or fraud.

These truths, I say, are rendered clear by the combined sciences of Mental Physiology, which proves the existence, nature, and objects of our moral faculties, and Political Economy, which unfolds the effects on human welfare of different political, economical, and legislative institutions and systems of action. I appeal to every man possessed of common understanding whether teachers of such doctrines are or are not preparing the public mind for the practical development of that grand Christian condition of society in which all men shall endeavour to act as brothers, and shall love their neighbours as themselves.

Nay, not only so; but I request you to consider the futility of teaching these sublime precepts to a people left in the mazes of selfishness, which is their inevitable condition until their minds shall be imbued with the truth that the world is actually constituted in harmony with the dictates of the moral sentiments of man.

Your time will not permit me to extend these remarks further; but nothing would be more easy than to trace the whole circle of the sciences, and show how each of them, by unfolding the will of God in its own department, is, in

truth, a pioneer to the practical development of Christianity.

It is true that we do not carry them forward to these applications in our lectures, and I presume this is the ground of the charge against us. But why do we not do so? Because it is the peculiar and dignified province of the clergy themselves so to apply them. Would you reproach the ploughman who in spring tilled, manured, and sowed your field, because he had not in spring also, and with his plough for a sickle, reaped the crop?

Equally unreasonable and equally unfounded is this charge against us. We are the humble husbandmen, tilling, manuring, and sowing the seeds of knowledge in the public mind, and to the clergy is allotted the not less important charge of tending the corn in its growth and reaping the golden harvest.

The cultivation of the moral nature of a being journeying through life on his way to a future state bears the same relation to his preparation for eternity that tilling and sowing in spring bear to the reaping of the fruits of harvest. It is clear, then, that if we are cultivating, enlightening, and improving the mental powers of our audiences for the duties imposed on them in this world, we are rendering them also fitter for the next; and that divines should dovetail their own instruction with ours, in so far as we disseminate truth, and should carry forward the pupils to whom we have taught the rudiments of natural knowledge to the full perfection of rational and Christian men.

Here, then, I conclude this course of Lectures. It has embraced a mere sketch or outline of a mighty subject, and has been chargeable with many imperfections. I have spoken plainly and forcibly what appeared to myself to be true. If I have sometimes fallen into error (as what mortal is free from liability to err?) I shall be anxious to obtain sounder and juster views; but if I have in other instances given a more correct exposition of the order of the Divine government of the world and the principles of natural religion than you previously possessed, I hope that, trusting in the power of truth, you will neither be startled at the novelty, nor offended by the consequences, of the ways of Providence which I have expounded.

You have an admirable rule, however, prescribed to you for your guidance in the advice given by Gamaliel to the

high priest of the Jews. "If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, you cannot overthrow it" (Acts v. 38). If I have truly interpreted to you any of the works, and ways, and laws of the Almighty, His arm will give efficacy to my instruction; if I have erred, my words will come to nought: in either event truth will triumph, and we shall all become wiser and better.

THE END.

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
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